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— INTRODUCTION  
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
established in 1967, with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration 
(ASEAN Declaration) by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. When ASEAN was established, it was conven-
tional wisdom that the new organization would be short-lived and 
many observers thought that ASEAN would probably be destroyed by 
disputes between the member countries. Despite these early specu-
lations on its long-term viability, ASEAN has gradually grown as 
an important regional grouping, with increased recognition from the 
outside world, and has played a very significant role in the promo-
tion of regional co-operation in political and economic affairs 
during the last twelve years. 
The promotion of regional economic co-operation was the prin-
cipal objective of ASEAN at its founding in 1967. However, an 
analysis of the factors accounting for the formation of ASEAN sug-
gests that it was not established primarily as a vehicle for 
economic development in the member countries. The five countries 
grouped themselves together in 1967 mainly for political and security 
reasons. The political objectives of the five countries were two-
fold. The first objective was to build up regional political co-
hesion as a counter-weight to the great powers who appeared to be 
competing with each other in regional political affairs. The 
second objective was to strengthen the nationalSstability of the 
five countries in the face of the growing communist threat which 
was perceived to be of two kinds - an internal threat from communist 
( x) 
subversion and insurgency and an external threat from China. 
However, because of the sensitive nature of international and 
regional political environment, ASEAN was initially formally limit-
ed to activities such as the promotion of regional co-operation in 
economic, social, cultural, educational, scientific and administrat-
ive fields. These were areas of a non-controversial nature. 
The early 1970's marked the beginning of a new era in the 
Southeast Asian political environment. The U.S.A. was gradually 
withdrawing from the Vietnam war while developing friendly relations 
with China. The relations between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union 
had also entered into a new era and the word 'detente' became a 
watchword in the Soviet-American relations. The Great Cultural 
Revolution in China came to an end and China appeared to have changed 
its aggressive policy towards the ASEAN countries since the end of 
the Cultural Revolution. The Indo-Chinese war came toan end in 
1975 with the fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the 
communist •hands and the new Indo-Chinese communist states were pre-
dominantly occupied with the re-construction of their economies. 
All these factors combined to bring a relatively stable political 
environment into Southeast Asia in the mid-1970's at least for a 
short period. 
These political developments have had a profound impact on 
ASEAN. In particular,the changing attitudes of China towards ASEAN 
countries have considerably reduced the fear of external communist 
threat to them. That, in turn, has caused the ASEAN countries to 
place greater emphasis on internal political stability. As a conse-
quence, such issues as economic development and regional economic 
( xi ) 
co-operation have begun to gradually overshadow the previous 
regional preoccupation with security and defence. The ASEAN has 
realised that economic and social progress in the member countries 
is the best weapon to combat internal communist subversion and 
insurgency. 
As ASEAN economies are export-led economies, international 
trade plays an important role in the economic development of these 
countries. Except in the case of Singapore, the economies of the 
ASEAN countries are based on agriculture and mining industry. They 
produce raw materials and commodities which have been the main 
sources of foreign exchange for these countries. In recent years, 
most of the international commodity markets have been characterised 
by such features as deteriorating terms of trade, fluctuating prices 
and demand and increased use of substitution in consumer countries. 
The instability in the commodity markets has resulted in the instab-
ility of export earnings which in turn has considerably weakened the 
economic development of the ASEAN countries in recent years. One 
adverse consequence of this heavy dependency on the export of pri-
mary products has been the growing international indebtedness of 
the ASEAN countries as their export earnings have always been 
exceeded by their import expenditures. 
The recent efforts of the ASEAN countries to diversify exports 
through a process of industrialization have been weakened by a 
number of factors of which the marketing of manufactured products 
is the most important. The internal markets of the ASEAN countries 
cannot provide adequate outlets for goods manufactured in these 
countries due to the low level of the purchasing power of the people. 
(xii) 
Access to the markets of developed countries has been weakened 
• by the growing protectionism of developed countries against the 
manufactured products from developing countries. On the other 
hand, ASEAN efforts to expand intra-regional trade on manufactured 
goods have met with only a limited success mainly due to the 
economic nationalism of the member countries. 
In recent years, ASEAN countries have increasingly seen their 
current economic problems, such as instability in the international 
commodity markets, the growing international indebtedness and the 
protectionism of developed countries, as issues which required an 
integrated approach to achieve desired solutions. In this regard 
ASEAN countries strongly support the demand for a new international 
economic order and clearly stand to benefit if the proposed NIE0 
demands are brought into effect. 
Among the extra-regional political and economic forces which 
have influenced the ASEAN countries to further their regional inte-
gration process, the new international economic order holds an 
important place as it has provoked a considerable amount of policy 
consultation and co-ordination among the five member countries. 
The promotion of NIE0 goals has been the key objective of ASEAN 
in its extra-regional economic policy formulation, ever since the 
demand for a new international order was put forward by developing 
countries in 1974. Apart from the active participation in the 
activities of the group of 77, the five countries have increasingly 
worked together in recent years to present themselves as a united 
group not only in the international forums such as the UNO, UNCTAD, 
World Bank, IMF, etc., but also when they approach the developed 
(xiii) 
countries to deal with trade and other economic issues. The NIE0 
demands, in particular the Integrated Commodity Policy and its 
cornerstone the Common Fund, have been the focal points of ASEAN's 
dialogues with the U.S.A., EEC, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada in recent years. 
Based on the theme elaborated in the preceding discussion, 
this study attempts to investigate the growth and development of 
ASEAN since its inception in 1967 with particular reference to its 
policy formulation towards extra-regional economic issues. This 
study, however, does not examine the overall strategic balance in 
the region or detailed politics and economics of individual ASEAN 
countries, though these have a bearing on ASEAN's policy formulation. 
This study attempts basically to investigate the aims and objectives 
of ASEAN in its extra-regional economic policy formulation, the 
steps that have been taken by ASEAN to achieve its goals, and 
finally, the success and failures of ASEAN in its attempts to 
realise its aims and objectives. 
This study consists of five chapters and a concluding chapter. 
The first chapter deals with the growth and development of ASEAN 
since its inception in 1967 focusing mainly on the following aspects: 
co-operation in intra-ASEAN politics including defence and security, 
ASEAN's relations with China and the other Indo-Chinese communist 
states, neutralization of Southeast Asia and the growing importance 
of its economic aspect. 
The second chapter examines the role of ASEAN with regard to 
the promotion of regional economic co-operation, in particular in 
the area of intra-regional trade and industrial development. This 
chapter gives a particular attention to the proposals put forward 
(xiv) 
by the Kansu report (or the Austin Robinson report) for ASEAN to 
promote regional economic co-operation and the steps that have been 
taken by ASEAN to implement these proposals. The chapter also 
discusses the problems that ASEAN has confronted in connection with 
the promotion of intra-regional trade and industrial development. 
The third chapter is devoted to examining ASEAN's role regard-
in the promotion of the new international economic order goals. 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with 
the basic issues of the new international economic order and their 
implication for the ASEAN economies. In this regard three issues - 
the Integrated Commodity Policy, foreign indebtedness of the ASEAN 
countries and access to the markets ofdeveloped countries are given 
particular attention. The second part focuses on ASEAN's political 
and diplomatic role regarding the promotion of the new international 
economic order with particular reference to the commodity producer 
organizations and the extent to which ASEAN can exercise its pro-
ducer power to strengthen its international bargaining power. 
The fourth chapter deals with ASEAN's economic relations with 
the U.S.A., EEC and Japan. This chapter also consists of two parts. 
The first part deals with the origin and development of ASEAN's 
trade diplomacy and its main techniques such as collective bargain-
ing power. The second part is sub-divided into three sections. Each 
section deals with ASEAN's economic relations with the three economic 
powers mentioned above, on the following basis : problems and 
issues, the basic demands ofASEAN, the response and reaction of the 
country concerned and finally the achievements and failures of ASEAN. 
The final chapter discusses recent developments of ASEAN's 
economic relations with Australia. It focuses mainly on two issues 
- Australian Protectionism and the new International Civil Aviation 
Policy (ICAP). This chapter attempts to identify the essential 
interests of ASEAN in its economic relations with Australia, the 
steps that have been taken by ASEAN to promote its economic 
interests and the response of the Australian Government. 
CHAPTER I. 
ASEAN : GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1967  
This chapter outlines the growth and development of ASEAN since 
1967 with particular reference to four areas such as internal poli-
tical co-operation, ASEAN's relations with neighbouring communist 
countries, in particular with China and Vietnam, neutralization of 
Southeast Asia and the growing importance of its economic aspect. 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded 
on 8th August, 1967, with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration (or 
the ASEAN Declaration) by five Southeast Asian countries, namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN 
represents about 72 per cent of the total population and about 68 per 
cent of the total land area of the Southeast Asian region.
1 
Prior 
to the formation of ASEAN, there were the Association Of Southeast 
'Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO but neither could survive as a viable reg-
ional organization. ASA was established in 1961 by Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand 2 but collapsed mainly due to the conflict 
between Malaysia and the Philippines over rival territorial claims 
'to-Sabah. 3 ._Another reason for the failure of ASA was that it did not 
become a true regional organization as it did not represent all the 
countries of the region, in particular Indonesia, whose participation 
was regarded as absolutely essential for the formation of any viable 
regional organization. 4 The idea of MAPHILINDO was put forward in 
1963, by the then President of the Philippines, Marcapagal, but it 
was never institutionalised, mainly due to the confrontation between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. As Thunku Abdul Rahaman, the then Prime 
2. 
Minister of Malaysia, noted "MAPHILINDO was a concept founded on a 
racial idea and on the supremacy of the larger elements dominating 
the smaller ones".
5 
 
The initiating forces for the formation of ASEAN were twofold - 
political and economic. Principal political motivation was the com-
mon desire of the five countries to strengthen their national stabi-
lity through the promotion of regional political co-operation. During 
the 1960's, the political stability of the five countries was seri-
ously threatened by the growing communist activities which were carried 
out by internal communist insurgents either under the form of direct 
military confrontation or through other means such as the infiltration 
of trade unions, student groups, political parties and armed forces.
6 
In Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) continued to ex-
pand its subversive and insurgent activities, thus creating serious 
internal security problems to the government, while in Thailand, the 
government had to deploy armed forces to keep under control the rising 
guerilla activities carried out by the Communist Party Thailand (CPT), 
in particular, in the North Eastern areas. In the Philippines, a new 
impetus was added to communist activities with the establishment of 
a Maoist guerilla group called "The New People's Army", while in 
Indonesia, even though the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had ex-
perienced a severe set back in 1965, it appeared to be attempting to 
regain its strength. Compared to the other four countries, Singa- 
pore had the lesser communist threat mainly due to the heavy sup-
pressive activities of the government, but Singapore was very much 
concerned with the Malayan Communist Party as it appeared to be the 
main threat to the internal security of Singapore! 
 
The problem of security of the five countries was further 
3. 
complicated by the changing attitudes of great powers which appeared 
to be competing with each other in regional affairs. Malaysia and 
Singapore were considerably affected by Great Britain's decision to 
withdraw its troops from the region by the early 1970's under the 
east of Suez policy. In order to cope with mounting local opposition 
to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, under the administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, the U.S. government also appeared to 
have changed its policy towards Southeast Asia. The new policy in-
dicated the U.S. intention to disengage gradually from regional mili-
tary affairs by withdrawing the major U.S. military installations. 
The U.S. decision affected, in particular, the Philippines and Thai-
land of which latter was always regarded as the next target of the 
communists after South Vietnam. 
Unlike the U.S. and Britain, the Soviet Union appeared to have 
increased its involvement in the region, mainly due to the escalat-
ing Vietnam war and because of the worsening Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Conditions in China were in turmoil; it was the time during which the 
Cultural Revolution had reached its climax. One of the main object-
ives of the Cultural Revolution was to support actively all the pro-
gressive and revolutionary movements in other countries of which non-
communist Southeast Asian countries always ranked first. 
Within this overall framework, it was felt that some kind of 
co-operation in political affairs was necessary in order to lessen 
the vulnerability of the five countries to the communist threat, as 
well as to build up regional cohesion as a counter weight to the 
great powers. As insisted by the then Foreign Minister of Thailand, 
Thanat Khoman, "I feel the need for cohesive political co-operation 
among the nations in the area of Southeast Asia and Pacific region. 
4. 
... if we cannot work together, if we don't succeed in creating a 
Southeast Asian or Asian solidarity, we shall always be dominated 
by one power or another, by Peking, by Moscow or by Western powers."
8 
In the economic front, the principal motivation for the forma-
tion of ASEAN was the common desire to increase economic potentials 
of the five countries. Economic and social progress were seen as a 
principal means of strengthening national stability. As noted by 
Ferdinand A. Marcos, the President of the Philippines, H... on the 
question of security we have concentrated on economic problems. Of 
•course, the tool against subversion happens to coincidewith the solu-
tion to our economic crisis. Social or economic development when 
utilised as an instrument of social justice will answer these two 
•questions and thus the concentration on our economic problems. It 
is quite obvious that the most accepted and most effective instru-
ments against subversion and insurgency is, and will always be 
economic development and social justice." 9 
ASEAN: Co-operation i Politics 
To begin with, the first task confronted by the ASEAN countries 
was to solve their internal political problems in order to make 
ASEAN a viable regional organization. As in the case of ASA and 
MAPHILINDO, conflicting political interests appeared to be threaten-
ing to destroy the newly formed ASEAN. There was no better politi-
cal understanding among the member countries when ASEAN was formed 
and each one knew only a little about each other's aspirations, 
interests and problems. As a result, even after the formation of 
ASEAN, the five countries seemed to be rivals rather than friends. 
Indonesia and Malaysia seemed not to be friendly, even though 
5. 
the confrontation between the two countries was officially settled 
more than a year before the formation of ASEAN, and each one appear-
ed to be nursing suspicion, mistrust and illfeelings towards the 
other in their relations.
10 
Singapore, the smallest member of ASEAN, 
had strained relations with her two immediate neighbours - Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Malaysia had been hostile to Singapore since it 
seceded from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, while Indonesia was 
hostile because of the role which Singapore played against Indonesia 
during and after the confrontation. The relationship between the 
two countries became more hostile just three months after the forma-
tion of ASEAN, when Singapore implemented the death sentence on two 
Indonesian marines who were captured during the confrontation, des-
pite several personal appeals made by the Indonesian President 
Suharto to pardon them. The incident caused a chain of reactions 
in Indonesia. Irate students attacked the Singapore Embassy in 
Jakarta and the Singapore Ambassador was placed under protective 
custody. In response to mounting internal opposition and demand for 
more stern action against Singapore, President Suharto took steps 
immediately to place various limitations on trade with Singapore and 
Indonesian citizens were discouraged from going to Singapore. The 
two marines were immediately declared national heroesand buried 
with full military honours. 11 
In addition to these obvious conflicts, both Malaysia and Indon-
esia appeared to be uneasy and jealous over the growing economic 
prosperity of Singapore while Singapore was consistently afraid and 
suspicious of her two giant neighbours because of its relative small-
ness in land size, the nature of the ethnic origin of its population 
and its important geopolitical location in the Malacca Strait.
12 
6. 
The most prominent bilateral dispute in ASEAN was the territor-
ial conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over the possession 
of Sabah. The Sabah question had a long history dating from 1878, 
but the dispute did not affect the formation of ASEAN as neither 
Malaysia nor the Philippines was actively involved with the dispute. 
However, just six months after the establishment of ASEAN, the five 
members found themselves embroiled in the quarrel between Malaysia 
and the Philippines. The dispute was started with the Philippines 
claim to Sabah which was regarded historically as a part of Malaysia. 
The dispute came to a peak in November 1968 with the break in diplo-
matic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. In retrospect, 
the Sabah dispute not only had weakened ASEAN unity to some extent, 
but also was responsible for the suspension of all ASEAN activities 
for almost two years until the Philippines gave up its claim on Sabah 
in 1969.
13 
Apart from these obvious conflicts, the aspiration of Indonesia 
to be a regional leader, unresolved border problems between Malaysia 
and Thailand, and the activities of Muslim secessionist movements in 
the Philippines and Thailand remained as sources of irritation, 
friction and suspicion among the five member countries. 
The first few years of ASEAN could be regarded as a period dur-
ing which the member countries were predominantly occupied with build-
ing up a political consensus by mending political fences, learning 
to live together politically and getting a better understanding of 
each other's political, economic, social and cultural aspirations. 
Through the growing adherence to the cause of regionalism and readi-
ness and willingness to solve their problems by peaceful means, over 
the years, the ASEAN countries have been able to develop what has 
7. 
been described by the Foreign Minister of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam, 
"a habit of regional co-operation thinking, ... which barely existed 
before the setting up of ASEAN"
.14 
As a result, the conflicts and disputes such as mentioned above 
have gradually abated over the years. The most serious dispute - 
the Sabah question - came to an end with the Philippines' unilateral 
decision to withdraw its claim over Sabah in favour of Malaysian 
sovereignty. The two countries normalised diplomatic relations at 
the end of 1969, and in general Malaysian-Philippines relations after 
1970 have never been better. The relationship between Indonesia and 
Singapore has also gradually improved over the years. Within several 
weeks, the conmotion over the execution of two mariners had died 
down and Indonesia lifted its trade restrictions imposed on Singapore. 
The growing relationship was further strengthened by the first offi-
cial visit of the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1973. 
The visit had a _profound impact on recent Indonesian-Singapore re-
lations. As one commentator has described it "More than all trade, 
investment and official government contacts, even at ministerial 
level, this visit changed the political climate between the two 
countries. And perhaps the single most important act of Lee on this 
occasion was, when on his own volition and in a gesture of concili-
ation, he sprinkled flower petals on the graves of the two executed 
marines during a visit to the national cemetery for war heroes outside 
Jakarta")
5 
In concluding, it can be said that, especially in the years after 
1970, ASEAN has achieved marked progress in the sphere of internal 
political co-operation. During this period almost all the major 
internal political problems among the member countries have been 
8. 
solved, relations among themselves have markedly improved, and final-
ly ASEAN has manifested itself as a viable regional organization. 
The growing political consensus was further strengthened by the 
summit meeting of ASEAN heads of governments held in 1976 in Bali. 
The Bali summit, for the first time in the ASEAN history, provided 
a platform for the political leaders to meet each other and discuss 
ways and means of achieving political togetherness by solving their 
internal problems. These discussions resulted in the signing of 
the Treat of Amity and Co-operation which marked the formal achieve-
ment of a degree of political togetherness. By signing the Treaty, 
the member countries have, in principle, agreed to solve their inter-
nal problems on the basis of the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. It 
was further agreed that future relations among them should be main-
tained on the following principles 16 : 
(a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity and national identity 
of all nations; 
(b) The right of every state to lead its national existence 
free from external interference, subversion or coercion; 
(c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
(d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
(e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
(f) Effective co-operation among themselves. 
Co-operation in Defence and Security Affairs 
The establishment of a direct military alliance is not a 
declared objective of ASEAN; nevertheless, co-operation in defence 
and security has been given considerable emphasis since the very be-
ginning of ASEAN. It has been argued, in particular by Indonesia, 
9. 
that if the ASEAN wanted to anticipate and treat realistically the 
security problems faced by the member countries, consideration should 
also be given to developing the defence role of ASEAN itself.
17 
Divergent opinions of the member countries have prevented them 
so far from coming to a common stance over defence and security 
issues. In general, all the ASEAN countries have agreed to the idea 
that ASEAN should not turn itself into a direct military alliance 
which gives the Indo-Chinese communist states the impression that 
ASEAN countries once again are ganging upagainst them as some ASEAN 
members did before under the American umbrella during the Vietnam 
war.
18 
However, some ASEAN countries, in particular Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand have emphasised, from time to time, the nec-
essity to increase co-operation in security and defence affairs in 
order to prevent the neighbouring communist countries from exploit-
ing internal weaknesses of the ASEAN countries. The perception of 
Malaysia and Singapore is that security could be brought to South-
east Asia by a modus vivendi with China and the other Indo-Chinese 
states on the basis of peaceful co-existence and the recognition of 
and respect for the independence of Southeast Asia as a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality. 19 
Indonesia, in principle, supports the diplomatic drive of Mal-
aysia and Singapore to reach a modus vivendi with the Indo-Chinese 
communist states, but at the same time it wants this diplomatic 
drive to be strengthened by a strong fabric of regional resilience 
not only based on economic co-operation but also based on military 
co-operation.
20 
 This is mainly due to the fact that, Indonesia 
strongly believes that the Indo-Chinese communist states will exploit 
the internal weaknesses of the ASEAN countries by extending their 
10. 
support for local insurgent movements. As noted by the President of 
Indonesia, General Suharto, "Even if the new Indo-China regimes did 
decide to limit their application of communism to national develop-
ment and re-construction this would not mean their decision would 
have no effect on nearby non-communist nations. In my view such in-
fluence on neighbouring countries could take the form of communist 
solidarity - a manifestation of communist solidarity towards the 
communist parties and groups in neighbouring communist countries, 
which of course would certainly encourage the communist elements in 
.21 
these countries'. 
It seems that Indonesia's emphasis on military co-operation has 
mainly been motivated by self-interests as the Indonesian government 
finds it very difficult to organize an effective security network 
from Java over its huge territory which includes more than a thousand 
islands. Since Indonesia cannot do this job alone, Jakarta would like 
the co-operation of its fellow partners in formulating an effective 
regional security network. Similar views are held by the Philippines 
and Thailand.
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In conclusion, a jointly instigated ASEAN common policy on 
security and defence matters is yet to be formulated, but military 
co-operation between individual ASEAN countries on a bilateral basis 
is already a living reality. Indonesia and Malaysia have co-oper-
ated in the security operations against communist insurgents along 
the Kalimantan border while Thailand and Malaysia have also launched 
joint operations against communist guerillas along their common 
borders. An agreement has been reached between Indonesia and the 
Philippines to stage joint military exercises as a first step toward 
closer military co-operation between the two countries. Malaysia 
and Singapore are also working hand in hand to curb the threat posed 
by the Malaysian Communist Party. The five countries have also ex-
tended their co-operation to some extent in the area of exchanging 
security and military information with each other.
23 
ASEAN : Relations with China and The People's Republic of Vietnam  
As ArnfinnJorgensen-Dahl suggests, one important factor which 
has considerably influenced the ASEAN members to develop political 
cohesion among themselves is "... their perceived intentions of extra-
organizational and extra-regional governments and interests". He 
further continues "... these extra-organizational forces made them-
selves felt in a manner which led the members to search increasingly 
for a common stand on several important foreign policy issues".
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The formulation of an ASEAN common policy with respect to relations 
with neighbouring communist countries, in particular with China and 
Vietnam, has been the most important among these foreign policy 
issues, and has provoked a considerable degree of policy co-ordina-
tion and consultation among ASEAN countries. 
The formation of ASEAN was perceived by China and Vietnam (then 
North Vietnam) as the foundation for another anti-communist mili-
tary organization in Southeast Asia in addition to the already exist-
ing South-EastAsian Treaty Organization (SEATO). 25 There were good 
enough reasons for communist neighbours to believe that ASEAN was 
established against them. Internally in every ASEAN country, commun-
ist parties were outlawed, engagement in any kind of communist acti-
vities were made illegal and all the countries were heavily involved 
in suppressing the internal communist movements. For example, in 
Indonesia, after the abortive coup of Indonesian Communist Party 
12. 
(PK1) in September 1965, something like half a million communists 
or supposed communists were killed by the army in a counter coup 
led by General Suharto.
26 
In their external relations, two ASEAN members, the Philippines 
and Thailand, were directly involved in the Vietnam war against 
Vietnam while the other three members also appeared to be supporting 
overtly and covertly the U.S. intervention in Indo-China. In addi-
tion to their membership in SEATO, the Philippines and Thailand had 
bilateral military and security agreements with the U.S.A., and 
under these agreements the U.S. had agreed to provide military assist-
ance to these two countries in case of direct communist attack or 
internal communist subversion. Both Thailand and the Philippines 
had permitted the U.S.A. to use their lands for naval and military 
bases and these bases were directly used by the U.S.A. to carry out 
its military activities against Vietnam during the war. Malaysia 
and Singapore allowed their territories for Commonwealth armed forces 
which were also mobilised against Vietnam in co-operation with the 
U.S. military troops. Moreover, ASEAN was established just two 
years after the U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson had disclosed the 
new U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia; one objective of it was to 
encourage the non=communist countries, in particular, those border-
ing on or near China, to organise their own security system through 
the promotion of co-operation in economic and political spheres.
27 
As anticipated, the initial response of China and North Vietnam 
to the formation of ASEAN was very hostile and reactive. In the 
wake of the formation of ASEAN, the People's Daily of China des-
cribed the new organization as "... an out and out counter revolut-
ionaryalliance against China, communism and the Peop1e".
28 The 
13. 
Peking Review commented on ASEAN: 
an important link in the chain of the 
US-Soviet campaign against China is to actively 
rig up an encirclement of China. With this in 
mind the Soviet revisionist ruling clique has 
been fraternizing with the followers and lackeys 
of US imperialism in Asia - the reactionaries 
in India, Japan, Indonesia and other countries - 
and working out criminal designs against China 
with.them. Jointly instigated by the Soviet 
revisionist and the US imperialists, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia formed 
an Association of Southeast Asian nations a 
part of the US-Soviet anti-Chinese ring." 9 
• During the period between 1967-1970, ASEAN-Chinese relations 
were very hostile. China had repeatedly accused ASEAN of being an 
anti-Chinese military clique, while ASEAN responded to China's claim 
with repeated denials that it was an anti-communist military organ-
izatIon.
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 During this period, neither ASEAN nor China made any 
effort to develop friendly relations with each other. Two factors 
have combined to bring ASEAN-Chinese relations into a new era in the 
period after 1970. First was the changing U.S. policy towards South-
east Asia initiated by the President, Richard M. Nixon. The second 
factor was the changing attitudes of China toward ASEAN since the 
end of the Cultural Revolution. 
In November 1969, with a view to lessening the U.S. overseas 
burden, in particular the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, the 
U.S. President, Richard M. Nixon, enunciated the "Guam Doctrine" 
indicating the future U.S. role with respect to its world wide mili-
tary commitments. The Guam Doctrine outlined three principles as 
follows. First, th'e U.S. would keep treaty commitments. Second, 
the U.S. would continue to provide a shield if a nuclear power threat-
ened the freedom of its allies vital to the U.S. security. Third, 
in other types of aggression the U.S. would limit its involvement to 
14. 
providing economic and military assistance, while leaving the 
nation threatened to assume the primary responsibility of provid-
ing the manpower for its defence.
31 
One principal objective of Nixon's doctrine was to provide a 
more responsible role for Asian nations in their own defence. Thus, 
the Guam Doctrine gave notice to the non-communist Southeast Asian 
countries that they would have to rely more on their own efforts 
and not depend too much on the U.S. in connection with security and 
defence matters.
32 
 
Another important development of changing U.S. policy was the 
rapproachment between the U.S.A. and China. This indicated the U.S. 
departure from its traditional policy towards China based on the 
principle of containment of Chinese expansion and influences in the 
region. In other words, the new U.S. policy indicated that it would 
no longer consider China either as expansionist or as a serious 
threat to the international community.
33 
In February, 1972, Presi-
dent Nixon himself paid an official visit to Peking and met Chinese 
leaders including Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. They discussed 
various matters of mutual interest and during the discussions it 
was reported that the U.S. had agreed to accept the one China 
concept.
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There have been several factors for the changing attitudes of 
China towards ASEAN after 1970. First, in the post Cultural Revolu-
tion era, China has predominantely been concerned with the construct-
ion of its underdeveloped economy aiming at a rapid economic devel-
opment. This encouraged China to develop economic ties with outside 
countries whatever their political ideologies might be. Second, 
15. 
the worsening Sino-Sovietdispute has compelled China to change its 
hard line toward ASEAN, because China would like to see ASEAN 
developing as a buffer zone shielding her against possible Soviet 
domination in the region.
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 Third, China's nuclear development has 
also contributed to the moderation of her policies. This is mainly 
due to the belief that as a nuclear power she should behave much 
more cautiously in international affairs. Final factor is the 
changing perception of China on communist revolution in the ASEAN 
countries. As one commentator has described, 
"If the US is prepared to withdraw its navy, air 
force, army bases and subversive agents from 
Southeast•Asia, then Peking has every reason to 
be quite relaxed about terminating her material 
support for revolutionaries. She can afford to 
do this because she is confident the present ruling 
elite in this region will not be able, over the 
long run, to maintain themselves in power even 
with the aid of American, Japanese,or Soviet patrons. 
In the Chinese view the more the position of the 
local elite becomes dependent on alien advisors, 
technology,and capital, the sharper the resulting 
class inequalities and economic conflict will 
become. Eventually the breakdown of traditional 
communities, classes;and relationships which occurs 
when the disruptive processes of the free market hit 
a neo-colonial country will create its own recruits 
for revolution. There will be no need for external 
Chinese stimulation." 36 
As a result of the considerations mentioned above, China's 
attitude toward ASEAN has changed from "one of strong disapproval - 
to one of outright endorsement of ASEAN". 37 The first significant - 
manifestation in the changing attitudes of China occurred in 1972, 
• when China extended its qualified support for the proposal for the 
neutralization Of Southeast Asia initiated by ASEAN in May 1971, with 
a view to bringing peace and stability to Southeast Asia.
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In sub- 
sequent years, China continued to make numerous statements supporting 
ASEAN's attempts to achieve economic and social progress in the 
16. 
member countries, and in May 1976, on the occasion of the Singapore 
Prime Minister Lew Kuan Yew's visit to Peking, ASEAN was endorsed 
by the Chinese Prime Minister, Hua Kuo-feng with the following words: 
"The first ASEAN summit conference held not long ago 
reaffirmed its positive proposal for the establish-
ment of a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast 
Asia and achieved significant results in strengthening 
regional economic co-operation. We feel sure that so 
long as the peoples of the Southeast Asian countries 
uphold independence and strengthen their unity, they 
will steadily win new victories in the struggle against 
imperialism and hegemonism." J 9 
The ASEAN countries have quickly sensed the need for accommodation 
with China under these new political developments in Southeast Asia. 
A common policy to maintain relation with China is yet to be formu-
lated, but relations between China and individual ASEAN countries 
appeared to have gradually improved since 1970. 
Malaysia has been the first country of ASEAN to develop relations 
with China. The Malaysian move started in 1971 with support for the 
Albanian resolution to admit China to the United Nations.
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In subse-
quent years, with the consent of China, Malaysia sent several trade 
delegations and sporting teams to China and the growing relationship 
between the two countries reached its highest level in 1974 when 
Malaysia extended formal recognition to China by establishing diplo-
matic relations. The Philippines and Thailand were the next to de-
velop relations with China by following in Malaysia's footsteps. The 
Philippines normalised diplomatic relations with China in June 1975 
and was followed by Thailand which established diplomatic relations 
with China in July of the same year. 
In May 1976, the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew paid an 
official visit to Peking and discussed with Chinese leaders various 
matters of mutual interest including the expansion of trade between 
17. 
the two countries. During the discussions, it was reported that 
China had assured Lee Kuan Yew that China would not interfere in 
the internal matters of Singapore, in particular with the way in 
which the Singapore government deals with its internal communist 
insugents.
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However, Singapore has yet to normalise diplomatic 
relations with China. As Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl suggests, the appar-
ent reluctance of Singapore to normalise diplomatic relations appears 
to be due to "... what she thinks will be the reaction in Indonesia 
to a Peking Embassy in Singapore".
41 	
As a result, Singapore appears 
to be waiting until Indonesia normalises diplomatic relations with 
China. 
Indonesia is the only member of ASEAN which is still following 
a cautious, wait-and-see policy toward China. Indonesia broke diplo-
matic relations with China after the alleged China's participation 
in the abortive communist coup of 1965. In subsequent years the 
relationship between the two countries rapidly deteriorated as a 
result of Peking's alleged backing for the banned Indonesian Commun-
ist Party (PKI) and because of Peking's continued espousal of an 
armed struggle against Suharto's military government. With the chang-
ing attitudes of China toward ASEAN, Indonesia came under some pres-
sure to re-establish relations with China, but Indonesia appeared 
to have considerable reservations about the resumptions of diplomatic 
relations.
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Before the resumption of diplomatic relations, Indon-
esia wants China to meet certain conditions such as, that China 
should totally refrain from supporting the internal communist insur-
gents in ASEAN countries, that China should cease relations with 
the overseas Chinese living in Indonesia, and that China should 
abandon its "party to party" and "people to people" policies under 
18. 
which China claims to have the right to support revolutionary move-
ments in other countries. 44 
The first significant change in the normalisation of relations 
occurred in February 1974, when the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
Adam Malik, met informally his Chinese counterpart Chi-Peng-fei in 
Paris at the Paris Conference on the Vietnam Cease-fire Agreement. 
During the three hours long discussions, it was reported that China 
had assured Adam Malik that China would close its overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission, that overseas Chinese should be loyal to the 
host government, and that China would not support communist insur-
gents in Indonesia. 45 
After this meeting Adam Malik attempted to push the Indonesian 
government to re-establish diplomatic relations with China but his 
attempts failed because of the strong opposition of the leading army 
officials and the more conservative elements in the government 
circle. % However; Indonesian tough attitudes towards - China seem 
to have changed in recent years. These mellowing attitudes were re-
flected in the speech given by President Suharto on the independence 
day of 1977. Referring to the normalisation of relations with China, 
President Suharto declared that: 
"if ever our relations with other countries 
became cold or frozen, it was simply because 
of our determination not to tag behind any other 
country or be dictated to by any other country, 
regardless of its size or strength. Indonesia's 
suspended relations with the People's Republic of 
China should be seen in this light. If the two 
could respect and recognise each other's 
sovereignty and their respective internal affairs, 
and considered bilateral relations beneficial, 
and then there would not be any obstruction to 
their reconciliation and to normalization of 
relations." 47 
In concluding, it can be said that the normalisation Of relations 
19. 
between Indonesia and China is only a matter of time and there is 
considerable speculation that it will occur in the near future. 
ASEAN : Relations with the People's Republic of Vietnam  
Like China, Vietnam was a great rival of ASEAN until recently. 
There were two reasons for the Vietnam's opposition. First, until 
recently Vietnam believed that ASEAN was an imperial product designed 
against communism and the communist countries. Second, it was the 
antagonistic role played by the ASEAN countries against Vietnam 
during the war. 
The fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into communist 
hands in April 1975 was the main compelling factor for ASEAN to 
seek friendly relations with the new Indo-Chinese communist states, 
in particular with Vietnam. All the ASEAN countries feared that 
Vietnam would soon pose a serious threat to their national stability 
by encouraging internal communist insurgents. They were particularly 
concerned with the large amount of military hardware which was.cap-
tured by Vietnam with the fall of Saigon, and it was widely believed 
that Vietnam would soon spill over its military weapons to insur-
gents.
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As anticipated, just after the fall of Saigon, Vietnam 
called on underground communist movements throughout Southeast Asia 
to step up the fight to overthrow non-communist governments. Ex-
tending its fully pledged support for insurgent movements, Vietnam 
went further saying, "Communist victories in Indo-China and United 
States setbacks in the region had combined to the point where the 
prospects for revolt had never been so good".
49 
The ASEAN countries soon realized the necessity to come to terms 
with the new developments in Vietnam. Immediate steps were taken 
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to recognize the new communist governments in Indo-China and at 
their eighth meeting held in May 1975, the Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN expressed their readiness and desire to enter into friendly 
and harmonious relations with the Indo-Chinese states.
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In the 
subsequent year Vietnam was invited to send observers to the Bali 
Summit of 1976. The invitation was invariably turned down and 
Vietnam charged the summit conference, "... ASEAN's extraordinary 
summit conference this time is actively prompted by the U.S. with 
a view to speedy realisation of new schemes of intervention and 
aggression of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Obviously, the U.S. 
imperialists and the pro-reactionary forces in Indonesia and other 
countries in Southeast Asia have continued using ASEAN to carry out 
the U.S. neo-colonialist policy and to oppose patriotic and progres-
sive movements in Southeast Asia". 51 
The Vietnamese claim was unanimously condemned by the heads of 
ASEAN at the Bali summit. At the same time, they reaffirmed their 
readiness to develop friendly relations with Vietnam. Urging Viet-
nam to refrain from calling ASEAN an anti-communist military organi-
zation, the Philippines President Marcos declared that, "... ASEAN 
has no intention of provoking its communist neighbours and I hope 
the communist states would maintain a climate of peace and friend-
ship. I certainly appeal to them to eliminate these biases that 
ASEAN is an initiative on the part of any Western powers like the 
U.S." 52 However, up to the mid-1976, ASEAN's diplomatic drive to 
develop relations with Vietnam met with only a little success as 
Vietnam responded to ASEAN overtures suspiciously and cautiously. 
The initial change in the Vietnam'spolicy occurred in July 
1976, with the official visit to four ASEAN countries - Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore - by the Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Phan Hien. During his tour, he was reported to have said 
. that Vietnam no longer regarded ASEAN as an imperialist venture.
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The eruption of military clashes with Cambodia along with the worsen-
ing antagonism between Hanoi and Peking were the main reasons for 
the change. Under the new political climate, Vietnam felt the need 
for friends in Southeast Asia and not enemies which might ally them-
selves with China against her. As one commentator has put it: "No 
power feels comfortable being outflanked. And Vietnamese reckoning 
is that if it has to live with an unfriendly neighbour to the North 
and hostile one on its west, it simply cannot afford to antagonise 
those living to the south and southeast." 54 
From mid-1976 to the present day, Vietnam's policy toward 
ASEAN has gone through two stages. During the first stage which 
covered the years 1976-1978, Vietnam's policy was basically aimed 
at developing bilateral relations with individual ASEAN countries 
while withholding recognition of ASEAN. During this period, three 
official visits were made by-the senior political leaders of Vietnam 
- Phan Hien, Deputy Foreign Minister in 1976, Nguyen Duy Trinh, 
Foreign Minister in 1977, and Pam Van Dong, Prime Minister in 1978 - 
but each time they carefully avoided visiting all the ASEAN countries 
at one time as Vietnam wanted to •avoid calling those visits ASEAN 
tours.
55 
For example, during his tour in 1976, Phan Hien openly 
stated that his tour was not an ASEAN tour. He went further saying, 
"It is not our point to visit the ASEAN organization. What we are 
seeking is strengthening of bilateral relations".
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During this 
period, Vietnam's relations with all the ASEAN countries appeared 
to have gradually developed except with Thailand. Trade relations 
22. 
with Singapore continued to grow, despite some ill-feeling which 
arose in connection with the Singapore's refusal to return to Viet-
nam the Vietnamese hijackers of a Vietnamese aeroplane. Vietnam 
accepted the offer made by Malaysia to provide . technical assistance 
to the rubber industry. A Philippines' television team was per-
mitted to make a film in Vietnam, while proper relations were main-
tained with Indonesia. 57 
However, Vietnam's attitudes toward Thailand appeared to be 
somewhat hostile. The progress made in the early 1976 towards devel-
oping friendly relations between the two countries was considerably 
disturbed by the October 1976 coup in Bangkok which was seen by 
Vietnam as the re-emergence of reactionary elite responsible for 
bringing Thailand into the Vietnam war on America's side. The deter-
iorating relations between the two countries had been characterised 
by numerous accusations made by Thailand as well as by Vietnam 
towards each other. Vietnam accused Bangkok of persecuting the 
Vietnamese people - estimated 40,000 - living in Thailand, seeking 
to restore the U.S. military presence, and supporting anti-communist 
refugee groups to organize their counter-revolutionary activities 
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On the other hand, Thailand accused Vietnam of training and supply-
ing communist guerillas in Thailand -. 
Thailand's relations with Vietnam turned into a new era after 
the October 1977 coup in Bangkok that ousted the anti-Vietnamese 
• government led by Tanin Kraivixien. General Kriangsak Chamanand was 
appointed as the Prime Minister and under his rule Thailand changed 
its attitudes towards Vietnam and aimed at developing friendly rela-
tions. In December 1977, at a meeting held in Vientiane, Thai and 
Vietnamese representatives agreed to take immediate steps to 
23. 
normalise relations between the two countries. 59  
In the second period starting from January 1979, Vietnam 
appeared to have changed its policy from ardent opposition to a 
progressively more accommodating attitude toward ASEAN. It made 
various diplomatic overtures which included an offer to recognise 
ASEAN. Vietnam also pledged support for the implementation of the 
proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia.
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The new peace 
offensive was launched in the wake of mounting opposition by ASEAN 
to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and Vietnam's attitudes 
toward the refugee problem. ASEAN members jointly denounced the 
Vietnam's action and strongly demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Cambodia. ASEAN brought to Vietnam's notice the promises 
given by the Prime Minister Pam Van Dong, during his tour in ASEAN 
countries in 1978. It asked that these promises, which included 
the respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territor-
ial integrity, be kept. 61 In reply to the ASEAN request, in a 
statement issued by the Vietnamese Ambassador to Indonesia, Iran My 
stated that Cambodia was a special case and that Vietnam would abide 
by the policy of peaceful co-existence and non-intervention, the 
policy stated by the Prime Minister to the ASEAN countries. 62 
The Vietnamese refugee problem has been another concern of 
ASEAN in its relations with Vietnam. The five ASEAN countries are 
the first place of asylum for most Indo-Chinese displaced by war, 
or what they see as deliberate oppression of ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam. The total number of refugees in the ASEAN region is esti-
mated at about 300,000
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and the five countries have a vital inter-
est in getting the problem under control. On numerous occasions 
ASEAN expressed its deep concern over the problem and urged the 
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Vietnamese government to take steps to prevent people from leaving 
Vietnam. However, no concerted effort Was made to solve the 
problem. The numbers of the boat people continued to grow. The 
apparent failure of Vietnam to co-operate actively caused ASEAN 
countries to seek an international solution to the problem and in 
this regard, ASEAN took steps to convene a Multilateral Conference 
on the "boat people" in Jakarta, in May 1979. Vietnam was invited 
to participate, and during the discussions, it was asked to co-oper-
ate actively with other countries to seek prompt solutions to the 
problem. Vietnam's delegation led by Tran My promised to do its 
utmost to lessen difficulties caused for other countries in the 
region .
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At this meeting, Indonesia proposed to establish a temporary 
processing centre for refugees, and for this purpose Indonesia agreed 
to give one of its islands, "Galang Island", off Singapore. Indon-
esia had further agreed to give a second one, if necessary. The pro-
posed processing centre was estimated to cost U.S.$ 17 million, and 
would accommodate 10,000 refugees. It was expected to complete the 
centre within five months. 
Despite these differences remaining between ASEAN and Vietnam 
over the invasion of Cambodia and the refugee problem,in general, 
since the beginning of 1979, relations between the two partners ap-
pear to be gradually improving. Malaysia has improved relations 
with Vietnam more rapidly than any other ASEAN country. 
Neutralisation of Southeast Asia  
The establishment of a neutral Southeast Asia is another import-
ant foreign policy issue which has generated a considerable amount 
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of policy co-ordination and consultation among the ASEAN countries. 
The original plan was put forward by the then Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Thunku Abdul Rahaman, at the Sixth Ministerial Conference 
for Economic Development held in May 1971, and it was re-presented 
to the Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN held in November of the same year. 
The Foreign Ministers accepted Rahaman's proposal in principle, and 
the Declaration of Peace and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur Declaration) 
was drawn up. The aims stated in the Declaration are: 
To restore and establish the peace and stability of 
the region free from international tension and to 
endorse the political sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Southeast Asian countries on the 
principles of abstention from the threat or use of 
force, peaceful settlement of internal disputes, 
equal rights and self-determination and non-
interferences by outside powers. 
II. To convert Southeast Asia to a "Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality" free from any form or 
manner of interferences by outside powers. 65  
The fully pledged commitment of the members to bring a neutral 
Southeast Asia into being has been reaffirmed at every ministerial 
meeting and at the two summit conferences held since 1971, and it 
was embodied as a principle in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
issued at the Bali summit of 1976. Concerned mainly with security 
of the member countries, the proposal was founded on the belief 
that the only possible way to restore national as well as regional 
stability was to keep the region free from the intervention by great 
powers in regional affairs because they are the ones, as the Malay-
sian Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn insisted "... who cause the 
tidal waves of instability in the region".
66 
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As far as the neutralisation proposal is concerned, two short-
comings are immediately discerned. Firstly, the vagueness in the 
meaning and content of the declaration. Secondly, lack of common 
understanding among the member countries on the question of how 
neutralised Southeast Asia can be made a reality. 
Except for the simple identification that a neutral Southeast 
Asia was a 'desirable objective', and that the member countries should 
explore ways and means of bringing this desirable objective into 
realization, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration neither provides a clear 
definition of the proposal, nor indicates how ASEAN is going to 
achieve its desirable objective. In 1971, the Foreign Ministers 
appointed a committee comprising senior officials of the ASEAN countr-
ies to study and consider what steps should be taken to bring the 
proposal into a reality, and to reach a common understanding on the 
interpretation of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" in the 
context of Southeast Asia.
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Nine years have already elapsed since 
the Declaration was made 'public, but ASEAN has yet to make a common 
interpretation which can be accepted by countries outside ASEAN, 
in particular by the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China whose partici-
pation is regarded as essential, if the proposal is to be implemented 
effectively. 
In 1971, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, 
outlined three possible ways of bringing the proposal into reality. 
Firstly, to show ASEAN members themselves that they are sovereign 
free states free from external interferences. Secondly, to make an 
approach to other countries in Southeast Asia to commit themselves 
to the principle of neutrality. Thirdly, to make an approach to 
the big powers, especially China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union to 
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guarantee the neutrality.
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When the proposal was put forward, China expressed its readi-
ness to respect it but on the condition that all military alliances, 
bilateral aswell as multilateral, in which ASEAN countries were 
involved must first be abolished, that all military bases be abandon-
ed, and that American influences and engagements in Southeast Asia 
be brought to an end.
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However, in the wake of China's deterior- 
ating relations with Vietnam and the U.S.S.R., China appears to have - 
changed its attitudes and in recent years, various statements have 
been issued expressing its fully pledged support for the implementat-
ion of the proposal. China seems to have believed that the neutral-
ization of Southeast Asia under the ASEAN umbrella will be the best 
means of containing growing Russian and Vietnamese influences in 
the region. 
Vietnam has also welcomed the idea, yet at the same time she 
insisted that "... the first thing to do to make Southeast Asia a 
zone of peace, was to end U.S. interference and aggression, withdraw 
all U.S. troops, and dismantle U.S. controlled military blocs in 
the region".
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However, in the wake of the worsenin§ Sino-Vietnam 
dispute, Vietnam also appeared to have changed its initial stand and 
in June 1978, Vietnam put forward its own plan to ASEAN to make 
Southeast Asia a zone of peace, independence and neutrality. 71 As 
suggested by Vietnam, Southeast Asia was to be declared a zone of 
peace, independence and neutrality and such a declaration should be 
subscribed to by ASEAN as well as by Vietnam, Laos and Burma on the 
following principles: 
(a) Respect for the independence, sovereignty of each country 
and non-interference in their affairs; 
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(b) Rejection of all foreign bases; 
(c) Establishment of mutually advantageous relations; 
(d) Regional co-operation for the benefit of true independence. 
The Vietnamese plan was closely reviewed by the Foreign Ministers 
at their meeting held in June 1978, but no agreement was reached on 
the. question of how to respond to the Vietnamese proposal. 
The willingness and readiness of the Soviety Union to support 
the proposal was revealed by a Soviet good-will mission to the Phil-
ippines in 1976, but the Soviet Union did not disclose how it would 
extend its support.
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The only great power which has rejected the 
proposal is the United States and a State Department spokesman said 
that the U.S. had agreed in principle not to support the proposal.
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The reconciliation of current differences between ASEAN and 
communist countries over the present defence arrangements, seems to 
be the main impediment to the implementation of the proposal for a 
neutralised Southeast Asia. As stated by the late Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak "...the superpowers cannot expect to 
guarantee the neutralization of Southeast Asia, as long as there are 
foreign military bases in the region".
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With respect to the exist-
ing . military bases and defence arrangements, Razak said "... all 
countries in the region must ensure that they would not be used in 
any conflict. Ultimately when the big powers had accepted neutral-
ization, the question of bases and treaties would be phased out. 
If we get outside powers to respect us, then we do not need any sec-
urity arrangement..
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In conclusion, the proposal for the establishment of a neutral-
ised Southeast Asia still remains as a talking point rather than a 
commonly accepted objective. ASEAN has so far failed to formulate 
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a common approach to bring the proposal into a reality while 
communist countries have increasingly used the issue to woo ASEAN 
to fulfil their individual interests. 
ASEAN: The Growing Importance of Its Economic Aspect  
The promotion of regional economic co-operation was the prin-
cipal aim of ASEAN at its founding. The first objective of ASEAN, 
according to the Bangkok Declaration, is "To accelerate the economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership 
in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community in Southeast Asian Nations".
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Economic and social pro-
gress was seen as a principal means of strengthening national stabi-
lity of the member countries, as it provided more resources for 
the ruling class "... to ameliorate poverty and other problems 
arising from the existing social systems, to defuse the explosive 
social and racial tensions inherent in these societies and to en-
hance the credibility of the present political leadership to govern 
more effectively without having any political upheavals". 77 
As a result of these high expectations placed on the practical 
advantages of economic and social development, economic factors 
have played a very significant role in promoting intra-ASEAN rela- 
tions as well as extra-ASEAN relations, since its inception in 1967. 
The growth and development of ASEAN's economic role can be divided 
into two stages, from 1967 to 1976, and from 1976 onwards. During 
the first period, ASEAN made only a little progress either in intra-
regional or extra-regional economic co-operation. This slow pro-
gress was due to a number of reasons. 
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Firstly, the idea of regional co-operation was a new phenomen-
on to the ASEAN countries as they did not have any previous exper-
ience of such co-operation. Added to this was economic nationalism 
which caused the member countries to be more concerned with their 
national economies. As a result, they appeared to be reluctant to 
take any step which was incompatible with domestic economic policies. 
Secondly, in spite of the simple identification of seven areas, 
namely, economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and admini-
strative, and the indication that the member countries desired to 
promote their co-operation in such areas, the ASEAN Declaration, 
which was the sole constitutional basis of ASEAN up to 1976, did not 
provide any specific or planned economic programme for members to 
carry out over a definite period. Therefore, it took some time 
for ASEAN to work out appropriate areas on which they could promote 
regional co-operation. 
The third factor was the structural weakness which prevented 
ASEAN from developing its own bureaucratic system that was essential 
for effective policy formulation and implementation. National 
Secretariats were established in each member country and their task 
was to make recommendations to the Standing Committee consisting 
of the Foreign Minister of the host country and the accredited ambas-
sadors of the other four members. The Standing Committee was created 
to provide with continuity in between the meetings of the Foreign 
Ministers whose annual-. meeting was the highest decision making body. 
In addition, there were various permanent and ad hoc committees, whose 
task was to make recommendations to the national secretariats. This 
was certainly a very complicated system which consistently consumed 
a considerable amount of time in between the period of making 
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decisions and implementing them. 
The first nine years could be regarded as a period during which 
ASEAN was predominently engaged in explorative activities by estab-
lishing various committees. These committees were assigned to seek 
ways and means of promoting regional economic co-operation. During 
this period the following committees were established: 
1. Food Production and Supply - 1968 
2. Civil Air Transportation - 1968 
3. Communications, Air Traffic 
Services and Meteorology - 1968 
4. Shipping - 1968 
5. Tourism - 1969 
6. Finance - 1969 
7. Commerce and Industry - 1969 
8. Mass Media - 1969 
With regard to the promotion of intra-regional trade and 
industrial development, no satisfactory progress was achieved dur-
ing this period. However, ASEAN participated in a study carried 
out by the United Nations' experts group on ASEAN economies. The 
study group produced in 1972 a report that suggested three main 
techniques for the promotion of intra-regional trade and industrial 
development. But until 1976, ASEAN did not take any steps regarding 
the implementation of the proposed techniques. During the first 
nine years, ASEAN efforts were basically limited to the promotion 
of co-operation in non-controversial areas like tourism, cultural 
affairs, mass media and so on. 
With regard to extra-ASEAN economic relations, a number of steps 
were taken to develop economic relations with the EEC and Australia. 
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The Special Co-ordinating Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) and the ASEAN 
Brussels Committee (ABC) were established in 1971 to conduct trade 
and economic relations with the EEC, while the ASEAN-Australian 
Dialogue was founded in 1974. The ASEAN-Geneva Committee was formed 
in 1971 to formulate an ASEAN joint approach to the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations of GATT. However, taken as a whole, progress made 
by ASEAN in the sphere of extra-regional economic co-operation, 
during the first period, remained far from satisfactory. 
The second period, starting after the Bali summit of 1976, has 
been more important. During this period ASEAN has made modest pro-
gress both in terms of its internal economic activities and in terms 
of its bargaining with external parties. At the Bali summit, a 
decision was taken to re-structure the administrative machinery of 
ASEAN. Accordingly, in 1976, an agreement was reached to establish 
an ASEAN Central Secretariat consisting of a Secretary General, three 
bureau directors (economic, science and technology, social and cul-
tural), four additional administrative officers and clerical staff. 
What authority the Secretariat can exercise has not been fully de-
fined, but it is responsible for planning and co-ordinating the work 
of ASEAN. - 
The heads of ASEAN also agreed to allow the other Ministers 
Meetings in their respective fields, when required or considered 
-necessary, to discuss or lay out the programmes for co-operation in 
such fields. After the Bali summit, five other Ministerial Meetings 
have been set up as follows: Economic, Labour, Social Welfare, 
Education and Information. Of these, ASEAN Economic Ministers have 
acquired a place essentially equal to the Foreign Ministers and they 
have dominated in policy formulation and implementation in the 
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economic sphere since the Bali summit. In March 1976, the Econ-
omic Ministers decided to re-structure the existing committees on 
economic matters, and set up their own committees as follows: 
1. Committee on Trade and Tourism, 
2. Committee on Industry, Energy and Minerals, 
3. Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry, 
4. Committee on Transportation and Communication, 
5. Committee on Finance and Banking. 
The old committees have been merged into these new committees 
which are responsible to the Economic Ministers who in turn can 
communicate directly with the heads of state. 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord signed at the Bali summit 
provided a fairly detailed "Programme of Action' on the economic 
front thus filling the lacuna left by the ASEAN Declaration. The 
Programme has identified four major areas - basic commodities, 
industrial development, trade and international commodity problems 
and other world economic problems - in which the member countries 
,  
can promote their active co-operation
.78 
Thus in the period after the Bali summit ASEAN economic acti-
vities have spanned over a wide range of areas of which three areas 
are particularly important. They are: the promotion of intra-
regional trade and industrial development, an increasing partici-
pation in the promotion of the new international economic order 
goals, and co-operation in extra-regional trade. ASEAN's perform-
ances in these three areas are discussed in detail in the next four 
chapters. 
34. 
FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER. 1. 
 
1. The term Southeast Asia is used to describe the countries 
which lie between India, China, Australia and the open expanse 
of the Pacific Ocean. Source for the statistics: Arnfinn 
Jorgensen-Dahl, "Policy Externalisation in Regional Integration 
with Special Reference to ASEAN". Paper presented to Australian 
Political Studies Association Conference, Armidale, N.S.W., 
August 24-26, 1977. p. 2. 
.2. For a brief account on the factors accounting for the formation 
of ASA, see Charles E. Morrison & Astri Suhrke,Strategies of 
Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller States, 
University of Queensland Press, Queensland, 1978, pp. 266-268. 
3. Shee Poon Kim, "ASEAN : Politics of Regional Co-operation", 
Occasional Paper Series, No. 21, Nanyang University, Singapore, 
p. 3. 
4. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, December 1974, p. 280. 
5. Dick Wilson, Asia Awakes, Pelican, 1970, p. 280. 
6. Shee Poon Kim, op.cit., p.13. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Peter 
Kumpa of The Balitmore Sun, Ian Wright of The Guardian, 
(London) and John Sterling of The London Observer, Bangkok, 
10 February 1969. Permanent Mission of Thailand to the U.N., 
Press Release, 25th February, 1969. 
9. 10 Years ASEAN, 	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1978, p. 98. 
10. ArnfinnJorgensen-Dahl,. 
11. Barbara F. Pace, K. Yong, K. Raffertly and Bernard K. Gordon, 
"Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia : The First Two 
Years of ASEAN 1967-1969", Strategic Department Report, 
RAC-R.98.2, October, 1970, p. 39. 
12. ArnfinnJorgensen-Dahl, op.cit., p. 4. 
13. /bid., p. 5. 
14. Quoted -In Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, op.cit., p. 6. 
15. Ibid., p. 5. 
16. Article II, Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. For the full 
text of the Treaty, see, Appendix no.3. 
17. Barbara F.Pace & Others,-op.cit., pp. 9-10. 
35. 
18. The Times of India, 3.2.76, p. 8. 
19. ibid. Also see Shee Poon Kim, op.cit., p. 8. 
20. The Melbourne Age, 10.10.75, p. 8. 
21. Ibid. 
22. The Times of India, 3.2.76 
23. Djakarta Times, 25.4.72, p. 2. Also see Malcolm Caldwell, 
"Asianization", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 4, 
No. 1, 1974, p. 41. 
24. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, op.cit., 
25. SEATO was founded in 1954 with the signing of a collective 
defence treaty by Australia, New Zealand, France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, the Philippines and 
Thailand following the defeat of the French military troops 
in Indo-China. An agreement was reached by the member countries 
to phase out the organization with effect from 30 June, 1977. 
See Justus M. 'Vander-kroef, "The lives of SEATO", Occasional 
Paper No. 45, ISEAS, Singapore, 1976. 
26. Peter Calvocoressi,Tkrld Politics Since 1945, Longman, London, 
1971, p. 297; also see Herbert Feith, "Growth and Development 
in Asia : Some Criticisms of Conventional Approaches", Lecture 
to the Asian Leadership Development Centre of World Student 
Christian Federation, Tosanzo, Japan, October 1972, pp. 2-3. 
27. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Extra-Regional Influences on Regional 
Co-operation in Southeast Asia", Pacific Community, Vol.8. 
No. 3, April 1977, p. 414. Also see his, Southeast Asia and 
Theories of Regional Integration, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
Research'School of Pacific Studies, Australian National Uni-
versity, May 1975. Also see Barbara F. Pace and Others, op.cit. 
pp. 11-12. 
28. Quoted in The Strait Times, 14.8.67. 
29. Peking Review, December 1967, p. 41. 
30. See The Strait Times, 30.9.67, p.1; 17.12.69, p.8; 18.12.69, 
p.l. Bangkok World, 21.3.68, p.3; 13.8.67, p.3; 17.12.69, 
p.25. Manila Bulletin, 13.8.67, p.l. Djakarta Times, 16.3.72 
p.l. The Times of India, 31.8.67, p.3. 
31. See Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: 
A New Strategy for Peace, Presidential Report to the Congress, 
February 1970, pp. 53-70. Also see Lau Teik Soon (ed.) New 
Directions in the International Relations in Southeast -Asia, 
Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1973. 
32. Lau Teik Soon (ed.), op.cit., p. 49. 
36. 
33. /bid., pp. 100-101. 
34. Ibid. 
45. 	/bid., pp. 46-54. 
36. /bid., p. 49. 
37. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Policy Externalisation in Regional 
Integration with Special Reference to ASEAN", op.cit., p. 7. 
38. Ibid., p. 7. 
39. /bid., p. 7. 
40. When the Albanian Resolution was adopted Malaysia and 
Singapore voted for it. Thailand and Indonesia abstained 
and the Philippines voted against. The apparent disagreement 
of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines was not about the 
desirability of China's membership in the U.N. but about the 
question of whether Taiwan (the Republic of China) should be 
excluded from the U.N. on the admission of Peking. See 
Asian Almanac, 8.1.72. 
41. Far Eastern Economic Review, Year Book, 1977, p. 283. 
42. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, op.cit., p. 7. 
43. Charles E. Morrison & Astri Suhrke, op.cit., p. 221. 
44. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, op.cit., p. 7. 
45. Charles E. Morrison & Astri Suhrl<e, op.cit., p. 221. 
46. /bid., p. 221. 
47. Far Eastern Economic Review, Year Book, 1977, p. 190. 
48. The Pentagon has calculated that the North Vietnam acquired 
about US$ 2 billion worth of serviceable American-made 
planes, tanks, artillery pieces, ammunition and other 
equipment when South Vietnam fell in April 1975. 
The Strait Times, 26.6.75. 
49. The Melbourne Age, 6.3.76, p. 17. 
50. Asian Almanac, 10.10.76, p. 7879. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid., p. 7878. 
53. Asian Research Bulletin, Supplement, 6.7.76, pp. 224-225. 
54. The Strait Times, 5.1.78, p. 12. 
37. 
55. For example, during the first tour Thailand was excluded. 
During the second and third tours Singapore was excluded. 
56. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23.7.76,.p. 8. 
57. Harold Crouch, "Southeast Asia in 1977" in Southeast Asian 
Affairs, ISEAS-, Singapore, 1978, p. 4. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Asian Wall Street Journal, 26.1.79, pp. 1 & 10. 
61. Ibid. 
62. The Indonesian Times, 19.1.79, p. 1. 
63. Mercury (Tasmania), 16.5.79, p. 3. 
64. Ibid. 
65. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration s-igned by the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. For the full text of the 
Declaration see Appendix No.4. 
66. Asian Almanac, 	10.10.66, p. 7878. 
67. J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Neutralization: A New Hope of 
Southeast Asia", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.2, 
January 1973, p. 76. 
68. Asian Almanac,, p. 4981. 
69. J.S. Djiwandono, op.cit., p. 68. 
70. Asian Almanac, p. 4981. 
71. The Strait Times, 17.5.78, p. 1. 
72. Asian Almanac, p. 7996. 
73. /bid., p. 4982. 
74. J.S. Djiwandono, op.cit., p. 69. 
75. Asian Almanac, p. 4981. 
76. The Bangkok Declaration, Part II, Aims and Objectives. 
For the full text of the Declaration see Appendix No.l. 
77. John Wong, "The ASEAN Economies", ERC Occasional Paper 
Series, No.1, Singapore, 1977, pp. 7-9. 
78. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Part II, Programme of 
Action. For the full text of the Declaration see Appendix 
No.2. 
38. 
CHAPTER II. 
ASEAN: ROLE TOWARDS THE PROMOTION OF  
INTRA-REGIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. 
This chapter investigates the role of ASEAN towards the pro-
motion of regional economic co-operation with special reference to 
intra-regional trade and industrial development. These two areas 
have been the focal points of ASEAN's economic co-operation since its 
establishment in 1967. 
The Structure of ASEAN Economies 
The ASEAN economies have many differences, but also much in com-
mon. They are not only different in the size of economies, but also•
in their level or degree of economic development. Singapore is the 
most developed country of ASEAN with a per capita income of US$ 2594 
per year, while Indonesia is the least developed country with a per 
capita income of US$ 267 per year. Table 2.1 provides basic data 
of total and per capita Gross Domestic Product. 
Table 2.1  
Total and Per Capita Gross Domestic 
Product of ASEAN Countries - 1977 
Country Total GDP 
in US$m. 
Per Capita 
GDP US$ 
Indonesia 37269 267 
Malaysia 11020 896 
Philippines 17795 407 
Singapore 5915 2594 
Thailand 16283 379 
Source •: UNO National Account Statistics, 1977. 
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Table 2.2 provides data relating to the percentage value of 
sectoral contribution to the GDP of ASEAN countries. 
Table 2.2  
Percentage Distribution of GDP at Constant 
Prices. By Industrial Origin; 1976. " 
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Source : Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book, 1978, p. 72. 
Data based on ADB Key Indicators 1977 
As the table indicates, the agricultural sector still remains 
a major contributor to the Gross Domestic Product of ASEAN countries, 
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except in Singapore where the major contributor is wholesale and 
retail trade. Indonesia has the biggest agricultural sector which in 
1977, accounted for 36 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. In 
the same year, the contribution of the agricultural sector to Malaysian 
Gross Domestic Product was 30 per cent, while in the Philippines and 
Thailand, the amount was 26 per cent. The agricultural sector of each 
country consists of two sections - the small scale rural agricultural 
and the large scale commercial plantation sector. The products of 
commercial plantation sector, such as rubber, coconut, palm oil and 
sugar are the main sources of foreign exchange for these four countries. 
The second most important sector of the Indonesian economy is 
mining. The contribution of this sector to the Gross Domestic Product 
in 1977, was about 12 per cent. In Malaysia too, the mining sector 
is important, but it is not as important as in Indonesia, and the 
contribution to GDP in 1977 was only 4.3 per cent. 
The second most important sector of the economies in the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand is the manufacturing sector. 
The contribution of this sector to the GDP was 16 per cent in Malaysia, 
24 per cent in the Philippines, 20 per cent in Singapore and Thailand. 
In Indonesia, the contribution was only 11 per cent. The manufactur-
ing sector mainly consists of labour intensive industries except in 
Singapore, where the manufacturing sector is relatively diversified 
compared to the other four countries. 
All the ASEAN countries are open market economies. Hence inter-
national trade plays an essential and important role in the economic 
development of these countries. In other words, all of them are 
"export-led" economies. With regard to international trade, two im-
portant features can be seen. The •first one is the heavy dependency of 
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• ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore) on the export of primary pro-
ducts. The second one is their heavy reliance on industrialised 
market economies for their trade. 
ASEAN countries export mainly raw materials and commodities. The 
export of manufactured products appears to have increased in recent 
years, yet, traditional exports - raw materials and commodities - still 
dominate the export sector of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand accounting for 60-70 per cent of their total foreign exchange 
earnings.
1 
In recent years most of the international commodity mark-
ets have been characterised by a number of problems such as frequent 
fluctuations in prices and demand, increased use of substitutes and 
deteriorating terms of trade. Instability of the commodity markets 
has resulted in the instability of export earnings which in turn has 
adversely affected economic development in most of the ASEAN countries. 
As mentioned before, another important feature in the trade 
relations of ASEAN countries, is their heavy dependence on the markets 
of the industrialised countries, particularly those of Japan, U.S.A., 
and EEC. For example, in 1964, 70 per cent of the region's total 
exports went to industrialised countries which in turn supplied 66 per 
cent of the region's total imports.
2 
In 1977, 64 per cent of ASEAN's 
total exports went to industrialised countries, while ASEAN obtained 
57 per cent of its total imports from industrialised countries. 3 
These figures clearly indicate the degree of dependence of ASEAN 
• countries on industrialised countries for their trade. This high 
degree of dependence can be regarded as a direct result of the heavy 
reliance on the export of primary products. The industrialised 
countries of the West and Japan happen to be major consumers of these 
primary products. As a consequence of this heavy dependence, ASEAN 
42. 
economies appear to be always vulnerable to adverse developments 
in industrialised countries. That in turn, hinders them from more 
self-reliant economic development. 
Table 2.3 provides data relating to intra-ASEAN trade. 
• Table 2.3  
Intra-ASEAN trade  
Year 
Total ASEAN 
Foreign Trade 
(USSm.) 
Total 
Intra-ASEAN 
Trade 
(USSm.) 
Intra-ASEAN 
trade as Per 
Cent of Total 
Foreign Trade• 
of ASEAN 
1968 10,981 1,952 17.8 
1969 12,250 2,215 18.1 
1970 13,700 2,325 17.0 
1971 14,807 2,461 16.6 
1972 17,473 2,780 15.9 
1973 28,047 4,399 15.7 
1974 46,378 6,542 14.1 
1976 52,823 7,029 13.3 
Source: Amado. A. Castro, "Economic Co-operation in 
ASEAN", Paper presented to the Tenth Pacific 
Trade and Development Conference, A.N.U., 
Canberra, March 19-23, 1979, p. 14. 
As the figures indicate, not only does intra-ASEAN trade remain 
at a very low level, but also it is gradually declining. During the 
period concerned, intra-ASEAN trade fell by 4.5 per cent from 17.8 
per cent in 1968 to 13 ...3 per cent in 1976. This low level of trade 
among ASEAN countries can be regarded as another result of their heavy 
dependence on industrialised countries. 4 • 
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Motivations for Regional Co-operation  
Though ASEAN countries have long been regarded as "export led 
countries", it seems that the existing pattern of international trade, 
based mainly on the export of primary products (excluding Singapore), 
will not be able to lead ASEAN economies into a real take-off either 
in the short-run or in the long-run. The most effective way to reduce 
the current over-dependency on primary products is the export diversi-
fication which involves further attempts to expand the manufacturing 
sector. 
Recent efforts of ASEAN countries to diversify exports through 
re-directing resources into manufacturing sector have been weakened 
by a number of problems, the most important being the marketing of manu-
factured products. The marketing problem can be viewed from two 
angles. Firstly, the internal markets for manufactured products 
are very limited mainly because of the low level of purchasing 
power of the people. This is clearly evident from the fact that the 
existing markets have failed even to absorb the current industrial 
output produced by the five countries at their current production 
capacity. Therefore, until per capita incomes rise significantly, 
, it is difficult for ASEAN countries to adopt new industrialization 
policies aimed at the local markets. Secondly, access to foreign mark-
ets, in particular OECD markets, also seems to be limited, because of 
•the various protectionist policies imposed on the manufactured pro-
ducts of developing countries. As UNCTAD reported, "... the barriers 
to manufactured export from the developing countries are much more 
restrictive on the whole than those for manufactured exports from the 
developed 'countries".
5 	
International competition is another factor 
which limits ASEAN's manufactured products entering into developed 
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countries markets. 
It is quite obvious that the current problems and obstacles faced 
by ASEAN countries with regard to industrialization, may not be easily 
overcome by unilateral efforts. Therefore, the most effective and 
well accepted way to overcome these problems is regional economic 
co-operation, because such co-operation would provide the basis for 
ASEAN countries to
6
: 
(a) achieve incremental industrialization - to set up 
industries on a regional market basis, that cannot 
be economically set up on a national market basis; 
(b) rationalize existing high-cost national-market-based 
industries - to improve manufacturing economies 
through converting such industries into regional 
market-based industries; 
(c) Improve production economies by eventually 
regionalising the market for all products where 
significant production economies can be gained 
through increasing the scale of production. 
Techniques for Regional Co-operation : The Kansu Proposals  
The Kansu report (also known asthe Austin Robinson Report) is a 
' result of an economic survey carried out on ASEAN economies during 
the period of 1970-1972, by the Centre for Development Planning, 
Projections and Policies of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations in co-operation with the ECAFE, UNCTAD 
and FAO. 
The Kansu report suggests three possible alternative ways and 
means for ASEAN to promote regional co-operation on trade and indu-
strial development. The first is the selective trade liberalization 
in selected commodities to be implemented through inter-governmental 
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negotiations. This approach aims at providing an approximately 
balanced expansion of trade among the ASEAN countries. The long-term 
objective of this recommendation is to create a "free trade zone" 
in the ASEAN region by removing all tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions. 
Secondly, the report advocates Industrial Complementarity Agree-
ments. These kinds of agreement, according to the Kansu report, can 
be negotiated by representatives of the private sector in a specific 
industry so that they may work out together proposals for speciali-
zation and an exchange of products within the industry. As the Kansu 
report indicates, "... the complementarity approach permits an ad hoc 
approach to trade liberalization; it can be implemented progressively, 
it is highly flexible with the possibility of a different combination 
of commitments for each industry as well as freedom for any country 
to accept or decline membership of any particular industrial agree-
ment, it involves a minimum of initial expected risk and at the out-
side it commits governments only to a process of negotiation, rather 
than to outright obligations". 7 
The recommended product areas to be brought under the compli-
mentarity agreements covered: the production of appliances and appar-
atus, rubber products, motor vehicles, agricultural machinery, 
electrical and non-electrical power generating equipment, building 
materials, chemicals and petrochemicals, processed foodstuffs and 
drycell batteries. 
Thirdly, the report suggests package deal arrangements in the 
form of joint industrial projects. Under this approach, certain large-
scale industrial porjects are allocated to each member country for an 
agreed and limited period of time. Member countries should grant 
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unconditional trade liberalization measures and other necessary in-
centives to imports of the manufactured goods from the particular 
country to which the project has been allocated. 
The Kansu report has outlined thirteen possible joint industrial 
projects which can be brought under the package deal arrangements. 
They are: nitrogeneous and phosphate fertiliser, carbon black, demethyl 
terephthalate, newsprints, combustion engines, compressors, typewrit-
ers, heavy-duty rubber tyres, metal working machine tools, electronic 
tin plating, TV picture tubes, fisheries and potash. In addition, 
the Kansu report has further shown several other areas such as agri-
culture, forestry, shipping, monetary, finance and insurance in which 
ASEAN can actively promote regional co-operation. 
Implementation of the Kansu Proposals. 
Even though the Kansu report was put forward in 1972,prior to 
1976, only a little progress was accomplished with regard to the 
implementation of the Kansu proposals. 
In the period after 1976, there have been numerous efforts to 
implement all the three techniques suggested by the Kansu report. 
Initial steps were taken at the Bali summit meeting in February 1976 
and the second meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers held in March 
in the same year. At the Bali summit, the heads of ASEAN states un-
animously accepted that rapid economic progress in the member 
countries was essential if they were to deal actively both with inter-
nal and regional political problems. The heads of -states strongly 
emphasised the necessity to increase economic co-operation between 
their states and it was agreed to assign the Economic Ministers the 
task of seeking ways and means of promoting regional economic 
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co-operation in such areas as basic commodities, in particular food 
and energy, industrial development, intra-regional trade and inter-
national trade. They were also to consider an ASEAN joint approach 
to international commodity problems and the other world economic prob-
lems. The Heads of States also outlined the basic guidelines of 
future co-operation in intra-regional trade and industrial development. 
These guidelines were embodied in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. 
According to the Declaration, co-operation among the member countries 
on industrial development should be based on the following principles 8 : 
I. Member states shall co-operate to establish 
large-scale ASEAN industrial plants, particularly 
to meet regional requirements of essential 
commodities. 
Priority shall be given to projects which 
utilize the available materials in the member 
states, contribute to the increase of food 
production, increase foreign exchange and 
create employment. 
Referring to the promotion of intra-regional trade, the 
Declaration states 9 : 
I. Member states shall co-operate in the fields of 
trade in order to promote development and growth 
of new production and trade, and to improve 
further development and to safeguard and increase 
their foreign exchange earnings and reserves. 
Member states shall progress towards the estab- 
lishment of preferential trading arrangements 
as a long-term objective on a basis deemed to be 
at any particular time, appropriate through 
rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous 
agreement of member states. 
The expansion of trade among member states shall 
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be facilitated through co-operation on basic com-
modities, particularly in food and energy and 
through co-operation in ASEAN industrial projects. 
) , 
Major Developments in ASEAN Economic Co-operation Since  
the Bali Summit of 1976. 
(a) Liberalization of Trade  
• One important development in this area has been the introduction 
of preferential trading arrangements which came into effect in January 
1978, with the signing of the 'Agreement on Preferential Trading 
Arrangements' (APTA) by the ASEAN Economic Ministers at their third 
meeting held in February 1977. 
Under the Agreement, the five member countries have agreed in 
principle to "... co-operate through mutual assistance in respect of 
basic commodities, particularly food and energy, provision of market 
support for the products of the ASEAN trade and increase in the utili-
zation of raw materials available in the Contracting States". 1° The 
Agreement suggests five techniques for the introduction of preferent-
ial trading arrangements. They are: 
I. Long-term quantity contracts. 
II. Purchase of financial support at preferential 
• interest rates. 
III. Preference in procurement by government entities. 
IV. Extension of tariff preferences. 
V. Liberalization of non-tariff measures on a 
• preferential basis. 
According to the Agreement, long-term quantity contracts shall 
apply to selected products subject to specific agreements negotiated 
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by the member countries. The negotiated contracts shall be for a 
period of three years to five years, depending on the products and 
quantities to be agreed upon,andsubject to annual review where appro-
priate. The second technique may be applied to either exports or im-
ports from the member states of selected products of ASEAN domestic 
origin to be covered by the preferential trading arrangements. As 
regards the third technique, the member countries agreed to send pre-
tender notices for international tenders to the Missions of the member 
states in the relevant ASEAN capital. In this regard, the member 
countries have further agreed: "Subject to such provisions as may be 
embodied in supplementary agreement on Government procurement and to 
the rules of origin to be subsequently decided, Contracting States 
shall accord each other a preferential margin of 21/2% which should not 
exceed US$ 40,000 worth of preferences per tender in respect of inter-
national tenders for Government procurement of goods and auxiliary 
services from united loans submitted by ASEAN countries vis-a-vis non-
ASEAN countries". 11 With regard to the last two techniques, the 
member countries have agreed to accord an ASEAN margin of tariff pre-
, 
ferences which may be decided throughnegotiations on a product by 
product basis. 
The Committee on Trade and Tourism (CTT) is responsible for the 
conduct of negotiations on products which are eligible for tariff 
preferences. The trade preferences negotiations take place every 
quarter and the member countries have agreed that each member will present 
100 items for preferences at each round of discussions. Under the 
first agreement which came into effect on 1 January 1978, prefer-
ential trading arrangements were made on 71 products, and subsequently 
were extended to cover a further 753 products, bringing the total number 
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to 824. At their sev2nthmeeting held in December 1978, the Economic 
Ministers approved 500 additional items to be implemented with effect 
from 15 March 1979, thus bringing to 1324 the total number eligible 
for tariff preferences. These products are accorded reduced tariffs 
which range between 10 per cent and 30 per cent. 
At present, much emphasis has been placed on primary products. 
The member countries have reached an agreement to assist each other in 
the trade and marketing of rice and oil. Through preferential trading 
arrangements, member countries will accord each other priority to 
supply and priority of purchase in critical circumstances, in times 
of shortage and excess supply. For rice,ASEAN exporting countries will 
in time of shortage, give the ASEAN importing countries the option of 
first refusal on available supplies. In return, in time of excess 
supply, the ASEAN importing countries will give the option of first 
refusal on their commercial requirements to the ASEAN exporting 
countries. 
In the case of oil and oil products, an emergency-sharing scheme 
in circumstances of shortage and excess supply has been adopted. Accord-
ing to the scheme, in the case of critical shortage, oil exporting 
members of ASEAN will assist any member affected by an oil shortage 
while in the reverse case of excess supply, the exporting member 
countries will be assisted by others in preventing the effects of over-
supply from causing disruption in their economies. 
The current preferential trading arrangements do not provide tariff •
reductions for manufactured products. However, the five members have 
agreed to hold discussions continually on manufactured products on a 
product by product basis. Thus at the present stage, tariff prefer-
ences for manufactured products will be granted on the basis of offers 
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and requests. Such negotiations have already been undertaken, but no 
agreement has been reached to date on a collective basis. However, 
as a result of the efforts by Singapore, two bilateral 
agreements on manufactured goods were concluded in the early 1977, 
one between Singapore and the Philippines, and the other between the 
former and Thailand. By these agreements, the Philippines agreed to 
reduce tariffs on all the manufactured goods by 10 per cent, while 
Thailand agreed to cut tariffs by the same amount but on selected 
groups of manufactured goods. 
II. Co-operation in Industrial Development  
(a) Package Deal Arrangements  
•At the Bali summit, it was decided to assign the Economic Ministers 
to formulate appropriate measures for initiating co-operative action 
towards the establishment of ASEAN large-scale industrial projects as 
recommended by the Kansu report under the package deal industrial 
arrangements. The Economic Ministers were further instructed to give 
special consideration to the establishment of such industries as urea, 
superphosphates, potash, petro-chemicals, steel, soda-ash, newsprint, 
and rubber products. 
Just one month after the Bali summit, in March 1976, the Economic 
Ministers met in Kuala Lumpur to review the Bali proposals relating 
to the establishment of ASEAN joint industrial projects, and 
decided to appoint an Experts Group with the following terms Of 
reference
12
: 
(i) Examine the feasibility of immediately 
establishing the following projects as 
ASEAN industrial plants:- 
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Indonesia - Urea 
Malaysia - Urea 
Philippines - Superphosphates 
Singapore - Diesel Engines 
Thailand - Soda-ash 
(ii) Investigate the technical and economic 
feasibility of establishing additional 
manufacturing capacity within the region 
to supply regional requirements for 
newsprint and potash. 
(iii) Consult with one another on national 
programmes for development of integrated 
steel and basic petrochemical industries 
with a view to co-ordinating these programmes, 
avoiding unnecessary duplication and competi-
tion, so as to achieve maximum benefits for 
the ASEAN region as a whole, and 
(iv) Exchange information on various sectors of 
national industrial development programme 
with a view to identifying possibilities for 
complementation among the existing industries 
in the region. 
The Economic Ministers also agreed to invite member countries to 
propose other industrial projects for adoption as ASEAN industrial 
projects to be established and operated within a reasonable period. 
In this regard, they further agreed that the Experts Group should also 
carry out feasibility studies on the following projects:- 
 
0) Metalworking Machine Tools 
(ii) Fisheries 
(iii) Electrolytic tin plating 
(iv) Heavy-duty rubber tyres, and 
(v) Electronic components. 
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It was agreed that the five proposed industrial projects would• 
be established as joint ventures, with all the member countries parti-
cipating in the equity and sharing in the profits and risks. Each 
project was expected to cost about US$ 200-300 million, and would be 
built on a scale large enough to supply the entire ASEAN market. It 
was further agreed that the equity investment would be shared by the•
five countries in the following manner - 60 per cent by the host 
country and 40 per cent by the other four countries, each contributing. 
10 per cent. 
The five projects were launched with a view to speeding up the 
region's food production. Four projects - two urea plants, super-
phosphate and soda-ash - were mainly concerned with the region's 
fertilizer requirements while diesel engine plant aimed at supplying 
the region's agricultural machinery. 
To date, three feasibility studies - Malaysian and Indonesian 
urea projects, and Thailand's soda-ash project - have been completed 
and all of them have been approved by the Foreign Ministers. The 
Philippines have yet to complete the feasibility study. It has been 
reported that, if the allocated phosphate project be found not feas-
ible, the Philippines will propose a newsprint project. 13 Singapore 
has withdrawn its diesel engine plant as the member countries could 
not come to an agreement over the preferential trading arrangements 
for Singapore's diesel engine products. 
(b) Industrial Complementarity Agreements  
ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN - CCI) was organized 
in Jakarta on April 28, 1972, in keeping with the objectives Of 
ASEAN. One objective of the ASEAN-CCI is to create regional industry 
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clubs as the principal vehicles for implementing industrial comple-
mentation as suggested by the Kansu report. The following regional 
industry clubs have been formed under the auspices of the ASEAN-CCI. 
ASEAN-CCI Industry Clubs  
Product Line Founding Date Areas under Consideration 
n/a 
June 1976 
March 1977 
April 1977 
July 1977 
April 1978 
Nov. 1978 
July 1977 
April 1978 
6. Pulp and paper April 1978 
7. Rubber products May 1977 
8. Textiles Nov. 1978  
n/a 
parts complementarity 
proposal 
preferences, standards, 
joint research 
joint project, prefer-
ences, training 
complementation, 
standards, preferences 
joint storage, marketing, 
new processing projects, 
and preferences 
materials exchanges, 
joint marketing, parts 
complementation 
complementation, pre-
ferences, materials 
complementation of pro-
ducts, joint materials 
supply 
standards, complementation 
tyres preferences and 
customs standardisation 
n/a 
1. Agricultural 
• machinery 
2. Automotive 
• products 
3. Cement 
4. Chemicals 
5. Electrical and 
electronic 
6. Food processing 
7. Furniture 
8. Glass 
9. Iron and Steel 
Source: H. Edward English, "ASEAN's Quest for Allocative 
Efficiency in Manufacturing - Some Preliminary 
Perspectives on the Role of Complementation and 
Trade Policies". Paper presented to the Tenth 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference, A.N.U., 
Canberra, March 19-23, 1979, p.9. 
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Apart from these, six other industrial clubs are in the formative 
stages - those concerned with leather products, ceramics, cord ropes, 
twine and net, non-electrical machinery, shipbuilding and ship 
repair, and non-ferrous metals. 
The regional industry clubs are private sector organizations 
composed of associations or federations representing one particular 
industry. Each regional industry club is a self-contained organization 
with its own operational and administrative structure. However, they 
must work under the supervision of theASEAN Working Group on Industrial 
Complementation (AWGIC). For the formation of a regional industry 
club, at least three national industry clubs must have formed and con-
solidated into an organization. The organization must be recognized 
by the AWGIC and the ASEAN-CCI. Before a national industry club 
can join a regional industry club, it must get recognition and endorse-
ment from its national chamber of commerce. The basic objective of 
the industry clubs is to achieve industrial complementation within 
particular industries within ASEAN. 
The original guidelines for ASEAN industrial complementation were 
adopted at the eighth meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in 
May 1976, and subsequently they were further developed and expanded 
by the ASEAN-CCI. The new, guidelines are yet to be approved by the 
Foreign Ministers. However, on the recommendation of the ASEAN-CCI, 
the ASEAN governments have agreed to formulate a comprehensive guide-
line scheme to be used at the government level and for this purpose 
a team of experts has been appointed. 
According to the ASEAN-CCI guidelines, the industrial complement-
ation activities should be carried out on the following principles
14
: 
1. That a Complementation Project is a programme for 
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exchanging products, parts or components among 
the ASEAN enterprises, or other entities, accredited 
by the Committee of Industry of the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers. 
2. That ASEAN governments shall determine the value 
added percentage that must be the ASEAN content 
(i.e., exclusive or non-ASEAN materials and components) 
in order that the product of the complementation pro-
ject can constitute an "ASEAN product". 
3. That the ASEAN governments shall also have the power 
to determine "accredited capacity" covered by the 
complementation project that will satisfy "the needs 
of the ASEAN market at reasonable prices". 
With regard to ownership, the following arrangements have been 
adopted. Firstly, all the member countries are encouraged to parti-
cipate in the equity, with the major part of each project to be held 
by ASEAN nationals. Secondly, non-ASEAN participants are allowed to 
join industrial projects, but the membership should be approved by all 
members. In special circumstances control by foreigners is not pre-
cluded. Thirdly, avoidance of any discrimination against ASEAN count-
ries controlling property in a complementation project is assured by 
basic rights such as compensation for nationalization and access to 
capital and earnings. 
The guidelines provide the following protective and incentive 
measures in support of ASEAN national investors and duly accredited 
ASEAN industrial complementation projec•s.
15 
1. Access to all ASEAN markets is to be provided on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis. 
2. Preferential access relative to non-ASEAN products 
shall be established. 
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3. Assurance of continuity of access to relevant raw 
materials is to be provided by whole or partial 
exemption of such products from national taxes and 
import duties and appropriate use of long term 
contracts. 
4. Utilisation of ASEAN technology is favoured where 
possible. 
5. Preferences for ASEAN products shall be granted only 
where ASEAN content is sufficient, and governments are 
called upon themselves to adopt purchasing policies 
favouring ASEAN products. 
Other supports and incentives include control over competing productive 
capacity, liberal loan financing, special tax incentives, support 
services and infrastructure conducive to the success of complementa-
tion projects. 
The industries covered by the industrial clubs can be categorized 
into four. First, resources based processing and manufacturing indu-
stries with some world market protential. Second, resources based 
. industries with regional markets only. Third, relatively labour inten-
sive manufacture with some world market potential, and finally, capi-
tal and skill-intensive industries with mainly regional market potent-
ial. The following table provides a sumaryl by country of principal 
manufacturing development opportunities in sectors covered by indu-
stry clubs.
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Indonesia 
Malaysia 
- Wood products, including rattan and other 
furniture; Petrochemicals and products; 
Textiles and Consumer durable components. 
- Rubber products, processed foods - oils, 
spices, electrical and other producer 
equipment. 
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Philippines - Industrial chemicals, Forest products, 
including furniture and pulp, Textiles and 
Clothing, Industrial electrical equipment, 
Consumer durables components. 
Singapore 
- 	
Basic petrochemicals, Electronic products, 
Engineering, especially precision products. 
Thailand - Wood and rattan products, Processed foods - 
oils, livestock products, Specialised textiles. 
Conclusion 
Taken as a whole, ASEAN's performances in the promotion of 
intra-regional trade and industrial development, even after the Bali 
summit, remain far from satisfactory. Though recent developments in-
dicate that the five countries are fully aware of the advantages that 
may accrue from regional co-operation, there are many differences 
and disagreements among them over the form and pace of regional econ-
omic co-operation. 
One important area where many differences can be seen, is the 
regional specialization of industries. Since primary products consti-
tute only a very small fraction of total intra-ASEAN trade, the main 
scope for expansion of trade lies in manufactured goods. However, 
ASEAN has so far failed to reach consensus on a comprehensive trade 
liberalization programme based on the establishment of a free trade 
zone. The principal reason is economic nationalism resulting from 
existing differences in the level of industrial development and indu-
strial efficiency among the member countries. Though the establish-
ment of a free trade area will result in a more efficient resources 
• allocation, as well as accelerated investments, at this stage free 
trade seems to be politically not feasible because of the fear of an 
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unequal distribution of welfare gains. A comprehensive trade liberal-
ization programme may give unequal advantage to some ASEAN members 
who have more efficient industries so that industrial growth in the 
less developed members is adversely affected.
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At present only two members - Singapore and the Philippines - are 
interested in the establishment of a free trade area. The reason is 
obvious; they are the most industrialised countries of ASEAN. 
Malaysia and Thailand support the idea, but their attitudes are quite 
different from those of Singapore and the Philippines. Indonesia at 
present is not keen at all on a free trade area. When the proposal 
for the establishment of a free trade area was put forward by Singa- 
pore, the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, was reported 
to have said, "Singapore is a capital of shops. Lee Kuan Yew wants 
the business side of ASEAN to be the dominant of the organization. 
And if this is so, of course his dream will be to have a free trade 
zone, so that all his goods can enter Indonesia, with its population 
of 130 million people. Free trade will be the last objective for the 
progress of ASEAN. It was not trade, but industries that should be 
. 
developed. 18  
Owing to these conflicting economic interests, the establishment 
of a free trade area has not been accepted by ASEAN even as a near 
term objective. Instead, ASEAN opted trade liberalization through 
preferential trading arrangements which involves, "...rounds and 
rounds of meetings of Government official haggling and bargaining 
over most items, if not over all items, many of which may feature very 
insignificantly in current or potential intra-ASEAN trade".
19 
The proposed five industrial plants have also been surrounded by 
a number of problems. Singapore has already abandoned its diesel 
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engine plant. There are many doubts about the viability of industri- 
al plants allocated to the Philippines. Thailand and Malaysia, and 
all the governments have indicated that they will undertake the 
regional industrial plants only if they are economically viable. 
Indonesian urea plant is the only one which appears itself certain to 
come on stream in the foreseeable future.
20 
 
However, ASEAN has achieved somewhat satisfactory progress in 
such areas as science and technology, food production, shipping, . 
tourism, civil aviation, communication and cultural affairs. All 
these are non-controversial areas so that there is no reason for 
member countries to have conflicting interests. However, as far as 
the ASEAN's achievements in relation to its two main objectives - 
promotion of intra-regional trade and industrial development - are 
concerned, it can be said that, "... ASEAN economic co-operation to 
date has been characterised more by rhetoric and plethora of meetings 
than by concrete achievements. Underlying all the difficulties is 
the fear of an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens of co-
operation and the ,reluctance to subjugate economic nationalism to 
regionalism".
21 
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CHAPTER. .111 
ASEAN - AND - THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 
This chapter focuses on the political and diplomatic role of 
ASEAN regarding the promotion of the new international economic order. 
Part one of this chapter deals with the basic issues of the new inter-
national economic order and their implications for the ASEAN econ-
omies. The second part investigates the role of ASEAN regarding the 
promotion of the NIE0 goals including the factors weakening the 
effectiveness of ASEAN resources diplomacy. 
Since 1974, the Third World countries have been demanding the 
establishment of what is called a "new international economic order" 
to provide them with a more just share of the world's prosperity. The 
basic elements of the proposed new international economic order have 
been set out in three documents, namely; 
1. The Declaration and Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at 
its Sixth Special Session held in May 1974. 
2. The Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on 
Industrial Development Co-operation. Originally 
this was adopted at the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) General Conference 
held in March 1975. It was subsequently approved 
by the United Nations General Assembly at its 
Seventh-'Special Session. 
3. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
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adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in December, 1974. 
The first two documents contain various proposals put forward 
by the Third World countries with regard to the establishment of a 
new international economic order. The Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States attempts to obtain from developed countries certain 
legally binding economic and political commitments which would en-
able the realization of the objectives embodied in the first two docu-
ments. The Charter insists that every member country of the United 
Nations should strive to promote the establishment of a new inter-
national economic order based on "... equity, sovereignty, equality, 
interdependence, common interests and co-operation among all states 
irrespective of their domestic and social systems".
1 
The proposed new international economic order deals with several 
key economic issues which are of great importance to developing 
countries. These issues can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Stabilization of export earnings of developing 
countries including the improvement of terms of 
trade through the application of price stabilization 
mechanism for primary products. 
Reorganization of the international monetary system 
in order to finance more effectively the needs of 
developing countries. 
(iii) Acceleration of industrialization of developing 
countries through the transfer of technology to 
developing countries from advanced industrialized 
• countries. 
(iv) Free and improved access to the markets of developed 
countries for manufactured products of developing 
countries. 
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(v) Right to regulate and control natural resources of 
developing countries including the activities of 
transnational corporations. 
All these issues are of great, importance to ASEAN countries as 
they all deal with vital economic problems facing them currently. 
However, three issues - commodity price stabilization, the debt prob-
lem and access to the markets of developed countries - are of particu-
lar importance to ASEAN. Therefore, these areas must be further dis-
cussed in order to understand their impact on the ASEAN economies. . 
The principal objective of the new international economic 
order is to raise prices of commodities and raw materials exported by
• developing countries. In this regard UNCTAD had designed the so-
called "Integrated Commodity Policy" with the following elements: 
(i) The establishment of international stocking 
arrangements for a wide range of commodities. 
(ii) A Common Fund to finance the stocking arrangements. 
(iii) A network of medium to long-term arrangements 
between purchasers and suppliers. 
(iv) A system of adequate compensatory financing 
when export earnings fall off. 
(v) The creation of processing industries for primary 
products in the developing countries. 
The maintenance of a link between the prices of 
the exports of developing countries and the price 
of their imports from developed countries. 
International stocking arrangements or the so-called "buffer 
stock-system" can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Integrated 
Commodity Policy. The Main purpose of the international stocking 
arrangements is to buy primary products when they are over-supplied 
in the world market and release the stock in times of shortage in 
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supply. At the beginning, it was proposed to arrange buffer stocks 
for 18 commodities, namely, wheat, maize, rice, sugar, coffee, cocoa, 
tea, cotton, jute and manufactured wool, hard fibres, rubber, copper, 
lead, zinc, tin, bauxite, alumina and iron ore. 2 
The proposed Common Fund aims at financing the buffer stock 
arrangements. In March 1979, an agreement was reached by developing 
and developed countries to establish a US$ 750 million buffer stock 
fund with each nation participating in the fund contributing a mini-
mum of US$ 1 million. The rest will be contributed by negotiating 
groups as follows: Group B countries 68 per cent, Group D or social-
ist countries 17 per cent, Group of 77 countries 10 per cent and 
China 5 per cent.
3 
Multilateral commitments between purchasers and suppliers have 
been proposed as an alternative means of stabilizing the export earn-
ings of developing countries. Such commitments may be made by sign-
ing mutual agreements to sell and buy a certain quantity of a commod-
ity throughout the committed period. According to the UNCTAD, the 
multilateral commitments could be beneficial to developing countries 
... in view of the importance of commodities to developing countries 
and particularly to those who depend on only one or two staple pro-
ducts for their livelihood, it can be seen that a predictable volume 
of sales would be a boom to planners".
4 
The proposed compensation scheme aims at providing compensatory 
finance to developing countries when they are facing a short-fall of 
export earnings and when those exports are not covered by the price 
• stabilization arrangements such as buffer stocks and multilateral 
commitments. It has been suggested that the compensatory finance 
would be made either as a loan or a grant, and that it should be 
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repaid when the countries' export earnings exceed the normal earning 
level. According to UNCTAD, "Compensatory financing system should 
be considered only as a last resort, when all other stabilizing 
measures have failed or, in some instance, are not feasible. They 
must thus be regarded not as a substitute for but as a complement to 
other stabilizing elements of the integrated approach" . 5  
The fourth element of the Integrated Commodity Policy concerns 
the establishment of processing industries for raw materials and 
commodities in developing countries. As the developing countries 
argue, the expansion of processing industry would enable them to in-
crease the volume of export earnings, in particular, by selling value-
added by-products instead of selling just unprocessed raw materials. 
The last element of the Integrated Commodity Policy focuses 
on the price indexation system which has been proposed to link the 
prices of developing countries' commodity exports to the prices they 
have to pay for essential imports from the developed countries, in 
order to maintain the purchasing power of their exports. 
ASEAN and the Integrated Commodity Policy  
As noted in the second chapter, international trade has been 
the engine for economic development in the ASEAN countries. The 
export sector of ASEAN is still largely dominated by primary products. 
The figures given in Table 3.1 show the major commodity exports of 
the ASEAN countries and their percentage of total world exports in 
1975. 
As the table indicates, ASEAN countries are the major producers 
of several agricultural and mineral •raw materials in the world. 
They together account for nearly 83 per cent of the world total 
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Table 3.1  
Major Commodity Exports of the ASEAN 
Countries in 1975. 
(US$ 1000) Total As % of 
Total World 
Exports 
'Natural Rubber 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
782,254 
261,996 
Thailand 175,000 1,319,250 82.92 
Palm Oil 
Malaysia 594,524 
Indonesia 151,639 
Singapore 73,362 819,525 83.57 
Tin Metal (tons) • 
Malaysia 77,635 
Thailand 16,552 
Indonesia 14,488 108,675 71.77 
Coconut, Copra 
& Coconut - Oil --. 
Philippines 402,666 
Malaysia 27,511 
Singapore 16,708 446,485 63.62 
Rice 
Thailand 293,000 293,000 9.21 
Spices 
Malaysia 43,662 
Indonesia 22,867 
Singapore 45,769 122,298 57.16 
Su gar 
Philippines 580,736 
Thailand 281,122 861,858 7.26 
Forest PrOdutts 
Indonesia 679,064 
Malaysia 662,952 
Philippines 246,775 1,588,791 15.09 
69. 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
(US$ 1000) Total As % of 
Total World 
Exports 
PettOleum  
Indonesia 54,450 54,450 3.93 
— Copper 
Philippines 397,433 397,433 3.10 
(17.79*) 
• Note: * As a percentage of world trade in copper ores 
(i.e., excluding trade in metal). 
Source: Far Eastern.Economic Review, Year Book 1978, p. 70. 
natural rubber production, 84 per cent of palm oil, 72 per cent of 
tin, 64 per cent of coconut products and 58 per cent of spices. 
Commodity and raw material trade has been the main source of 
foreign exchange for ASEAN countries and it still accounts for near-
ly 70-75 per cent of their total foreign exchange earnings. Tabu-
lated below are figures relating to their principal exports and the 
percentage contribution of these to the total foreign exchange earn-
ings of the ASEAN countries. 
As the figures indicate, ASEAN countries are still largely 
dependent on few commodities to earn foreign exchange with the notable 
exception of Singapore. In 1974, Indonesia obtained about 87 per 
cent of its total foreign exchange earnings from three primary pro-
ducts - petroleum, rubber and timber. Three commodities - rubber, 
• 
• 
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Table 3.2  
Principal Exports and their Percentage Contribution 
to the Total Foreign Exchange Earnings of the ASEAN 
Countries in 1964 and 1974. 
1964 1974 
Indonesia: 
70.2 
6.5 
1.5 
9.8 
12.0 
Petroleum 38.5 
Rubber 32.0 
Coffee 3.6 
Tin 2.8 
Timber - 
Others 23.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Malaysia: 
Rubber 41.3 30.1 
Tin 21.4 14.7 
Saw Logs 6.0 8.8 
Saw Timber 2.7 4.5 
Palm Oil 2.4 10.7 
Others 26.2 31.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Philippines: 
Copra 21.4 5.1 
Sugar 19.9 27.0 
Copper 4.6 14.4 
Logs & Rimber 19.3 9.0 
Coconut Oil 8.1 14.0 
Others 27.1 30.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Singapore: 
Petroleum Products 13.1 25.8 
Crude Rubber 23.3 14.3 
Clothing 1.6 2.2 
Fixed Vegetable Oil 1.6 2.5 
Machinery & Equipment 4.7 16.2 
Others - 51.0 38.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Thailand: 
Rice 35.9 19.4 
Rubber 16.7 10.0 
Tin 7.8 6.2 
Maize 11.4 12.1 
Tapioca 5.3 7.6 
Others 23.0 44.7 
Total 100.0 • 100.0 
Source: John Wong, The ASEAN Economies: Development 
Outlook for the 1980's, Chopman Enterprise, 
Singapore, 1977, p. 16. 
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tin and palm oil - accounted for about 55 per cent of total foreign 
exchange earnings of Malaysia, while four commodities - copra, 
sugar, copper and logs & timber - jointly earned 68 per cent of the 
total foreign exchange earnings of the Philippines. In the same year, 
Thailand earned 48 per cent of its total foreign exchange earnings 
from four commodities - rubber, rice, tin and maize. 
One important conclusion that can be drawn from the figures 
given in Table 3.2 is the over-dependency of ASEAN countries on the 
export of primary products for earning foreign exchange. This over- 
' dependency has adversely affected their economic performance in two 
ways.
6 
Firstly, the short-term instability of the commodity markets 
is reflected in wide year-to-year fluctuations in prices and export 
earnings. This can be seen by examining the figures given in Table 
3.3. 
' As the table indicates, none of the five commodities - i.e., 
rubber, sugar, rice, palm oil and coconut oil has had stable price 
conditions in the international commodity market in recent years. All 
these commodities have been characterised by the problem of wide-
spread price instability which has been a major feature of most com-
modity markets since 1972. 
Secondly,' the adverse long-term trends in commodity markets 
are reflected in the deteriorating terms of trade which has further 
slowed down the growth of export earnings. Table 3.4 provides relat-
ing indices of the terms of trade for developing countries of primary 
products. 
The preceding discussion has outlined the close relationship 
that remains between the export of primary products and economic 
development of ASEAN countries. It has also outlined the extent to 
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Terms 
Table 	3.4 
of Trade of Developing 
Countries. 
(excluding Petroleum) 
1960 98 
1965 95 
1970 100 
1971 95 
1972 93 
1973 101 
1974 94 
1975 84 
1976 87 
Source: UN-Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics. 
which the market instability has adversely affected their economic 
performances. The discussion further suggests that the ASEAN 
countries are most likely to remain on the current pattern of exports 
for the foreseeable future until they diversify their exports on a 
broad basis. If this is so, then what would be the future demand 
and price conditions in the world market for ASEAN's primary products? 
It is true that most of the primary products exported by ASEAN have 
been blessed by recent commodity boom, but the World Bank predicts 
that the recent upward trend in the commodity prices is only a temp-
orary phenomenon and the prices of major commodity groups are most 
likely to fall to the average price level of the 1960's . by 1980 
except in the case of petroleum, bauxite, timber, sugar, beef and 
fishmeal.
7 
If the World Bank forecasts are correct, then only three 
commodities that are currently exported by ASEAN will have better 
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market potentials in the next decade. These three commodities are 
sugar, timber and oil but they constitute only a very small fraction 
of ASEAN's total exports. 
Thus, price stabilization of commodities as suggested by the 
Integrated Commodity Programme will definitely have far reaching 
beneficial effects on ASEAN economies. ASEAN has therefore lent 
strong support to the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities 
and to the Common Fund conceived as an integral part of that Programme. 
ASEAN has a vital stake in the programme as its member countries ap-
pear to be the most affected ones among the Third World countries if 
the Programme is brought into effect. According to UNCTAD predict-
ions "... if world trade in the 18 commodities (first list prepared 
by UNCTAD in 1975) proposed to be included in the Common Fund should 
be added up, ASEAN is the most affected region in the world. The 
ranking of individual countries trading in the 18 commodities shows 
Brazil first, Malaysia second, the Philippines third, Indonesia 
seventh and Thailand nineteenth". 8 
ASEAN and theInternational Indebtedness  
The growing debt problem of developing countries and the prob-
lems it poses for their economic development is another important 
issue to which developing countries seek solutions under the proposed 
new international economic order. Describing the factors accounting 
for the growing indebtedness of developing countries UNCTAD reports, 
"the traditional view has also been to look upon debt problems as 
having their origins in financial mismanagement and laxity in the use 
of borrowed resources; but the present context belies this view. 
Many developing countries today are in a position in which their 
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difficulties in shouldering the burden of debt-service obligations 
have little to do with their own actions but are the result of a 
concentration of external forces that has reduced their foreign 
exchange earnings and raised their import costs".
9 
Two reasons can be cited for the growing foreign indebtedness of 
the ASEAN countries. Firstly, as the UNCTAD indicates, it is a dir-
ect result of the concentration on external forces, because all the 
ASEAN countries have consistently had to depend heavily on foreign 
loans to cover the year-to-year widening deficit in the current ac-
count as their export earnings have always been exceeded by import 
expenditure. Secondly, inadequacy of local capital formation has 
caused them to depend heavily on foreign finance for the implementa-
tion of their various economic development programmes.
10 
Owing to 
these two reasons, over the years, all the ASEAN countries have been 
trapped in an ever widening international indebtedness and servicing 
of these loans has become a real problem in the sense that it has 
significantly impaired their ability to sustain a level of imports 
adequate to meet their economic development requirements. 
As the figures indicate, of ASEAN members, Indonesia is the 
country most affected by foreign indebtedness. Current estimations 
indicate that in 1980, Indonesia will have to allocate 18.5 per cent 
of its total foreign exchange earnings to service the foreign debt.
11 
The total foreign indebtedness of Indonesia is now estimated to 
exceed US$ 10 billion and the World Bank predicts that the actual 
debt service ratio in Indonesia will exceed the current estimate of 
18.5 per cent by the end of this decade and it will be about 20 per 
cent. 
12 
In terms of debt service ratio, Malaysia ranks second while 
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Table 3.5  
Foreign Indebtedness of ASEAN Countries - 1977 
(US$ million) 
Debt Service 2 Debt Service3 
Outstanding l Payments Ratio (%) 
Indonesia 11408.7 1299.4 11.9 
Malaysia 2053.0 442.4 6.5 
Philippines 2985.1 267.2 6.4 
Singapore 994.0 81.6 0.8 
Thailand 1050.6 126.5 3.4 
 
Note: 1. Disbursed only : data refer to debt 
outstanding at end of year. 
2. Service payments consist of principal and 
interest payments made in foreign currencies; 
data refer to transactions during the year. 
3. Service payments as percentage of exports 
of goods and services. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Annual Report - 1978. 
the Philippines is third. In these two countries, in 1977, the debt 
service ratio was 6.5 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively. 
Singapore and Thailand, compared to the other three countries have - 
the smallest debt service ratio - in 1977, 0.8 per cent and 3.0 per 
cent respectively. International indebtedness is one of the acute 
problems which face the majority of ASEAN countries currently. There-
fore, there is an imperative need for a moratorium on official debts 
because many anti-poverty programmes in these countries are being 
postponed as export earnings are switched to pay debts on existing 
loans. 
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ASEAN and the Access to the Markets of Developed Countries  
The protectionist policies of developed countries against 
manufactured products of developing countries have not only debili-
tated their (developing countries) industrialization efforts, but 
also have weakened their efforts to diversify exports. Referring to 
various tariffs that have been imposed by developed countries on 
manufactured goods of developing countries, UNCTAD reports, "Despite 
most-favoured nation tariff reductions in the post-war period as a 
result of trade negotiations in GATT, tariff protection in the post- 
war period remains one of the major obstacles to expansion and diversi-
fication of exports from developing countries. According to esti-
mates, tariff facing developing countries in these markets are, on 
average, about 50 per cent higher than those levied on imports from 
other developed countries". 13 
Apart from direct import tax, the manufactured products of 
developing countries are confronted with various non-tariff barriers 
such as health regulations, quota ceilings, discretionary licensing, 
other variable levies, labelling and certificate of origin regulations. 
These non-tariff barriers have further limited the entry of manu-
factured products of developing countries to the markets of developed 
countries. 
In order to ensure free and improved access to the markets of 
developed countries for manufactured products of developing countries, 
the following proposals have been put forward under the proposed 
new international economic order.
14 
1. Developed countries to take effective steps 
to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on a 
preferential basis on products of export interest 
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to developing countries. 
2 The Generalised Scheme of Preferences to be 
recognized as a permanent feature of inter-
national trading system and improved to include 
all products of interest to developing countries, 
at zero rates of duty and without quotas or 
ceilings or any other non-tariff barriers. 
3. Developing countries have a right to use export 
incentives to improve competitiveness of their 
manufactured exports; developed countries should 
recognize the need for a preferential treatment 
for the former in any new set of rules on subsidies. 
4. In Multilateral Trade Negotiations priority should 
be given, through special procedures for negotiations 
between developed and developing countries, to the 
elimination of all kinds of barriers to the exports 
of developing countries, on a preferential and non-
reciprocal basis, to the maintenance and improvement 
of GSP, and to the granting of preferential treatment 
in all the different areas of the negotiations so 
as to ensure net additional benefits for the inter-
national trade of developing countries. 
These proposals were closely reviewed at the recently concluded 
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations but no substantial trade concessions 
were offered to developing countries. As reported by the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, "The developing countries had hoped to take advant- 
age of the Tokyo Round to make the 30-year-old agreement more respons-
ive to their development needs. A legal framework group was set up 
with the task of updating certain of its provisions, but by the end 
of January, developing countries were convinced it was unlikely to 
achieve anything of substance. Its main achievement, from their view 
point, will be the so-called enabling act, which should provide a 
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legal basis for both the tariff preferences extended by industrial-
ised countries to the developing and for the preferences the latter 
may extend to each other."
15 
The issue of free access to markets is of great importance to 
ASEAN countries as the expansion of manufactured export is becoming 
an increasingly important characteristic of their economic develop-
ment. 
The process of industrialization in any country tends to go 
through two phases. The first stage is import substitution after 
which industries may become export oriented. During the first phase 
industries are set up to produce import substitution consumer goods. 
These industries are supported by the ready-made internal market 
created through the imposition of high tariffs to protect the infant 
industries from foreign competition. Once the easy first stage is 
over, these industries face a number of problems, one of which is the 
limitation of the internal market. Thus at the second stage, for 
the continuation of the industrialization process, it is necessary 
to convert these industries from import substitution to an export 
oriented basis. Thus free access to foreign markets is necessary if 
the industrialization process is to expand smoothly at the second 
stage. 
This principle applies equally to the ASEAN countries. When 
they began to adopt industrialization policies in the early 1950's, 
major emphasis was given to the establishment of small scale import 
substitution industries. At the beginning these industries seemed 
to be inefficient with an excessive cost level. However, over the 
years, they have been able to develop a number of highly competitive 
labour -intensive industries such as clothing, textiles, footwear, 
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leather goods, rubber products and beverages. Apart from this, 
since the early 1960's almost all the ASEAN countries have adopted 
policies to encourage the establishment of export oriented industries 
such as electronic products and more sophisticated consumer goods. 
Singapore, the most industrialised country of ASEAN, has now placed 
greater emphasis on the production of heavy manufactured goods like 
steel and metal products, automobiles, petrochemicals, computers, 
office machines, precision instrument, ship building, aircrafts 
and rapid transit systems. 
Expansion in the export of manufactured products in the ASEAN 
countries is not a temporary phenomenon but a constant development. 
A study carried out by the Centre for Research and Communications in 
Manila suggests that the consumer industries of the ASEAN countries 
are projected to grow by more than 6 per cent a year in real terms 
between 1973-2000.
16 
The report further shows that among the con-
sumer industries clothing, footwear and beverage industries would 
post annual growth rates of more than the average rates at 8.5 per 
cent, 7.7 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively. Among other indu-
stries, the fastest rising are industries in the field of electrical 
machinery, transport equipment, other machinery and chemicals all.of 
which might grow by about 8.5 per cent per year or evenslightly 
higher.
17 
Tabulated below are data relating to the growth of manufactured 
exports from the ASEAN countries between 1965-1976. 
As the figures indicate, the recent growth in the export of 
manufactured products by ASEAN countries has been very rapid, except 
in the case of Indonesia. However, during the same period, the share 
of ASEAN in the markets of developed countries declined from 63 per 
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Table 3.6  
Growth of Manufactured Exports from 
ASEAN Countries-  19651976  
(US$ million) 
1965 1970 1975 1976 
Indonesia 10.9 11.9 75.0 119.0 
Malaysia 67.8 151.7 664.4 798.5 
Philippines 65.8 78.4 258.9 396.8 
Singapore 300.4 427.6 2232.6 2920.3 
Thailand 12.1 38.6 332.0 510.6 
Source : Helen Hughes, "The Prospects of ASEAN Countries 
in Industrialised Country Markets". Paper 
presented to the Tenth Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference, A.N.U., Canberra, 
March 19-23, 1979, p. 25. 
Table 3.7  
ASEAN Countries' Exports by Destination 
1960 and 1976 
(% of total exports) 
1960 1976 
United States and Canada 30 16 
Japan 10 23 
Market economy Europe 19 17 
Australia and New Zealand 4 4 
Total, industrialised market 
economy countries 63 60 
European Centrally planned 
countries 2 3 
ASEAN countries 26 16 
Other developing countries 9 21 
Total developing countries 35 37 
Total 100 100 
Source : Helen Hughes, op.cit., p. 27. 
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cent in 1960 to 60 per cent in 1976. This is evident, when the 
exports of ASEAN are analysed on the basis of destination. 
As Table 3.7 indicates, during the period 1960-1976, ASEAN's 
share in the North American and non-communist European markets 
declined by 14 per cent and 2 per cent respectively, while •the share 
of theAustralian and New Zealand markets remained stagnant. During 
the same period ASEAN's share in the Japanese market increased by 
13 per cent from 10 per cent in 1960 to 23 per cent in 1976. But 
overall, the share of ASEAN in the markets of developed countries 
fell by 3 per cent during this period. 
The principal reason for the decline of ASEAN's share in the 
markets of developed countries, from ASEAN's point of view, is the 
protectionism of developed countries. This explanation, as Helen 
Hughes argues, is grossly exaggerated, but one cannot simply over-
look the high tariff imposed by developed countries on certain indu-
strial products like clothing, textiles, footwear and electronic pro-
ducts which are the main manufacturing products currently exported by 
the ASEAN countries.
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Falling tariffs; according to Helen, Hughes, 
... were critical to the developing countries' expansion of manu-
factured products exports at some 15 per cent a year from the early 
1960's to the mid 1970 1 s". 19  This was particularly critical to 
ASEAN countries where the potential for export of manufactured goods 
as a vehicle of economic development appeared to be much more sub-
stantial than most other developing countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
ASEAN: Political and Diplomatic Role Towards the New  
International Economic Order 
Though, the demand for the establishment of a new international 
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economic order was publicly aired in 1974, the foundation for the 
demand of 1974 was laid with the resolutions presented by the 
developing countries at the first meeting of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in 1964, seeking 
a new pattern of international trade, the stabilization of commodity 
prices at higher levels and more foreign aid for developing nations. 
In 1967, just three years after the first UNCTAD meeting, 
the Association of South East Asian Nations was formed and one of 
the declared aims of the new organization was, according to the 
Bangkok Declaration, "To collaborate more effectively for the greater 
utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of 
'their trade, including the study of the problems of international 
commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communi-
cation facilities and the raising of the living standards of their 
peoples". 2° 
Between 1967 and 1976, ASEAN's activities with regdrd to inter-
national economic and commodity problems were limited mainly to 
work carried out by non-aligned countries and the Group of 77. Three 
ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore - had actively 
participated in the discussions of the 4th Summit Meeting of Non-
aligned Countries held in September 1973, in Algeria. This conference 
is considered the first step towards setting up diplomatic and insti-
tutional machinery to promote the demand for a new international 
economic order. At the meeting, the heads of the non-aligned count-
ries expressed their disillusionment with international co-operation 
for economic development in the developing countries and called for 
a Special, Session of the United Nations General Assembly to be de-
voted exclusively to problems of development co-operation. (This 
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ultimately became known as the Sixth Special Session.) In the 
Economic Declaration issued at the end of the meeting, the heads of 
states outlined the conceptual framework for a new international 
economic order.
21 
Subsequently, the ASEAN members played an active role in the 
Dakar Conference on Raw Materials held in February 1975. The Con- 
ference carried out a detailed analysis of the fundamental problems 
relating to trade in primary products and other world economic prob-
lems. At the end of the Conference, the delegates issued the Dakar 
Declaration which is considered the second important step in the move 
towards the demand for a new international economic order.
22 
In August 1975, the ASEAN members participated in the formu-
lation of the Lima Declaration, the third important document pro-
duced by developing countries with regard to the establishment of a 
new international economic order.
23 	
In February 1976, the Philip- 
pines was the host country to the Ministerial Meeting of the Group 
of 77. At this meeting, the Philippines' President,Marcos, brought 
to the attention of delegates the establishment of a Third World 
Economic System in order to overcome the current restrictive trade 
practices of developed countries. According to Marcos, "A final and 
necessary component of a programme to build a Third World Economic 
Order is the expansion of trade and technological exchange among 
Third World countries themselves. This process can begin with such 
sub-regional groups as the ASEAN, later to expand into a regional 
group like the Latin American Free Trade Association and eventually 
into an inter-regional groups comprehending Africa, Asia and Latin 
America".
24 
In the Manila Declaration, issued at the end of the meeting, 
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the Ministers of the Group of 77 again expressed their disappoint-
ment with the poor support given by developed countries for measures 
to solve the economic problems facing developing countries and 
strongly urged the developed countries to take effective steps to 
implement the solutions embodied in the Algiers and Lima Declara- 
tions.
25 
Obviously, since 1967, ASEAN has played a key role in the 
group of 77 in promoting the NIE0 goals. As Professor Amado A. 
Castro notes, "In the Group of 77, ASEAN is perceived as a moderate 
grouping and now both the Group of 77 and the Group B (developed) 
countries are looking to ASEAN for leadership in bridging various 
'positions and bringing the Common Fund to fruition and the concerns 
of the LDC's with regard to the New International Economic Order to 
realization. There are already signs and there will be even more 
action showing that ASEAN desires positive results" 6 
The Bali Summit of 1976 marked the beginning of a new era 
of ASEAN's political and diplomatic role towards 'the new internation-
al'economic order. The realization of NIE0 goals, in particular, 
the Integrated-Commodity Policy and the Common Fund, was given a 
special emphasis at the Summit meeting and it was urged that the 
member countries should seek every possible means to bring the Inte-
grated Commodity Policy into effect. The heads of states outlined 
the basic guidelines of future ASEAN diplomacy concerning the 
realization of the NIE0 goals. These guidelines were included in 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, according to which, the future 
role of ASEAN towards the NIE0 should be based on the following two 
principles. 27 
1. The principle of ASEAN co-operation on trade shall 
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also be reflected on a priority basis in joint 
approaches to international commodity problems and 
other world economic problems such as the reform 
of international monetary system and the transfer 
of real resources, in the United Nations and other 
relevant multilateral forums, with a view to contri-
buting to the establishment of the new international 
economic order. 
2. Member states shall give priority to the stabilization 
and increase of export earning of those commodities 
produced and exported by them through commodity agree- . 
ments including buffer stock schemes and other means. 
At the second Summit meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in August 
1977, the ASEAN heads of states once again noted that the ICP was, 
fundamental to the developing countries' efforts to overcome commo-
dity problems and urged the developed countries to take steps for 
the early conclusion of negotiations on specific commodity arrange-
ments and for the early establishment of the Common Fund.
28 
Thus in the period after 1976, the realization of NIE0 goals, 
in particular, the ICP, has become one of the key objectives of 
ASEAN in its external economic policy formulation. During this period 
ASEAN has emerged as a strong collective bargaining force and the 
five members have increasingly worked together to present themselves 
as a united group, not only when they deal with developed countries, 
but also at the other international forums such as the UNO, UNCTAD, 
GATT, IBRD, IMF and so on. The NIE0 demands have been the main 
subject of trade dialogues held with the U.S.A., EEC, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
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ASEAN and the Commodity Producers Organizations  
In recent years, ASEAN members have increasingly participated 
in the establishment of various commodity producers organizations 
as part of its overall diplomacy towards the new international econ-
omic order. The principal objective of these organizations is to 
stabilize prices of commodities through the conclusion of agreements 
between the producer and consumer countries. Some of these organ-
izations have been initiated by ASEAN itself, while in the establish-
ment of others ASEAN has played an important role. So far the 
following organizations have been established. 
The Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries  (ANPRC) 
The ANPRCwas established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thai-
land, Singapore, Sri Lanka and South Vietnam at the Conference of 
Natural Rubber Producing Countries held in Kuala Lumpur. The Confer-
ence was convened by Malaysia to discuss the possibility of formulat-
ing a joint approach of rubber producing countries to stabilize the 
price of natural rubber.
29 
The main objective of the ANPRC is to 
map out a price stabilization programme for natural rubber through 
the formulation of an international rubber agreement between 
producer and consumer countries. 
As a result of the efforts made by the ANPRC, in 1978, the 
major rubber producer and consumer countries met in Kuala Lumpur 
to discuss the possibility of formulating a price stabilization 
scheme for natural rubber. At this meeting, the producer countries 
put forward a proposal to establish an international rubber agree-
ment based on the following elements.
30 
1. The establishment of a 4,000,000 tonnes buffer stock 
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with 3,000,000 tonnes to be provided by the 
producer and consumer countries and 1,000,000 
tonnes to be derived from the UNCTAD Common Fund. 
2. The establishment of an International Rubber 
Council to operate the scheme, with votes in the 
Council shared equally by exporting and importing 
members. 
3. The Council would be permitted to borrow from the 
capital markets to increase the buffer stock beyond 
the agreed level if necessary. 
4. The exporting and importing groups, each would 
contribute 100,000 tonnes of rubber or its 
equivalent in cash, the allocation of contributions 
among the countries would be in proportion to their 
voting power. The remaining 100,000 tonnes would 
be contributed in equal shares by all member countries. 
5. The agreement would be for a period of five years. 
• No agreement was reached On the proposed scheme, but the 
participants agreed to use the above suggestions as the basis for 
the forthcoming rubber talks due to be conveneeby the UNCTAD. 
Discussions are already underway at UNCTAD on the formulation of an 
international rubber agreement and there is a strong possibility of 
concluding such an agreement in the near future. 
International Tin Agreement  
The first tin agreement was concluded in 1953,
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well before the 
establishment of ASEAN, but it had played a key role in signing the 
fifth International Tin Agreement which came into being on 1 July 
1976. Basically, the Agreement seeks to stabilize tin prices within 
agreed price limits. This is done mainly through a buffer stock 
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which buys tin to defend a ceiling. In addition, the Agreement per- 
mits the imposition of export controls in defending the floor price. 
According to the Agreement the buffer stock is financed 
through compulsory contributions by producer-members to a total 
equivalent of 20,000 tonnes of tin metal and through voluntary contri-
butions by consumer-members to a total equivalent of an additional 
20,000 tonnes of tin metal. Cash contribution must be made at the 
floor price prevailing at the time when the fifth Agreement came 
into being. 
Decisions on price ranges, export controls, and other matters 
are made by the International Tin Council (ITC). Producers and 
consumers share voting power equally, with each group holding 1,000 
votes. All decisions require at least a majority of both groups 
voting separately. The three ASEAN members, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand hold a commanding position in the Tin Agreement as their 
voting power accounts for about 73 per cent of the total voting 
rights held by producer-members.
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The Asian Coconut Community  
The Asian Coconut Community was established by an agreement 
reached by India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri : Lanka 
and Thailand in October 1968. The member countries agreed to pro-
mote co-operation in such areas as the exchange of information on 
marketing, research activities, quality control, land productivity 
technology, pest control and price stabilization of coconut 
•products.
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•The Pepper Community  
The Pepper Community was established in 1970 with Malaysia, 
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Indonesia and India as founder members. They, together, account 
for nearly 80 per cent of world total pepper production. The other 
pepper producing countries - Sri Lanka, Brazil, Cambodia and Thai-
land - have been invited to join the community. It was agreed 
that the member countries would co-ordinate research activities 
on the technical and economic aspect of the pepper production. It 
was further agreed that the member countries should co-operate in 
such matters as the promotion of increased consumption, enlargement 
of markets and price stabilization. 34 
Inter-governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) 
CIPEC members are Indonesia, Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia and 
two associates - Australia and Papua New Guinea. CIPEC accounts 
for about 72 per cent of internationally traded copper or 45 per 
cent of free world mine production. On the eve of recent wide fluct-
uations in the copper market, in November 1975, CIPEC called for 
a dialogue between producer and consumer countries which eventually 
took place in Geneva in March 1976. Some 30 major producer and 
consumer countries participated in the discussions which resulted 
in an agreement to : 
(a) Establish a permanent producer-consumer forum 
for copper; 
(b) Set up an interim committee to facilitate its 
establishment; and 
) Accept a tentative list of studies to be carried 
out by the new organization. 
Discussions are underway at present at the UNCTAD seeking a possible 
price stabilization mechanism for copper. 35 
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International Bauxite Association (IBA) 
IBA was established in 1974 by seven major producers to deal 
with what they saw as common problems facing the bauxite industry. 
The IBA now has 11 members: Australia, Indonesia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam 
and Yugoslavia. (Greece, India and Trinidad and Tobago are 
observers.) 
At present IBA works as a clearing house for the exchange of 
economic and technical information that will assist members in 
co-ordinating development of their bauxite industries. IBA has 
denied any intention to introduce a price stabilization mechanism 
for bauxite, but studies are underway to introduce a formula to 
"index" the price of bauxite to the price of finished aluminium. 
This could affect the operations of the current Bauxite market.
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ASEAN and the "Commodity Producer Power" 
Another important aspect of ASEAN's resources diplomacy is the 
growing determination of ASEAN to use its "commodity producer 
power" in order to strengthen its international bargaining power. 
In this regard an important question immediately arises. To what 
extent can ASEAN exercise the "producer power" (as OPEC does) to 
control future supplies so as to create artificial scarcities and 
raise export prices above the competitive market level? In other 
words, is oil a special case, or can effective producer power be 
exercised also for natural rubber, palm oil, tin, copper, bauxite 
and other primary products? 
In his article "The Threat from the Third World", Fred. Berg-
•sten states, "Four countries control more than 80 per cent of the 
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exportable supply of world copper, have already organized, and have 
already begun to use their oligopoly power. Two countries account 
for more than 70 per cent of world tin exports, and four countries 
raise the total close to 95 per cent. Four countries combine for 
more than 50 per cent of the world supply of natural rubber. Four 
countries possess over one-half the world supply of bauxite ... 
A widge range of Third World "countries thus have sizeable potential 
for strategic market power. They could use that power against all 
buyers, or in a discriminatory way through differential pricing 
or supply conditions - for example, to avoid higher costs to other 
LDC's or against the United States alone to favour Europe or Japan. 07 
Referring to the argument that oil and OPEC represent a 
unique case which cannot be duplicated, Bergsten states that, "It 
is very doubtful that oil is different in any qualitative sense. 
Indeed, many other OPECs look much easier to organize and maintain. 
OPEC had to pool twelve countries to control 80 per cent of world 
oil exports, but fewer countries are usually involved in production 
of other primary products. Most OPEC countries are heavily depend-
ent on oil, and cartelization was especially risky for them. Other 
commodity producers are more.diversified. ... And economic and 
political differences among OPEC countries seem much sharper than 
those among other potential cartelizers. So new OPECs seem at least 
as likely as OPEC itself.
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In contrast with Bergsten's arguments a report produced by 
15 economists from Japan, EEC and North America indicates that, 
... the frequent portrayal of a future world of primary commodities 
divided up into cartels of developing country producers, as in the 
OPEC countries, dictating prices and turning the supply on and off - 
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to achieve political and other ends, is vastly overdrawn. Primary 
products are produced by many countries, imports are not everywhere 
a major proportion of total consumption, and industrial rather than 
developing countries are the leading suppliers of many international-
ly traded commodities. Furthermore, many primary commodities can be 
substituted for each other, depending on price and availability." 39  
The arguments mentioned above represent two different views 
on the ability of developing countries to intervene in export markets 
by employing their commodity producer power. One argument suggests 
that OPEC example can be duplicated while the other suggests it 
cannot. However, in a broad sense, the ability of developing count-
ries, who produce primary products other than oil, to carry out 
any successful market intervention either by cartelization or any 
other form (e.g., one producer acting as a price leader with others 
following, imposition of quantitative limitations or export taxes), 
will depend essentially on the existence of three conditions which 
are
40
: 
(a) a dominant position by a producer country in export 
markets or the capacity for effective collusion by 
a group of producer nations; 
(b) an inelastic demand for the product in consumer 
countries; 
(c) a low elasticity of supply of alternative materials 
for consumer countries. 
When these conditions are taken into consideration in the 
context of ASEAN, it seems that ASEAN's ability to exercise 'pro-
ducer power" to intervene in export markets is very limited. It is 
true that ASEAN holds a commanding position in the world market 
in the trade of several agricultural and mineral products such as 
94. 
natural rubber, tin, palm oil, coconut products and spices, but 
none of them has an inelastic demand in consumer countries. CM the 
other hand, almost all the primary products exported by ASEAN are 
confronted with the problem of availability of various substitutes 
in major consumer countries. In short, it can be said that none 
of the ASEAN's primary products (excluding Indonesian oil) is of 
sufficient importance to acquire for ASEAN a very special position 
in international trade as none of them can be considered as essent-
ial for the functioning of the economies of consumer countries. 
The conflicting economic interests of the member countries is 
another factor which limits the capacity of ASEAN to use its com-
modity producer power. There are many differences and disagreements 
among the member countries, in particular, between Singapore and 
the other four members, over the various issues of NIEO. 41  Singa-
pore as a resources poor industrialised country has no direct 
interest in the Integrated Commodity Policy or any market intervent-
ion aiming at raising commodity prices, but the Integrated Commodity 
Policy has been the main concern of the other four countries. 
Singapore,as a resources consumer, wishes to buy commodities where 
they are cheapest and on the other hand, as a relatively industri-
alised country, would like to sell its manufactured goods in the best 
markets available. Thus Singapore's main concern is access to the 
markets of developed countries, but this issue is of less import-
ance to the other four members than the Integrated Commodity Policy. 
As a result of these conflicting economic interests ASEAN has not 
been able to adopt a common policy with regard to international 
commodity problems. 
95. 
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III. 
1. Preamble - Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, UNO, Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX), January, 1975. 
2. Towards an Integrated Commodity Policy, UNCTAD Briefing 
Paper, No. 1, June 1975, p. 2. 
3. A. de Vass Gunawardena, "Commodity Agreements", 
Economic Review (Colombo), Vol. 4, No. 10 & 11, Jan/Feb. 
1979, pp. 25-26. 
4. Towards an Integrated Commodity Policy, op.cit., 
5. /bid., p. 7. 
6. John Wong, The ASEAN Economies: Development Outlook for 
the 1980's, 	ERC Occasional Paper Series, No.1, Chopman 
Enterprise, Singapore, 1977, p. 20. 
7. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "ASEAN - Resources Diplomacy 
and Regional Policies", Paper presented to the Conference on 
Southeast Asia's Natural Resources and the World Economy, 
Kuala Lumpur Hilton, 17-20 September 1977, p. 16. 
8. Amado A. Castro, "Economic Cooperation in ASEAN", Paper 
presented to the Tenth Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, A.N.U., Canberra, March 19-23, 1979, p. 18. 
9. Debesh Bhattacharya, "Aggression by the Rich Countries 
Against the Poor: What has UNCTAD IV Achieved?", Paper 
presented to the UNCTAD IV Project sponsored by World 
Christian Action, Australian Catholic Relief and Action 
for World Development, July 1976, p. 18. 
10. Anne Booth, "The Economic Scene: An Overview", in Southeast 
Asian Affairs - 1977, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1977, p. 25. 
11. /bid. 
12. /bid. 
13. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/Cl/166/Supp. 5. 
14. Brainslav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Creation 
of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and 
the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly", 
International Organizations, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 1976, 
pp. 331-333. 
15. Far Eastern.Economic Review, February 9, 1979, pp. 76-77. 
96. 
16. Canberra Times, 12.7.77, p. 16. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Helen Hughes, "The Prospects of ASEAN Countries in 
Industrialized Country Markets", Paper presented to 
the Tenth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, 
A.N.U., Canberra, March 19-23, 1979, pp. 12-25. 
19. /bid. 
20. The Bangkok Declaration - Part II - Aims and Objectives. 
See Appendix No. 1. 
21. For the full text of the Declaration, see, Non-Aligned 
Conferences: Basic Documents 1961 -1975, Bandaranayake 
Centre for International Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1975. . 
22. Ibid. 
23. /bid. 
24. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Toward a New Economic Order", 
Insight, May 1976, pp. 18-19. 
25. For the full text of the Manila Declaration, see 
Non-Aligned Conferences, op.ciit. 
26. Amado A. Castro, op.cit., p. 18. 
27. Declaration of ASEAN Concord, see Appendix No. II. 
28. 10 Years ASEAN, ASEAN Central Secretariat, Jakarta, 
1978, p. 197. 
29. Asian Almanac, pp. 2447-2449. 
30. Asia Research Bulletin, 31.7.78, p. 464. 
31. Though the first International Tin Agreement was concluded 
in 1953, it did not become effective until 1956. 
32. Asia Research Bulletin, 31.8.78, p. 235. 
33. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, January 1969, p. 23138. 
34. /bid., May 1972, p. 25244. 
35. News Release, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
.Office of Media Service, Washington, D.C., April 1976. - 
36. /bid. 
37. C.F. Bergesten - 'The Threat - from the Third World', Foreign 
Policy, No.11 (Summer 1973), pp. 106-116. 
97. 
38. /bid., p. 725. 
39. Ibid. Also see S. Kransner - 'One, Two, Many OPEC's...? 
Oil is the Exception', Foreign Policy, (No. 14, 
Spring 1974), pp. 84-90. 
40. /bid., p. 724. 
41. H.S. Kartadjoemena, The Politics of External Economic 
Relations: Indonesia's Options, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1977, pp. 48-53. 
98. 
CHAPTER IV. 
ASEAN : ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A.,  
THE EEC AND JAPAN. 
This chapter deals with ASEAN's economic relations with the U.S.A., 
the EEC and Japan. The chapter is composed of two parts. The first 
part investigates the factors leading ASEAN to seek more effective econ-
omic relations with developed countries, the origin and development of 
ASEAN's trade diplomacy and the techniques of ASEAN's trade diplomacy 
such as collective bargaining power. The second part is sub-divided 
into three parts; each one deals with ASEAN's economic relations with 
the U.S.A., EEC and Japan separately, focusing mainly on emerging prob-
lems and issues, the principal demands of ASEAN, the response and re-
actions of the country concerned and finally, the achievements and fail-
ures of ASEAN in its relations with these three countries. 
• The necessity for ASEAN to seek more effective trade and economic 
relations with developed countries,in recent years, has been generated 
by three factors. First, the ASEAN countries are urgently in need of 
an increasing inflow of capital investment, technology and expertise 
from developed countries for developing their natural resources in order 
to accelerate their industrialization. Second, the ASEAN countries 
will.continue*to need extra-regional markets for their primary products, 
because their limited industrial capacity cannot possibly absorb the 
current raw material output. Third, until per capita income rises 
significantly in the ASEAN countries, their manufactured goods will need 
extra-regional markets for optimal development. 
4 
International trade, as discussed in the previous chapters, is a 
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fundamental element of economic progress of the ASEAN countries. How-
ever, except for the simple provision that ASEAN should "... maintain 
close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and reg-
ional organizations with similar aims and purposes and explore all 
avenues for even closer co-operation among themselves",
1 
the Bangkok 
Declaration of 1967 did not put much emphasis on the conduct of ASEAN's 
economic relations with a third country or a group of countries. A 
gradual development of ASEAN's economic relations with three major 
economic powers - the U.S.A., EEC and Japan and with the other developed 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, can be seen in 
the years after 1970. 
At the Bali summit of 1976, the ASEAN heads of state took steps 
to scrutinize the basic guidelines on the conduct of ASEAN's external 
economic relations with developed countries. These guidelines were 
embodied in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord issued at the end of the 
summit. According to the Declaration, "ASEAN member states shall accel-
erate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their 
raw materials and •finished products by seeking the elimination of all 
trade barriers in those markets, developing a new usage for these pro-
ducts and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with 
regional groupings - and individual economic powers." 2 
The Declaration further states that "such efforts shall also lead 
to co-operation in the field of technology and production and to im-
prove the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export 
products with a view to diversifying exports." 3 
It was further agreed that future ASEAN's economic relations with 
a third country or a group of countries or any other international organ-
ization should be conducted on the following principles
4
: 
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(a) Co-operation with ASEAN as a group should not be at 
the expense of existing bilateral arrangements; 
(b) Co-operation should serve to complement ASEAN's 
capabilities and not supplant them; 
(c) Co-operation should be for projects conceived by 
ASEAN which are of regional character and for the 
benefit of all the ASEAN countries. 
I n the period after 1976 it can be said that ASEAN has made 
modest progress in terms of its bargaining with external parties. High-
lights have been: the top level trade 'dialogues; with the EEC (April, 
1977), Japan, Australia and New Zealand (August, 1977), and the U.S.A. 
(September, 1977 and July, 1978). The role of ASEAN as an emerging 
bargaining force in recent years has probably made more headlines than 
any of its other forms of economic co-operation, i.e., the promotion 
of intra-regional trade and industrial development. 
. As far as the role of ASEAN as a collective bargaining force is 
concerned, one important question immediately arises. How much col-
lective leverage can ASEAN exercise against developed countries to win 
its legitimate demands - i.e., price stabilization of commodities, free 
and improved access to the markets of developed countries for its 
manufactured goods and an increased inflow of capital investment, 
expertise and technology from advanced countries? It can be assumed 
that the five countries have more bargaining power when functioning 
together than when acting separately. In addition, there are a number 
of economic and political sources which provide a strong basis for 
ASEAN to employ its collective bargaining power effectively and force-
fully. 
Firstly, as mentioned in the second chapter, ASEAN countries are 
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major producers of several agricultural and mineral raw materials and 
in the trade of these commodities ASEAN holds a commanding position in 
the world market. Although ASEAN's primary products have various sub-
stitutes, commodities like natural rubber and tin are still very much 
needed by developed countries for their industrial activities. For 
example, in several respects, such as resistance of heat accumulation, 
low-crack growth to temperature and allround versatility, natural rub-
ber still remains a better elastomer than synthetic rubber while for 
tin the ability to use substitutes is very limited. ASEAN accounts 
for nearly 83 per cent and 72 per cent of the world total production 
of natural rubber and tin respectively. For these two commodities, 
ASEAN can use its 'producer power' to a large extent to strengthen its 
international bargaining power. 
Secondly, the ASEAN countries are among the fastest growing 
developing countries and they together represent a big market of nearly 
250 million people for industrial goods of developed countries. More-
over, the ASEAN countries have a vast amount of unexploited natural 
resources which are of great importance to developed countries. 
A third factor is the oil power of ASEAN. Indonesia is already 
a member of the Orgaization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
The current estimation indicates that Indonesia has 2.5 per cent of 
the world's total petroleum reserves with a life spanning from 22 to 
25 years.
5 	
Malaysia's oil production has recently surpassed its 
domestic requirements and it has planned to expand production from the 
present level of 100,000 barrels per day to 500,000 barrels per day by 
1980, enabling the country to be the second member of ASEAN exporting 
oil.
6 	
Thailand has made its first significant offshore oil discovery 
recently, while the Philippines have also launched an extensive 
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exploration for oil in recent years. 
Fourthly, the strategic location of the ASEAN countries is 
excellent and crucial for almost all the developed countries. As 
described by a commentator "... it is both a sort of bridge between 
Asia and Australia and compulsory passage between China and Europe, 
and also Japan and the Middle East, Africa and Europe and also between 
China and Australia". 7 As a result, ASEAN is in control of strategi- 
cally important air and sea routes in the world. 
All these factors discussed above have made ASEAN an important 
collective bargaining force vis-a-vis developed countries in recent 
years. Another important question arises in this context. Does ASEAN 
have the necessary 'political will' to use its collective bargaining 
power effectively and forcefully? How much collective leverage ASEAN 
can exercise obviously depends on the extent to which the five coun-
tries are willing to work together when they deal with developed 
countries. Despite their conflicting economic interests, it can be 
said that, in recent years, the five countries have increasingly worked 
together to represent a common stand over the main demands of ASEAN 
when they have approached developed countries. 
In general, it can be said that the role of ASEAN as an emerging 
bargaining force in recent years, has certainly made it quite diffi-
cult for developed countries to avoid giving due consideration to 
ASEAN demands. This is evident from the top-level trade dialogues 
that have been held by ASEAN with the U.S.A., the EEC and Japan in the 
years after 1976. 
ASEAN and the United states o f America. 
In January 1975, the diplomatic representatives of the U.S.A. 
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to the ASEAN countries met ASEAN's officials to discuss the establish-
ment of formal links between the U.S.A. and ASEAN on the matters which 
were of mutual interest to the two parties. 8 The decision to approach 
the U.S.A. was taken at the second meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers 
held in March 1976 and at their fifth meeting held in September 1977. 
It was decided to convene an ASEAN-U.S. dialogue on trade and economic 
co-operation as soon as possible. The Economic Ministers drafted an 
eleven point joint memorandum to be put forward at the dialogue. The 
memorandum included, among other things, North-South trade issues, 
commodity price stabilization,promotion of co-operation between ASEAN 
and the U.S.A. in trade and the industrial development in the ASEAN 
countries, and improvement in the flow of U.S. capital investment into 
the region. 
The first ASEAN-U.S. dialogue took place on 8-10 September 1977, 
in Manila. The discussion between the two parties centred mainly 
on four areas which were: 
(i) Liberalization of U.S. protectionist policies 
ensuring free and improved access to the U.S. market 
for ASEAN's primary products and manufactured goods. 
The U.S. refusal to provide preferential trade treatments 
to Indonesia under the Trade Reform Act of 1974. 
(iii) Price stabilization ofcommodities exported by ASEAN 
including the implementation of the Integrated Commodity 
Policy. 
v) Increased participation by the U.S.A. in the industrial 
development of the ASEAN countries. 
I. Liberalization of Trade  
The U.S.A. is the second largest export market for ASEAN after 
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Japan. The total value of ASEAN's exports to the U.S. market rose 
from US$ 787 million in 1965 to US$ 1105 million in 1970 and US$ 7141 
million in 1977. Table 4.1 represents data relating to the value of 
ASEAN's exports to the U.S. market and ASEAN's share of U.S. imports. 
Table 4.1  
Value of ASEAN's Exports and its Share 
of U.S. Imports.  
(US$ Million) 
Year Value of ASEAN's 
Total Exports to 
Market 
Value of total 
U.S. Imports. 
ASEAN's Share 
of U.S. Imports 
(1) (2) (3=1+ 2x100) 
1965 787 21366 3.68 
1970 1105 39952 2.77 
1973 2223 69476 3.20 
1974 4298 100997 4.25 
1975 4501 96902 4.64 
1976 5798 120678 4.84 
1977 7141 146817 4.86 
Source : Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
19783 National Data Book and Guide to Sources. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Washington, D.C., p. 878. 
Though a dramatic increase in the value of ASEAN's exports to 
the United States market can be seen in recent years, ASEAN's share of 
U.S. imports is still very small and rate of increase is negligible. 
As the figures indicate, during the last twelve years, ASEAN's share 
increased only by.1.18 from 3.68 in 1965 to 4.86 in 1977. The 
apparent increase in the share of ASEAN is mainly due to increased im- 
ports of petroleum products by the U.S.A. from Indonesia in recent years. 
In 1970, the value of Indonesian exports to the U.S.A. was US$ 182 
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million or about 17 per cent of the total ASEAN's exports. In 1977, 
the Indonesian share rose to nearly 49 per cent of total ASEAN's ex-
ports amounting to US$ 3491 million. Table 4.2 provides statistics 
relating to the individual trade relations of the ASEAN countries with 
the U.S.A. 
According to the Table, the value of the total exports of ASEAN 
to the U.S.A. in 1977 was US$ 714 million while the value of imports 
amounted to US$ 3882 million. Thus in 1977, ASEAN had an overall trade 
surplus worth of US$ 3259 million. However, of the ASEAN countries, 
Singapore and Thailand have never had a trade surplus in their trade 
with the U.S.A. In 1977, Singapore had a huge trade deficit of 
US$ 365 million, while Thailand alsb had a trade deficit worth of 
US$ 160 million. 
The figures given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that trade be-
tween ASEAN and the U.S.A. has gradually improved during the last decade 
but overall performances of ASEAN with regard to the access to the U.S. 
market are far from satisfactory. This sluggish improvement, from the 
ASEAN countries' point of view, is mainly due to the various protection-
ist policies of the U.S.A. that have limited entry of ASEAN's primary 
products (excluding oil) and manufactured goods into the U.S. market. 
Thus, at the first ASEAN-U.S. trade dialogue, the ASEAN countries 
expressed their deep concern over two devices used by the U.S.A. to 
limit imports from developing countries, the quota system and counter-
vailing duties. The quota system, as the ASEAN delegates had argued, 
would disadvantage newcomers to the U.S. market because of the use of 
past export performances to determine the size of quotas on certain 
products. On the other hand, the countervailing duty system is used 
when the governments of exporting countries are deemed to be unfairly 
Table 4.2  
Individual Trade Relations-of the ASEAN countries 
vith'the'U:SA: ' 
(US$ million) 
Indonesia 
Im. 
Malaysia 
'Im. Ex.  
Philippines 
Im. Ex. 
Singapore 
Im. Ex. 
Thailand 
Im. Ex. 
1965 • 2 165 91 212 349 369 107 41 
1970 266 182 67 270 373 472 240 81 150 100 
1973 442 505 157 440 495 670 684 467 256 141 
1974 531 1693 377 775 747 1091 988 553 369 186 
1975 810, 2222 393 772 832 756 994 534 357 217 
1976. 1035 3004 536 940 818 883 965 695 347 276 
1977 763 3491 561 1322 876 1103 1172 875 510 350 
Source : Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
op.cit., p. 878. 
107. 
• subsidizing goods for export. According to the U.S. government, 
such subsidies are inherently wrong if they favour exports over goods 
made for domestic use. The ASEAN countries were very critical of 
the countervailing duty -measures because they had adversely affected 
certain garments exported by ASEAN to the U.S. market. The ASEAN 
delegates argued that these protectionist measures would not only 
discourage the industrialization efforts of developing countries, but 
also they would be inconsistent with the stand and views of the United 
States on free trade and the free market mechanism. In order to en-
sure free and improved access to the U.S. market for ASEAN's primary 
products and manufactured goods, the ASEAN delegates demanded that 
the U.S.A. modify the way of deciding quotas and the countervailing 
duty system, and that it recognize the right of developing countries 
' to promote their export industries. 
II. The Trade Reform Act of 1974 and Indonesia  
Indonesia because of its membership in OPEC, has become one of 
the victims of the,U.S.A. Trade Reform Act of 1974 which disqualified 
from trade concessions under the U.S. Generalised System of Prefer-
ences, countries which have entered into a cartel-type arrangement, 
the effect of vital materials or to charge a monopolistic price which 
creates serious disequilibrium in the world economy".
9 
As a result, 
since 1974, Indonesia has been excluded from receiving concessions 
of the U.S. GSP. This has considerably weakened the entry of Indon-
esian exports other than oil into the U.S. market. With respect to 
the issue, the ASEAN delegates requested the U.S. to consider Indon-
esia as an exceptional case in the application of the Trade Reform 
Act of 1974. 
108. 
III. Commodity Price Stabilization  
In connection with the price stabilization of commodities and 
raw materials, ASEAN expressed its deep concern about the implement-
ation of the Integrated Commodity Policy and requested the U.S.A. to 
actively support the early establishment of the Common Fund. ASEAN 
had argued that if the Common Fund could be brought into effect first, 
then it would be easy for the ASEAN countries to start negotiations 
on the buffer stock arrangements for their major agricultural and 
mineral commodities - natural rubber, tropical timber, vegetable and 
seed oil, tin, copper, sugar and hair fibres. ASEAN had brought to 
the U.S. notice the "STABEX' arrangements provided by the EEC to 
certain African developing countries and urged her to adopt similar 
arrangements for commodities exported by ASEAN. 
IV. U.S. Participation in the Economic Development of ASEAN  
In 1976, total U.S. direct foreign investment amounted to 
US$ 148782 million, of which US$ 3372 million, or 2.26 per cent of 
the total amount was invested in the five ASEAN countries. Tabulated 
below are the figures relating to U.S. direct investments in the 
ASEAN countries in 1976. 
Table 4.3  
U.S. Direct Investment in the ASEAN Countries 
- 1976   
(US$ million) 
Indonesia 1469 
Malaysia 364 
Philippines 810 
Singapore 459 
Thailand  270 
ASEAN't - TOtal - 3372 
Source: Sueo Sekiguchi and Larry Krause, 
'Direct Foreign Investment in ASEAN by Japan and 
the United States', Paper presented to the Tenth 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference, A.N.U., 
Canberra, March 19-23, 1979, p. 18. 
At the dialogue, ASEAN emphasised the need to increase the U.S. 
capital investment in the member countries and to assure the increas-
ed inflow of the U.S. investment, the ASEAN delegates requested the 
U.S.: 
(a) to consider the proposed U.S.income tax regulation 
which waives certain tax privileges provided under 
the former American tax deferral system for American 
companies operating in the region. 
(b) to maintain the investment incentives granted by the 
American Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
Those incentives are aimed at promoting the growth 
of developing countries through investments by 
American companies. 1° 
The first ASEAN-U.S. trade dialogue ended with few results as 
neither party could come to an agreement on the first three issues - 
free access to the U.S. market, modification of the Trade Reform Act 
and the price stabilization ofcommodities. The U.S. officials led 
by Richard Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
expressed their great concern over the economic difficulties of the 
ASEAN countries but clearly indicated that at this stage the U.S. 
would not be able to give any major trade concession to ASEAN. In 
response to ASEAN's demand for the liberalization of U.S. protection-
ist policies, U.S. officials made no specific commitments but urged 
ASEAN to participate actively in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
in GATT by making reciprocal contributions in the form of concessions. 
The U.S. delegates argued that such reciprocal concessions would 
make it easier for the U.S.A. government to push for major trade 
liberalization by gaining popular support. However, the U.S. recog-
nized the need to make "substantial concessions" on tropical products 
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and agreed to support ASEAN at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
to achieve this. 
In connection with the price stabilization of ASEAN commodities, 
the U.S. view was that it did not want to get drawn into such nego-
tiations while talks were already underway on the same subject at 
the UNCTAD. With regard to ASEAN request for U.S. support for the 
Common Fund, the U.S. officials argued that the proposed amount of 
US$ 6 billion was neither feasible nor necessary and reiterated the 
U.S. approach to international commodity problems based on the then 
Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal that price stabilization 
mechanisms should be based on a commodity by commodity approach. 
ASEAN delegates did not agree with the U.S. proposal and it became 
evident that neither party was ready to depart from their initial 
stand. As a result, discussions were suspended and both parties 
agreed to start them at a later stage.
11 
ASEAN'S call for U.S. assistance with its industrial programme 
also met with limited success. However, the U.S. agreed to extend• 
its financial and technical assistance on a collective basis as well 
as bilateral basis. It was further agreed to set-up a working commit-
tee to carry out feasibility studies on the proposed ASEAN's projects 
such as a food security system, animal husbandry, livestock product-
ion, forestry and end-uses of timber, vegetables and fats.
12 
It was clear that ASEAN did not achieve anything tangible from 
the first ASEAN-U.S. dialogue. But the dialogue was certainly an 
important landmark in recent ASEAN-U.S. economic relations as it laid 
the foundation for a permanent process of consultation between the 
two parties on trade and other economic issues of mutual interest. 
For this purpose ASEAN h d announced that it was setting up an 
ASEAN-Washington Committee comprising the ASEAN heads of mission 
in Washington. 
It was further agreed to hold a second ASEAN-U.S. dialogue 
which eventually took place in Washington in September 1978, at the 
ministerial level. The agenda for the discussion presented by ASEAN 
was not very much different from the original one presented at the 
Manila dialogue. ASEAN efforts to justify its main demands basically 
centred on the theme that free market strategies could work to solve 
ASEAN's current economic problems and therefore they should be allow-
ed free access to the markets of developed countries. As the Foreign 
Minister of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam, had argued, "for the last 20 
to 30 years the U.S. and other developed countries have told us in 
the United Nations and other international organizations to go for 
trade and not aid. We have taken this advice. The ASEAN countries 
are not coining for aid. We say we want to trade."
13 
The second ASEAN-U.S. dialogue also ended with bitter feelings 
• as ASEAN did not receive any substantial commitment from the U.S.A. 
with regard to its principal demands. As it was reported in the news 
media, ASEAN received only sympathy when it asked for special tariff 
preferences and for Indonesia to be given exceptional status. 14 
In response to ASEAN's concern over the Common Fund, the U.S.A. tent-
atively agreed to support it but did not elaborate to what extent 
the U.S. would extend its support. With regard to the demand for 
increased U.S. participation in the economic development in the 
region, the U.S. agreed to encourage American private investment, to 
support ASEAN's five industrial projects from the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank and to form a Joint U.S.-ASEAN Business Council
.15 
In concluding, it can be said that ASEAN's achievements from 
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the two dialogues are far from satisfactory. The failure of ASEAN 
•in its dealings with the U.S.A., however, does not mean that South-
east Asia is becoming of less importance to the U.S.A. after its 
failure in Indo-China in 1975. Southeast Asia, in particular ASEAN, 
is of great concern to the U.S.A. for economic as well as political 
reasons. As noted by one of the U.S. career diplomats to Southeast 
Asia in 1977 16 : 
... it is rich in raw materials greatly in demand: 
oil, hardwoods, rubber, tin and other tropical products. 
It commands air and sea lines vital to those who would 
move their ships and planes between the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans or keep Communications with the countries 
of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. It sits 
astride Japan's oil pipeline from the Middle East. 
Its steadily growing trade is predominantly with Japan, 
the United States, non-communist neighbours and Western 
Europe in that order. It is •a growing area of investment 
for Japan, the United States, non-communist neighbours 
and Western Europe, again in that order. The tolerance 
of and assistance to our Seventh Fleet by the non-aligned 
nations of Southeast Asia, along with our bases in the 
Philippines, support the U.S. presence in the Western 
Pacific and contribute to the peace and progress in that 
area." 
This statement clearly indicates the political and economic 
importance of the ASEAN countries to the U.S.A. Even,after the Viet-
nam war, the U.S.A. has repeatedly denied that there is any intent-
ion to 'pull out of Southeast Asia' and in June 1977, the Secretary 
of State, Cyrus Vance, indicated the U.S. determination to remain as 
an Asian and Pacific power.
17 
On this basis, it can be assumed that 
ASEAN's failure to receive any firm commitment from the U.S.A. was 
not due to the deteriorating interests or importance of the ASEAN 
countries to the U.S.A. In fact, the U.S. economic stake in ASEAN 
is considerable and more likely to grow in future. 
The U.S. opposition to ASEAN's main economic demands must be . 
viewed from a different angle. It seems that most of the ASEAN's 
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demands involve world wide economic issues, in particular,the Third 
World's demands for a new international economic order. Some basic 
issues of the NIE0 like the Integrated Commodity Policy have encount-
ered strong opposition from the U.S.A. ever since they were put for-
ward by developing countries in 1974. The U.S.A. has, in principle, 
accepted the necessity to stabilize the export earnings of developing 
countries, but it is strongly opposed to any move which would lead 
to the creation of producer cartels enabling the participants to 
charge monopolistic prices. The U.S.A. believes that price stabili-
zation of commodities should be carried out on the basis of a commo-
dity by commodity approach but not on the basis of the proposed Inte-
grated Commodity Policy. On the other hand, the U.S.A. has firmly•
insisted that any move to liberalise trade can be carried out only 
on the basis of reciprocal concessions. This is obviously in conflict 
with the views of ASEAN which has asked for trade concessions on non-
reciprocal basis. 
On the other hand, various talks have already been undertaken 
at the UNCTAD aiming at a world wide compromise between developed 
and developing countries over the North-South trade and other economic 
issues. The U.S.A. wants to see the outcome of these discussions and 
until then it does not want to change its present attitudes towards 
the new international economic order. Under these circumstances, it 
is not surprising that ASEAN has failed to receive any firm commit-
ment from the U.S.A. with regard to its principal economic demands. 
However, as far as the two dialogues are concerned, they have 
certainly helped both parties to gain mutual understanding on the 
problems of each other. From the ASEAN countries' point of view, one 
important achievement from the dialogues is that they provided an 
/\ 
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opportunity to tell the U.S. that the domino theory still has some 
validity in the political context of Southeast Asia, even though the 
U.S. thought it had lost validity with the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos into the communists' hands in 1975. Based on this theme, 
ASEAN has tried to convince the U.S. that ASEAN's existence as a 
non-communist regional bloc is fundamentally vital for the U.S. if 
the U.S. wants to preserve and secure its interests in the region. 
Another important achievement of the dialogues is the U.S. acceptance 
that ASEAN is a viable regional organization. This recognition will 
certainly play a key role in future U.S.-ASEAN economic relations. 
ASEAN and the European Economic Community  
The European Economic Community represents the third largest 
export market for ASEAN. Tabluated below are indicators of ASEAN's 
percentage value of imports and exports from and to the EEC between 
the period of 1969 and 1976. 
— Table'4.4  
Percentage Value of ASEAN's Imports and 
Exports From and To the EEC. 
Imports Exports 
1969 20.1 14.1 
1970 19.6 15.0 
1971 20.2 15.7 
1972 18.0 15.2 
1973 17.7 15.1 
1974 17.1 14.4 
1975 16.3 14.7 
1976 15.3 16.4 
Source : United Nations Yearbook of Annual 
Statistics, 1977. 
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As the table indicates, during the period concerned, ASEAN's 
exports to the EEC remained stagnant, except in 1976; in that year 
a flight improvement could be seen. Since the late 1960's ASEAN 
has been faced with a number of problems with regard to the access 
to the EEC market for its primary products and manufactured goods. 
Among these problems, the competition coming from some African 
countries for primary products, the British entry into the EEC and 
various protectionist policies against developing countries manufact-
ured products are the most important
.18 
In particular, the close 
economic ties between the EEC and some African countries arising from 
their old colonial relationship caused those countries to receive 
special trade preferences from the EEC, which in turn have adversely 
affected ASEAN's agricultural products exported to the EEC market. 19 
These considerations along with the ASEAN's desire to obtain 
more foreign investment from the EEC have made it necessary and urgent 
for ASEAN to seek more effective trade and economic relations with 
the EEC which represents •the single largest trading unit in the world. 
On the otherhand, abundant natural resources, along with politi- 
cal and strategic considerations caused the EEC to seek friendly rela-
tions with ASEAN. As the President of the EEC, Roy Jenkins, noted 
"Europe is aware not only of the economic potential of the region 
but also of its political importance. ASEAN has an important role to 
play to ensure the peaceful development of its part of the world. 
Therefore, it is in our mutual interest by strengthening our relation-
ship to help contribute to ASEAN solidarity."
20 
The question of formulating an ASEAN joint approach to conduct 
relations with the EEC was considered by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
at their fourth meeting held in March 1971. The issue was further 
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elaborated and scrutinized by the ASEAN representatives to the 
Group of 77, when they met in Bangkok in October 1971 and at a 
meeting of the ASEAN Secretariats-General held in Bali in October 
of the same year. These discussions led to the establishment of the 
Special Consultative Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) and it was given 
permanent status in the ASEAN machinery at the Fifth Foreign Ministers 
meeting held in April 1972. It was envisaged that the SCCAN would 
provide working machinery to hold negotiations on a regular basis 
with the EEC in such areas as trade, aid, access to the EEC market, 
industrial co-operation and capital investment in the ASEAN countries. 
The first SCCAN-EEC meeting of 1972 marked the beginning of formal 
links between two groups and since then SCCAN has been instrumental , 
in the formulation of ASEAN Joint memorandums in 1972 and 1975, and 
in the establishment of a Working Group to carry out a study on the 
EEC's Generalised System of Preferences. 
In order to intensify relations between ASEAN and the EEC, and 
to ease the workload of the SCCAN, an agreement was reached by the 
ASEAN members in June 1972, to establish another body, called the 
"ASEAN Brussels Committee" (ABC), comprising the five ambassadors or 
representatives accredited by ASEAN countries to the European Economic 
Community. 
In the subsequent years, ASEAN-EEC relations seemed to be improv-
ing, and was encouraged by official visits by high ranking EEC offic-
ials - Professor Ralf Dahrendorf - former Commissioner of External 
Relations; Dr. Marisholt - former EEC President; Francois Xaviour; 
Sir Christopher Soames - the EEC Vice-President,and Roy Jenkins the 
' EEC President. 
The meeting between Sir Christopher Soames and the ASEAN Foreign 
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Ministers, considered closely futher possibilities for the expansion 
of a formal relationship between the two groups and resulted in the 
establishment of a Joint Study Group (JSP). This group was basically 
intended to serve as the mechanism through which to explore together 
all possible areas where co-operation could be broadened, intensified 
and diversified. 21 Since its establishment the Joint Study Group has 
held three meetings in Brussels in June 1975 and in October 1977, 
and in Manila in December 1976. The activities of the Joint Study 
Group have been to deal with four areas, namely, commercial, agricul-
tural, industrial and development co-operation. 
The ASEAN-EEC discussions have centred on four major areas, 
namely: 
1. General problems of trade between the two parties, 
including the consequences of an expansion of EEC 
membership. 
2. Improvement in the EEC's Generalised System of Preferences 
in order to cover ASEAN agricultural products. 
3. Improved access to the EEC market for ASEAN's semi-
finished and finished manufactured products. 
4. EEC participation in regional economic development. 
1. Enlarged European Economic Community and the ASEAN Countries  
Relations of individual ASEAN countries with the EEC had been 
established well before the decision of ASEAN in 1972 to follow a 
joint approach. In fact, Thailand in 1962, was the first among ASEAN 
countries to accredit its own representative to the EEC and was fol-
lowed by the Philippines in 1964, Indonesia in 1967, Malaysia in 1968 
and finally Singapore in 1972. By establishing diplomatic relations, 
the ASEAN members expected "to be in a better position to defend 
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their exports against the unfavourable effects of the common agri-
cultural policy on the one hand, and the EEC's preferential arrange-
ments with its eighteen African associated states on the other".
22 
When Great Britain resumed formal negotiations with the European 
Economic Community for membership in 1971, ASEAN countries, in 
particular two Commonwealth members - Singapore and Malaysia - found 
it necessary to accelerate their relations with the EEC as the latter 
made it clear that in the event of U.K. entry, Commonwealth Asian 
countries would not be eligible for associate status under Part IV 
of the Treaty of Rome. 23 Apart from this, it was also announced that 
with the entry of Great Britain into the EEC, the former had agreed 
to phase out the Commonwealth Preference System over a four and half 
year period beginning from 1st January 1974, the date from which the 
U.K. customs tariff would start being aligned on the Community's 
external tariff. 
These arrangements created by the British entry to the EEC, were 
considered to have detrimental effects on trade relationsbetween the 
Commonwealth ASEAN countries and the EEC, and therefore Singapore 
and Malaysia together with other Asian Commonwealth countries, sought 
individual trade agreements with the EEC to safeguard their trade inter-
ests. At the same time Indonesia also took steps to seek similar 
trade arrangements with the enlai-ged European Economic Community. 
On the other hand, Great Britain, emphasising the effects which could 
have emerged from its entry, demanded that the EEC should give due 
consideration to whatever problems arose in. connection with the 
Commonwealth Asian countries' trade with the Community. 
The pressure put by the Commonwealth Asian countries on the one 
hand and Great Britain on the other, resulted in the conclusion of the 
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"Joint Declaration of Intent"(JDI) between the EEC and Great Britain, 
and it was attached to the Treaty ofAccession. The Joint Declaration 
of Intent aimed basically at safeguarding the trading interests of 
the five Commonwealth Asian countries - Malaysia, Pakistan, India, 
Singapore and Sri Lanka. By giving special preferences to these five 
countries, the EEC did not intend to discriminate against other devel-
oping Asian countries. However, Indonesia seemed to be quite uneasy 
with the contents of the JDI and sought Dutch help in enlarging the 
JDI to cover all Southeast Asian countries. The general EEC view 
of the Indonesian proposal was that such an enlargement would have a 
weakening effect on the discharge of Community commitments to 
the Commonwealth Asian countries. However, in the end, it was agreed 
to include the other developing Asian countries in the same geograph-
ical area into the scope of the Joint Declaration of Intent. Thus 
the first paragraph of the JDI states: 
"Inspired by the will to extend and strengthen the 
trade relations with the developing independent 
Commonwealth countries in Asia (Ceylon, Indian, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore) the EEC is ready, 
• from the date of accession, to examine with these 
countries such problems as may arise in the field of 
trade with a view to seeking appropriate solutions, 
taking in to account the effect of the generalized 
tariff preferences scheme and the situation of other 94  
developing countries in the same geographical area. 
Improvement in the EEC's Generalized System of Preferences  
and Improved Access to the EEC Market for ASEAN. 
The Generalized System of Preferences was introduced by the 
European Economic Community in July 1971 with the provision that the 
GSP should be renewed every year in order to cope with the develop-
ments which might occur in the trade relations between the community 
and a third party. Under the GSP scheme, ASEAN countries have been 
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allowed to export to the EEC market industrial goods duty free and 
more than 50 agricultural products at reduced tariffs.
25 
However, 
the concessions . granted have not covered several agricultural pro-
ducts like pepper, palm oil and coconut oil which are major products 
among ASEAN exports. 
Thus improvement in the GSP covering agricultural products 
which were of export interest to ASEAN Was a key issue in the discus-
sion held between the Chairman of SCCAN, Professor Sumitro Djojohadi-
kusumo, and the EEC representative, Professor Ralf Dahrendorf, in 
1972. The ASEAN delegation demanded that the EEC should take steps 
to make such necessary adjustments in the GSP. In return, the EEC 
delegates offered no promises to undertake the proposed adjustments 
but expressed readiness to take ASEAN's trading problems into account 
under the provisions of the Joint Declaration of Intent. Discussions 
between the two parties took place continually on the issue, but no 
substantial improvement occurred in the GSP until 1974. At the begin-
ning of 1974, the EEC made several modifications in the GSP in order 
to offset disadvantages which might arise from the phasing out of the 
Commonwealth Preferences scheme to JIM countries. According to the 
modifications, Singapore and Malaysia were allowed to export plywood 
duty free and a new quota system was introduced for Malaysian canned 
fruits. Apart from this, the regulations relating to the •"rule of 
origin" werealso modified to ensure Singapore's entrepot trade. The 
modifications of 1974, as Malcolm Subahn has put it "were the most 
substantial since the introduction of the GSP scheme in July 1971; 
even so, they fell considerably short of the demands of the ASEAN 
countries" 
26 
ASEAN expressed its disappointment in a memorandum submitted to 
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the EEC in April 1974, which asked that "products currently exported 
by ASEAN be brought within the scope of the GSP, that tariffs on 
processed agricultural products and agricultural commodities exported 
by ASEAN in competition with the Lome Convention countries be elimin-
ated or at any rate sharply reduced, and that the rule of origin and 
the cumulative rule of origin be further liberalised".
27 
Once again 
ASEAN's demands were largely ignored by the EEC but it was agreed to 
continue discussions until both parties could find solutions. The 
subsequent discussions did not make major breakthrough but they helped 
ASEAN to receive some tentative promises from the EEC, such as the 
proposal to bring palm oil and pepper under the GSP, an increased 
quota for plywood and the proposal to reduce the ASEAN list of agri-
cultural products from 51 to seven.
28 
III. The European Economic Community and the Regional Economic 
Development  
Describing the responsibility of the EEC as the world's largest 
trading unit in economic development of underdeveloped countries, 
Roy Jenkins, the EEC President, wrote in 1977 "In the same light 
should be seen the financial assistance and food aid which the commun-
ity and its member states give to the developing world. The major fund 
established for the economic development for the countries covered 
by the Lome Convention will not limit aid to them. In 1976, we took 
•our first step towards financial assistance to non-ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) developing countries in Asia and South America. 
In addition, the Community has given considerable assistance to ASEAN 
in the field of trade promotion. Funds for projects to develop reg-
ional integration have also been available for ASEAN".
29 
Thus the EEC took steps to establish US$ 1000 million fund to 
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help developing countries to solve their debt problems and Indonesia 
was one country which would benefit from the fund. In 1974, the 
EEC sent two statistical experts to assist ASEAN countries in the 
improvement of data collection, compilation and presentation in con-
nection with foreign trade. In addition, several study programmes 
and seminars have also been arranged by the EEC for ASEAN officials 
to improve their knowledge in relevant fields at the EEC Centre and 
in the member countries. The ASEAN countries have also been given 
the opportunity to participate in a large number of trade fairs and 
exhibitions in the EEC countries and to organise "ASEAN weeks" in 
departmental stores in the EEC countries. In 1975, the EEC published an 
"ASEAN Profile" to distribute among the EEC traders and investors to 
divert their attention to the ASEAN region. 
The first EEC-ASEAN Conference on Industrial Co-operation held 
in Brussels inApril 1977, was also sponsored by the EEC. The confer- , 
ence according to newspaper reports, helped to bring alarger European 
industrial and commercial presence into the ASEAN region. It was 
decided to hold the second conference on Industrial Co-operation in 
.1 
Jakarata in 1979.
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In concluding, it can be said the ASEAN's achievements from its 
dealings with the EEC are not satisfactory. As in the case of U.S.A., 
ASEAN has failed to receive any firm commitment from the EEC with 
regard to its two main economic demands - price stabilization of com-
modities and improved access to the EEC market. The EEC has firmly 
insisted that it will not take any positive steps towards the liberal-
ization of trade, in particular for manufactured products, until its 
member countries are able to overcome the current economic difficulties. 
Opposed to the ASEAN's request, it has become evident that the EEC 
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also intends to adopt a more and more inward looking approach to 
the liberalization of trade. Growing unemployment in member countries 
caused the EEC to reconsider its import policies on labour intensive 
manufactured goods like clothing and textiles and there is a grow- 
ing feeling that member countries must maintain a certain minimum 
level of production in such industries. 
With regard to the price stabilization of commodities, in prin-
ciple the EEC accepted the necessity to do so but its version of the 
Common Fund had many differences from the one that had been suggested 
under the Integrated Commodity Policy. According to the EEC's 
opinion, the Common Fund should be envisaged to act more as a clearing 
house for commodity arrangements already negotiated than as a source 
of finance.
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ASEAN and Japan : Emerging Problems of Economic Relations  
For several reasons, such as being a prime trading partner, 
foreign investor and aid donor, Japan is of greater importance to 
ASEAN than the two other economic powers - the U.S.A. and the EEC. 
On the other hand, ASEAN countries are also of equal importance to 
Japan for political,strategic and economic considerations which are 
discussed in detail below. This high interdependency has persuaded 
both ASEAN and Japan to give strong emphasis to each other in their 
foreign policy, but official ASEAN-Japanese relations were established 
only in 1977 with the establishment of an ASEAN-Japan Forum with the 
following terms of refere
n
ce
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: 
(i) to explore avenues for the promotion of co-operation 
on a collective basis between ASEAN and Japan in such 
areas as trade, industrial development, food and 
agricultural development and cultural affairs; 
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to review and monitor the progress of co-operation 
between ASEAN and Japan; 
(iii) to recommend appropriate measures to expand economic 
co-operation between the two parties. 
The pressure which induced ASEAN to seek more effective and 
orderly economic relations with Japan in 1977 were generated by mount-
ing dissatisfaction of the ASEAN members with their post-war economic 
relations with Japan. Therefore, any study of recent ASEAN-Japanese 
economic relations would necessarily entail an examination of the 
origin and development of the post-war Japanese economic expansion 
in Southeast Asia. 
Post-war Japanese foreign policy toward Southeast Asia has been 
cultivated and developed on three major considerations - her own 
military adventure in the Second World War, the subsequent defeat by 
the Western allies in 1945 and finally, her resurrection as a world 
economic power.
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In this context, for several reasons, ASEAN count-
ries have always been regarded as vital for Japanese economic well 
being. Firstly, Japan as a resources-poor developed country, has 
always had to depend on resources-rich ASEAN countries for her indu-
strial development. Secondly, the five ASEAN countries collect-
ively represent' a big market with 250 million people which is of 
great importance for Japanese manufactured products. Thirdly, ASEAN 
countries are in control of the sea routes in the region through . 
which Japan conducts more than 80 per cent of her import-export trans-
portation. These economic considerations caused Japan to be increas-
ingly concerned with the political stability of ASEAN countries. 
According to an unpublished Japanese official document, "... it is 
essential for Japan that the countries of these areas will not become 
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hostile to Japan or ruled by any power or powers hostile to Japan, 
... it is also essential that these areas are politically stabilised 
and become economically prosperous as Japan's prosperity is closely 
linked with. theirs:.3 •4  This statement clearly reveals the political, 
economic and strategic importance of the region to Japan. Thus prime 
objective of the post-war Japanese foreign policy has been to sup-
port the policies which are likely to create a favourable environment 
for Japan in order to secure her economic and commercial interests. 35 
With economic recovery, Japan had terminated her self-imposed 
isolationist period and by the 1950's it began to be actively involved 
in the Asian activities with renewed interest. In December, 1953, 
the Japanese cabinet announced the basic guidelines of Japanese policy 
toward Southeast Asia; first, to co-operate with the united Nations 
and third powers in programmes of economic assistance; second, to 
give government assistance but to leave the initiative for such pro-
grammes primarily to private interests; and third, to seek a settle-
ment of the reparations problem as quickly as possible. 36 According-
ly in April 1953, and in October 1954 respectively, Japan gained 
full membership of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) and the Colombo Plan. In addition, Japan had also played a 
key role in the establishment of the Ministerial Conference for 
Economic Development of Southeast Asia and the Asian Development 
Bank in the 1960's. 
In the 1970's, the U.S. and the EEC further encouraged Japan to 
increase its participation in Southeast Asian affairs for several 
reasons. The most important were, first, to lessen Japanese competi- 
tion while providing Japan with alternative non-communist source of 
raw materials along with a big market, thus preventing Japan from 
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falling back on the Chinese mainland; second, to ease the burden of 
the U.S.A. in assisting the development of Southeast Asian nations 
by sharing it with Japan; third, to prevent Southeast Asian nations 
from turning to the communist bloc for assistance that could draw 
them into the influence of the communist countries and finally, to 
perfect the American containment policy in Asia. 37 
The post-war Japanese economic penetration into ASEAN countries-has 
been carried out through three devices, (a) trade, (b) provision of 
extensive loans and development assistance and (c) Japanese private 
investment
.38 
In 1956 and 1959 Japan concluded reparation agreements 
with Thailand (US# 200 million), the Philippines (US$ 500 million) 
and Indonesia (US$ 200 million) respectively. Most of the reparation 
money was used to import Japanese goods and as a result, Japanese 
trade with ASEAN countries had increased tremendously by the end of 
the 1950's. Trade between Japan and ASEAN countries was further 
intensified by Japanese yen loan system and Japan had outstripped the 
U.S.A. and the EEC by the late 1960's. Since then Japan has dominated 
the ASEAN market with an annual trade growth of 26 per cent. 
Table 4.5  
Percentage Value of ASEAN's Imports and 
Exports From and To Japan. *  
Imports "Exports 
1969 24.6 24.0 
1970 26.3 24.8 
1971 27.8 26.3 
1972 28.3 26.9 
1973 28.1 28.3 
1974 25.7 27.9 
1975 25.7 27.1 
1976- . 24.8 24.4 
Source : United Nations Yearbook of Annual 
Statistics 1977. 
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As the table indicates, nearly 1/4 of ASEAN's total trade is 
conducted with Japan. During the period concerned ASEAN's imports 
from Japan has always exceeded its exports except in 1973 and 1974. 
Capital goods and machinery have always topped Japanese exports to 
ASEAN while raw materials, commodities and oil have been the principal 
items among Japanese imports from ASEAN. 
Table 4.6 provides data relating to trade relations of individual 
ASEAN countries with Japan. According to the table a considerable 
variation in Japanese trade with individual ASEAN countries can be 
noticed. Malaysia and Indonesia are the only members of ASEAN that 
have been able to enjoy trade surplus with Japan in recent years. Up 
to 1975, the Philippines had a trade surplus with Japan but since 
then Japanese exports have exceeded imports from the Philippines. 
Singapore and Thailand have never had a surplus in their trade with 
Japan. 
During the 1960's the Japanese economy experienced rapid econ-
omic growth of about 10 per cent in real terms a year and at the end 
of the decade Japan became a third economic power in the open market 
economy. This economic prosperity has persuaded Japan to be involved 
in foreign aid programmes to developing countries. Thus in April 1964, 
Japan joined the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and agreed to contribute annually one per cent of the national 
income •to the development assistance fund. (However, its actual aid 
performance has been very poor.) In the same year Japan gained the 
membership of the International Monetary Fund and agreed to dis- 
charge her international monetary obligations in accordance with 
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TABLE 4.6. 
Trade Balance Between Japan and ASEAN 
Countries 
(US$ million) 
1973 '1974 1975 1976 1977 
• 
Jan-Jun 
Indonesia Export .2214 4572 3430 4091 2487 
..Import  902 .1450. 1850.. 1639 789 
Balance 
+
1312 
+
3122 
+
1580 
+
2452 
+
1698 
Malaysia Export 776 979 691 1362 705 
Import  448 708 566 704 391 
Balance 
+
328 
+
271 
+
125 
+
658 
+
314 
Philippines Export 820 1105 1121 793 426 
Import 620 911 1026 1114 527 
Balance 
+
200 
+
194 
+
95 -321 -101 
Singapore Export 223 619 399 647 302 
Import 930 1388 1524 1531 703 
Balance 7707 -769 -1125 . 7884 • -401 
Thailand Export 394 686 724 848 364 
Import 720 951 959 1070 629 
Balance -326 -265 -235 -222 -265 
. Note - 
 
. •+ denotes Surplus; - denotes Deficit. 
Source : Far Eastern Economic Review, 
March 10, 1978, p. 40. 
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Article 8 of the IMF.
39 
Ever since Japan began to provide develop-
ment finance to developing countries, the five ASEAN members have 
always been ranked among the top recipients of Japanese aid. Tabu-
lated below are indicators relating to Japanese bilateral aid to 
ASEAN countries. 
— Table - 4.7  
Japan's Official Development Assistance 
to ASEAN Countries (Cumulative Value)  
(Net Disbursement, US$ million) 
  ance 
Grants Other 
than Techni- 
cal Assist- 
Techni- 
cal 
Assist- 
ance 
Develop-
ment Lend- 
ing and 
Capital 
Total 
World Total 1960-77 1755 625 4985 7365 
ASEAN Total 1960-77 808 193 2048 3052 
Indonesia - 1960-77 271 67 1347 1686 
Malaysia 1960-77 8 22 190 220 
Philippines 1960-77 486 40 299 825 
Singapore 1960-77 8 11 41 60 
Thailand 1960-77 36 54 171 261 
Source : Makoto Ikema, "The Common Approach to Foreign 
Policy, with Special Reference to ASEAN's 
Relations with Japan", Paper presented to 
the Tenth Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, A.N.U., Canberra, March 19-23, 
1979, p. 29. 
According to the table, Japan's bilateral ODA accumulated from 
1960 to 1977 amounted to US$ 7365 million of which US$ 3052 million 
or about 41 per cent was allocated to five ASEAN countries. Indonesia 
and the Philippines are the major recipients of Japanese bilateral 
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aid. As the figures indicate, during the period 1960-1977, about 
55 per cent of Japanese total bilateral aid to ASEAN went to Indon-
esia while the Philippines' share was about 27 per cent. 
The principal objective of Japanese foreign aid has been to help 
ASEAN countries to strengthen their political and social stability 
by improving economic and social conditions.
40 
Another significant 
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feature of Japan's foreign aid is it is tied. For example, Japan 
has always tended to give its credits and other assistance on the 
condition that such financial facilities should be used to import 
Japanese goods. Japan has also tended to give a large, amount of 
funds to countries which allow Japan to exploit their natural resources 
on minimal conditions. 
Private Investment  
Private investment is the third aspect of Japan's economic rela-
tions with ASEAN countries. As in the case of trade and aid, Japan-
ese private investment also began to pour into ASEAN countries with 
the economic boom of the 1960's. Three motives have guided Japanese 
private investment: namely, to procure resources for Japanese indust-
ries, to defend the market for Japanese goods and to utilise cheap 
labour.
42 
 The following table shows the actumulated figures of 
Japanese direct investments in ASEAN countries as of 31 March 1977. 
In 1977, total Japanese direct investment in the world amounted 
to US$ 19405 million, of which five ASEAN countries accounted for one-
fifth or 20.3 per cent. Once again Indonesia has been ranked first in 
Japanese investment priorities and as the table indicates more than 
68 per cent of Japanese total investment in ASEAN has been invested 
in Indonesia. There have been three different types of capital 
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Table 48 
Japanese Direct Investment in 
 ASEAN -1977. 
(US$ million) 
TOtal — Percentage 
ASEAN 3946 100.0 
Indonesia 2703 68.5 
Malaysia 356 9.0 
Philippines 354 9.0 
Singapore 305 7.7 
Thailand 228 5.8 
• 
Source : Far Eastern Economic Review, 
10 March 1978. 
• investment, namely, import substitution, resources exploitation and 
export orientation.
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The industrial sector has always been pre-
dominant in investment priorities, especially labour intensive indu-
stries such as textile, clothing, electronic devices and chemicals. 
According to 1972 statistics, 77 and 66 out of 358 industries estab-
lished by Japanese investors were textile and chemical processing 
industries respectively. 
The abovediscussion has brought out some salient features of 
post-war Japanese economic relations with ASEAN countries. In short, 
Japanese policy has always been directed by its twin objectives - 
source of raw materials and a market for Japanese goods - along with 
the common objective of maximising profit in the shortest possible 
time. 
The current pattern of economic relation has given rise t 
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several problems which are of great concern to ASEAN countries; the 
most important among them are: 
(a) a huge trade deficit that has continually been 
experienced by the majority of ASEAN countries; 
(b) increasing exploitation of natural resources by 
Japan through its rapid economic penetration; 
(c) less participation by Japan in the industrial 
development in ASEAN countries, in particular 
non-labour intensive industries. 
ASEAN efforts to correct this lop-sided trade relationship and other 
inequalities met with limited success thus causing considerable dis-
satisfaction and resentment among the member countries with the grow-
ing Japanese economic penetration of their countries. The anti-
Japanese riots and demonstrations in ASEAN' capitals during the offi-
cial visit of Tanaka, the former Prime Minister of Japan, in 1974, 
manifested ASEAN fear of Japanese expansion.
44 
This situation gave 
rise to the necessity for ASEAN to reassess and to re-structure its 
economic relations with Japan, and for this purpose the ASEAN-Japan 
Forum was established in 1977. However, the foundation of the ASEAN-
Japan Forum was laid in 1973 with ASEAN's joint approach to Japan 
over the issue of indiscriminate production and export of synthetic 
rubber by Japan, which was thought to have detrimental effects on the 
natural rubber industry in ASEAN countries. 
During the period 1962-1972, Japan increased her synthetic rubber 
production twelvefold from 70,000 tons to 820,000 tons. In 1972, 
Japan exported 205,000 tons, a thirty-threefold increase in merely 
ten years.
45 
This indiscriminate production and export of synthetic 
rubber threatened to destroy the natural rubber industry which was 
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one of the major foreign exchange sources of the majority of ASEAN 
countries. At their sixth meeting held in 1973, the ASEAN foreign 
ministers took the synthetic rubber issue into consideration and 
agreed to appoint a committee comprising senior officials of the 
member countries to map out a plan of action to deal with Japan.
46 
 
In August 1973, ASEAN submitted a joint memorandum to Japan in 
which the member countries expressed their grave concern over in-
creased synthetic rubber production. The memorandum urged the Japan-
ese government to take immediate steps to reduce the production and 
export of synthetic rubber and insisted strongly on establishing a 
direct consultation system between Japan and ASEAN over the issue. 
The memorandum further called Japan to play a more active role in up- 
lifting the economies of the ASEAN members.
47 
Japan responded immed-
iately to ASEAN joint memorandum and agreed to form a joint consultat-
ion system as demanded by ASEAN. This agreement eventually resulted 
in the establishment of the ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rubber 
(AJFSR) and in the subsequent discussions under the auspices of 
AJFSR, Japan agreed to limit her synthetic rubber production to assure 
that the Japanese synthetic rubber would not endanger the economies 
of ASEAN.
48 
In the following years, the ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rub-
ber gradually extended its scope and areas of consultation to cover 
trade, aid, industrial and agricultural development. These expanded 
activities necessitated the institutionalization of ASEAN-Japan dia-
logues on a permanent basis, and for this purpose, in 1977, the 
ASEAN-Japan Forum was established. So far the ASEAN-Japan Forum has 
held two meetings - one in Jakarta in.March 1977 and the other in 
November 1977 in Tokyo. In addition, the heads of ASEAN countries 
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met the former Prime Minister of Japan, Fukuda, in August 1977 at 
the summit conference held in Kuala Lumpur. 
In the discussions at the meetings of the ASEAN-Japan Forum and 
the summit have centred on issues relating to aid, trade, industrial 
development and cultural co-operation, of which the most important 
have been: 
I. Aid: ASEAN has requested •Japan to provide US$1 billion on 
concessional terms to implement the five ASEAN projects agreed to . by 
the heads of ASEAN countries at the Bali summit.
49 
Japan has accepted 
the request and reaffirmed its readiness to extend financial assist-
ance but on two conditions: first, that each industry should be identi-
fied by Tokyo as being an ASEAN project and second, that Japan , must 
be Satisfied that the proposed projects are feasible.
50 
Japan put forward these conditions because it wants to make sure 
that the projects are approved by all the members collectively before 
they are implemented. From the Japanese point of view such a guarantee 
is required as the ASEAN Secretariat has not developed a powerful 
bureaucracy of its own.
51 	
On the other hand, the feasibility condi 
tion has been put forward because Japan fears thatgreater output can 
result from the projects and that it will eventually need accommodation 
in Japanese markets. Therefore, Japan wants to make certain that the 
ASEAN market is sufficient to absorb the output of the five projects. 
Indonesia has submitted its feasibility study on the Urea project 
to Japan but Japan has not made a decision yet. According to pro-
jections of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the urea 
supply in ASEAN countries will exceed demand by 1982 if the proposed 
Indonsian Urea project is implemented. It was thought that the market-
ing problem might be further increased by the production of a 
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Malaysian urea project on which a feasibility study has just been 
finished by a Japanese expert team. If these results are likely to 
threaten the Japanese market, it is certain that Japan will not make 
available agreed financial assistance until ASEAN countries make 
necessary revisions in their plans in accordance with Japanese 
requirements.
52 
II. Trade: ASEAN has requested that Japan should take steps to 
make improvements in its Generalised System of Preferences by remov-
ing certain tariff and non-tariff barriers, thus ensuring improved 
access to Japanese markets for ASEAN manufactured and semi-manufact-
ured products. ASEAN has further demanded changes in the application 
of cumulative rules of origin to ASEAN products and in the base year 
used for determining ceilings for mining and manufactured imports 
from 1975 to 1976.
53 
With regard to these demands Japan has made no firm commitment 
except for declaring its readiness to give due consideration to 
ASEAN trading problems. However, as a result of pressure from ASEAN, 
in 1978 Japan agreed to liberalise the cumulative rules of origin 
applying to certain ASEAN products.
54 
Apart from this no favourable 
concessions have been offered in favour of ASEAN with regard to 
tariff, non-tariff barriers and the base year. 
III. Commodity Price Stabilization: Noting that the existing exports 
of ASEAN to Japan consist mainly of primary commodities, ASEAN has 
discussed with Japan the possibility of establishing a commodity 
price stabilization system for ASEAN commodities along the lines of 
STABEX scheme introduced by the EEC. The basic objective of the 
scheme is to provide emergency loans to ASEAN, either to each member 
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country or to the group as a whole when prices fall below a certain 
level, strictly determined through the market. The proposal has met 
with little success as Japan wants to see what will be the outcome of 
the current discussions at the UNCTAD on the implementation of the 
Integrated Commodity Policy. 55 However, at the summit conference, 
Fukuda promised that Japan would participate actively in formulating 
an international rubber price stabilization agreement acceptable to 
both producing and consuming nations. 
As far as ASEAN-Japan dialogues and the summit meeting are 
concerned, it is clear that ASEAN achievements are far from satis-
factory. Not only did ASEAN not receive any long-term commitments 
from Japan with regard to its major concerns, but also the commitments 
made by Japan seem to be somewhat ambivalent and tentative. Japan 
has always been reluctant to make any commitment which does not con-
form with the policies of the U.S.A. and the EEC over the issues like 
commodity price stabilization. On the other hand, Japan has been very 
careful not to apply any kind of discriminatory measures for ASEAN 
alone, as Japan fears that such measures would jeopardise her world-
wide trading relations, especially those with the other developing 
countries. 
- 
In the preceding discussion an attempt has been made to investi-
gate the emerging issues and problems of ASEAN's economic relations 
with the three major economic powers in the world today - the U.S.A., 
the EEC and Japan. Taken as a whole, the discussion suggests that 
ASEAN's achievements from its dealings with these economic powers 
necessarily remain marginal and in some cases ASEAN has achieved 
nothing at all. There have been various reasons for the failure of 
ASEAN. First as mentioned before, much of the ASEAN's economic 
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demands are either directly or indirectly involved with the Third 
World's demand for a new international economic order. Various inter-
national discussions are already underway seeking a world wide com-
promise between developed and developing countries. All the developed 
countries are waiting to know the outcome of these discussions and 
until then they do not want to give any short term solution for 
the commodities exported by ASEAN, which represent only a very small 
fraction of the whole Third World. 
Secondly, the current economic recession has made it quite diffi-
cult for the U.S.A., EEC and Japan to comply with ASEAN's demand for 
greater access to their markets for ASEAN's manufactured products. 
In particular, the growing unemployment in these countries has caused 
them to be more concerned with their labour intensive industries 
whether they are efficient or inefficient when compared to those of 
labour intensive industries of the ASEAN countries. 
Thirdly, unwillingness of ASEAN to make reciprocal commitments 
is another factor accounting for the failure of ASEAN in its dealings 
with developed countries. The ability of ASEAN to gain trade commit-
ments from other countries obviously depends on the strength of 
ASEAN commitment to free market-disciplined economic development. 
It is unrealistic for ASEAN to expect other countries to liberalise 
their tariff barriers while ASEAN is maintaining very high external 
tariff wall. Obviously, ASEAN would have achieved far better results 
from the U.S.A., the EEC and Japan, had ASEAN agreed to deal with 
them on the basis of complementation and efficient manufacturing 
development among them. 
Finally, it seems that ASEAN still lacks the necessary political 
will to employ its collective bargaining power effectively. As a 
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result, ASEAN has not been able to generate the necessary pressure 
on developed countries. The effectiveness of ASEAN's collective 
bargaining power depends not only on the unanimity of the five 
countries, but also on the extent to which ASEAN can exercise its 
'producer power' against developed countries. So far ASEAN has not 
made any attempt to use its producer power but its ability to do so 
in future also seems to be limited because of the conflicting 
economic interests of the member countries. 
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CHAPTER V. 
ASEAN and Australia : Recent Developments  
in Economic Relations. 
Recent economic relations between ASEAN and Australia have been 
highlighted by the growing opposition from ASEAN to Australia's 
regional economic policies. In the period after 1975, relations 
between ASEAN and Australia have rapidly -deteriorated with ASEAN 
unhappy about the various protectionist measures that Australia has 
adopted since 1974. The deteriorating relations reached the low 
point in February 1979 with the implementation of the new Internat-
ional Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) by Australia. Focusing mainly 
on these two issues, this chapter attempts to identify the essent-
ial interests of ASEAN in its relations with Australia, the steps 
that have been taken by ASEAN to promote its economic interests 
and the response of the Australian Government. 
The Origin and Development of Formal Links Between ASEAN and  
Australia  
The move towards the establishment of formal links between 
ASEAN and Australia started in 1973, when ASEAN expressed its desire 
and readiness to develop economic relations with Australia on a 
collective and permanent basis. In May 1973, the heads of ASEAN 
diplomatic missions to Canberra held an unofficial exploratory round 
of discussion with the Australian officials. At this meeting it was 
agreed to hold further discussions to seek ways and means of promot-
ing economic co-operation between the two parties. 
In January 1974, a team of Australian officials met the 
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Secretaries General of ASEAN in Bangkok. Discussions were mainly 
centred on the promotion of co-operation in such areas as trade, 
investment and technical assistance. ASEAN emphasised the increased 
participation of Australia in the economic development of ASEAN 
countries but insisted that future co-operation should not jeopardise 
the existing bilateral relations between Australian and individual 
ASEAN countries. 
The Bangkok meeting was followed by another meeting held in 
Canberra in April 1974. At this meeting, it was finally agreed by 
both parties that economic co-operation between ASEAN and Australia 
should be institutionalised. For this purpose, the ASEAN-Australian 
Dialogue was established (subsequently,name was changed to the ASEAN-
Australian Forum). At the Canberra meeting ASEAN reiterated the 
necessity to expand trade relations between ASEAN and Australia, but 
no final agreement was reached over the economic issues. 
With regard to Australian participation in the economic 
development of the member countries, ASEAN put forward four ASEAN 
joint projects and Australia was asked to give active support to see 
the projects off the ground. The projects were: (i) Protein Food 
Processing; (ii) ASEAN's Food Handling; (iii) Establishment of ASEAN's 
Consumer Protection Agency, and (iv) Research Centre for Education. 
The Protein Food Processing Project aimed at developing, distributing 
and utilising new forms of low cost protein rich foods, while the Food 
Handling Project aimed at an overall improvement in methods of handl-
ing, transporting and storing such products as fruits, vegetables, 
grain, fish and livestock products) 
 
In response to the ASEAN request, the Foreign Minister of 
Australia announced that Australia would contribute A$ 5 million 
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along with training facilities for ASEAN personnel attached to the 
four projects. In subsequent years considerable progress has been 
made in the implementation of the four projects, in particular the 
Protein Project and the Food Handling Project. 
Emerging Issues in Trade : The first ASEAN Joint Approach in 1976;  
Australia as the closest developed country is of great importance 
to ASEAN as a potential market for its primary and manufactured pro-
ducts. As reported in "Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970's", 
"Though a relatively small economy, Australia is a significant inter-
national market and her geographic position near Southeast Asia sug-
gests that she will be of growing importance as a market for certain 
raw materials and manufactured products".
2 
In the early 1970's, ASEAN exports to the Australian market be-
came highly competitive vis-a-vis Australian produced goods as a 
result of the various import liberalization measures introduced by the 
Australian government in the late sixties and early seventies. Dur-
ing this period, Australia had considerably increased the import of 
foreign manufactured goods in order to meet rising internal demand 
generated by the growth in incomes of Australian people associated 
with the mining boom of the sixties and early seventies. The import of 
foreign products was further encouraged by the effects of the Austra-
lian government'policies which introduced an equal pay for women' 
and brought about a large increase in minimum wage level.
3 
In July 
1973, tariffs on all imported products were cut by 25 per cent and in 
the same year the Australian dollar was revalued. As a consequence 
of these import liberalization measures, the Australian share of world 
import of labour intensive manufactured products rose from 1.9 per 
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cent in 1971 to 2.7 per cent in 1974.
4 
In the period after 1974, however, the entry of ASEAN exports 
to the Australian market has been severely affected by the various 
protectionist measures imposed by the Australian government on grounds 
of rising internal economic difficulties. In March 1974, a new quota 
system was imposed with a high tax surcharge on the items that exceed-
ed the prescribed limit provided under the quotas. Some of the high-
est nominal rates of protection on various clothing products were as 
high as 50 to 100 per cent. 5 In September 1974, the Australian 
dollar was devalued and since the mid-1970's, the Australian govern-
ment has continued to make various changes in its Generalised System 
of Preferences in order to protect the local labour intensive 
industries as a counter measure to the rising unemployment problem. 
Table 5.1 shows the change that occurred in the Australian tariff 
structure after 1974. 
Table 5.1 
Average Effective Rates of Assistance 
Provided by the Australian Government 
to Selected Labour Intensive Industries 
during the Period 1974-1976. 
1974-1975 	'1975-1976  
Textile 37 70 
Clothing 130 
Footwear 71 80 
Source: Debesh Bhattacharya, "Australia and a 
New International Economic Order", 
Australian Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, 
December 1978, p. 52. 
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The five ASEAN countries have been ranked among the top casu-
alities of the Australian protectionism but damage has been very 
uneven. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have been severely 
affected as the export of manufactured products has become an import-
ant element in their economic development in recent years. Singapore 
has been less affected as labour intensive manufactured products 
account only for a small fraction of Singapore's exports. Indonesia 
has also been less affected as it has only a relatively small export 
oriented manufacturing sector. 
At the discussions of the ASEAN-Australian Forum,ASEAN has con-
sistently expressed its dissatisfaction with the existing pattern 
of trade between the two parties. The existing pattern has always 
been in favour of Australia which has consistently had a huge surplus 
in its trade with ASEAN. Table* 5.2 provides data relating to trade 
between Australia and ASEAN. 
Table 5.2  
Trade Between ASEAN and Australia  
(A$ Million) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1976 
1977 
Australian Exports 
to ASEAN 
182 216 297 389 502 725 659 671 
Australian Imports 
from ASEAN 98 108 87 107 194 245 317 457 
Trade Balance . +84 +108 +210 +282 +308 +480 +342 +214 
Note : + denotes surplus 
Source : Dyason House Papers, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
September 1978, p. 6. 
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As the figures indicate, trade between ASEAN and Australia 
increased rapidly over the period 1966 -1976 with Australia enjoy-
ing a huge trade surplus. During the period concerned, Australian 
exports to ASEAN increased threefold from A$ 182 million in 1966/67 
to A$ 671 million in 1976/77. During the same period Australian 
imports from ASEAN increased fourfold from A$ 98 million in 1966/67 
to A$ 457 million in 1976/77. However, the growth rate in imports 
had not been fast enough to offset the huge trade surplus that Aust-
ralia had consistently enjoyed since the late 1960's. 
Thus, at the discussions ASEAN strongly demanded the modification 
of the import restrictions imposed since 1974 in order to assure an 
improved access to the Australian market for ASEAN exports but the 
ASEAN request was largely ignored. However, in response to: mounting 
opposition from ASEAN to Australia's regional economic policies, in 
1976, the Australian government put forward a proposal to establish 
an ASEAN-Australian Joint Trade Committee with the following terms 
of reference.
6 
(i) Exchange of information on trade and 
• . commercial matters; 
(ii) Exploring measures for .expanding ASEAN-Australian 
trade and developing proposals for trade . 
co-operation; 
(iii) Identifying and exploring measures for the 
solution of trade problems; 
(iv) Studying the scope of Australian participation 
in ASEAN economic development projects. . 
The proposal was turned down by ASEAN without serious consider-
ation. In response to the Australian proposal, in November 1976, 
ASEAN submitted a joint memorandum to the Australian government 
criticising the Australian protectionist measures and the other 
regional economic policies. The memorandum started its attack on 
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Australian protectionism by stating, "The sound development of ASEAN 
exports to Australia is hampered by trade barriers. For a developed 
country, Australia has one of the highest tariff rates, especially 
on labour intensive light industrial goods exported by developing 
countries. An increasing number of such items as furniture, forest 
products, footwear, yarns, textile and garment products etc. are 
constantly placed under tariff review for protection purposes". 7 The 
memorandum was highly critical of the Australian System of Tariff 
Preferences(ASTP) and stated that, "Although Australia was the first 
developed country to grant tariff preferences to the developing 
countries the benefits derived therefrom have been far below the 
expectations of the ASEAN member countries. In fact the ASTP has 
not really contributed towards any substantial increase in exports 
of the ASEAN member countries to Australia ... because of the scheme's 
limited product coverage, the low level of tariff reductions, the 
existence of a quota system and stringent definitions of handicrafts".
8 
Thus in order to ensure improved access to the Australian market for 
ASEAN exports, the memorandum suggested among other things
9 . 
. 
(a) Wide product coverage to include 87 new categories 
of products of export interest to ASEAN - including 
a wide range of primary products, fabricated timber, 
textiles, machine tools, mechanical and industrial 
• machinery and electrical parts. 
(b) Substantial reduction in tariffs on 75 categories of 
products presently covered by the ASTP. 
(c) Removal of recent Australian restriction which had 
the adverse effect of excluding a number of ASEAN 
handicrafts from the list of products eligible for 
preferences. 
(d) Liberalization of stringent rules of labelling 
and packaging. 
On shipping, the memorandum suggested that, "Australia persuade 
shipping lines to refrain from introducing excessive freight rises, 
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improve handling facilities, open more ports to products of interest 
to ASEAN and relax stringent navigation regulations".
10 
The memorandum was officially a joint approach and signed by all 
the five members. By submitting the memorandum, as it was reported 
in the Far Eastern Economic Review, "ASEAN left open the possibility 
of future co-operation - but only if Australia increases its economic 
and technical aid to developing nations, reduces its tariffs and 
import quotas and adopts 'more equitable' shipping rates". '' 
It appeared that Malaysia and the Philippines had played a key 
role in the preparation of the joint memorandum. Also these two 
countries were the most critical of Australia's external economic 
policies since their major exports such as coconut oil, clothing, 
textiles and various rubber products to the Australian market were 
severely hit by Australian protectionism. Of ASEAN countries, Malay-
sia had the largest trade deficit in its trade with Australia; it 
was A$ 111 million in 1976. The reluctance of Australia to make 
trade concessions led Malaysia to seek various retaliatory actions 
against Australia and in June 1977, the Malaysian Trade Ministry 
threatened that the Malaysian government was planning to narrow the 
existing trade deficit. 
The Ministry did not disclose the way in which the government was 
going to narrow the deficit but the Malaysian Trade Commissioner to 
Australia declared that, "Malaysia at present has more options than 
ever before, ... Malaysia has been faced with two possible ways to 
narrow the gap. One is negative; to buy less from Australia. The 
other one is to sell more to Australia. The second alternative has 
become more difficult in the last eighteen months because of Austral-
ian import restrictions".
12 
Accordingly, in the same month, the 
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Malaysian Minister for Trade and Industry, Abu Sameh, threatened 
Australia that Malaysia was considering cutting off its wheat im-
ports from Australia worth about A$ 36 million. Furthermore, Austra-
lia was notified that Malaysia would like to re-negotiate the sugar 
contract between the two countries under which Malaysia agreed to 
import 1.65 million tonnes of Australian sugar over the period of 
six years. Apart from these Malaysia's retaliatory actions 
included
13
: 
- advising importers to look for alternative sources 
of the products that they have been traditionally 
buying from Australia including wheat, sugar and 
dairy products; 
- taking action to slow down the entry of Australian 
imports into Malaysia; 
- notifying Australia that Malaysia would like to 
review the 19 year old Malaysian trade agreement 
with Australia in which each agreed to accord 
preferential treatment for certain products (timber 
and rubber products from Malaysia; wheat and milk-
based products from Australia) to ensure mutually 
beneficial terms. 
Meanwhile the Philippines also appeared to be engaged in an 
undisclosed trade war with Australia by taking various retaliatory 
actions against Australia. The Philippines' Central Bank began to 
delay issuing letters of credit for the import of certain Australian 
products while the government refused to ratify a trade agreement 
signed in June 1976 with Australia until the Philippines was satis-
fied over its trade relations with Australia. (This agreement was 
ratified in 1979.) 
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The Australian Response. 
It is widely accepted that the joint approach of ASEAN and 
the subsequent retaliatory actions of Malaysia and the Philippines 
have brought ASEAN-Australian relations into a new era. As Frank 
Frost has put it, "... until 1975 ASEAN was of minor significance 
for Australia in its relations with Southeast Asia, primarily because 
the scope of ASEAN's own co-operation was modest. A combination of 
factors including a pattern of rising manufactured exports from 
some ASEAN members, Australian import restrictions after 1974 and 
ASEAN's greater sense of purpose after 1975, produced the circum-
stances in which ASEAN challenged the legitimacy of Australia's exist-
ing economic relationship with its members in its joint approach in 
1976. ASEAN's joint approach has already been influential in 
directing greater attention to the international implication of 
Australian domestic economic policies. The Australian government 
has had great difficulty in formulating an effective response to 
ASEAN's criticism and the decisions at Kuala Lumpur postponed rather 
than resolved the outstanding issues".
14
- 
The problems faced by Australia with regard to the 
fOrmulation of an effective response to ASEAN have political 
and economic aspects. Politically, the Australian dilemma has been 
how to respond to ASEAN without damaging Australia's long estab-
lished political relations with ASEAN. Since the inception of ASEAN 
in 1967, Australia used to make various diplomatic overtures 
supporting the existence of ASEAN and Australia has always emphasised 
the role which ASEAN has to play in bringing peace and political 
stability to Southeast Asia. On numerous occasions Australia has 
expressed its desire to develop friendly relations with ASEAN and 
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both the Labour and Liberal-National Country Party (L-NCP) govern-
ments have given ASEAN a special emphasis in their foreign policy 
formulation. 
It was in the expectation that ASEAN would soon turn itself into 
an anti-communist military bloc that the establishment of ASEAN in 
1967 was warmly welcomed by the then L-NCP government. The Minister 
of External Affairs declared that, "We are involved in regional 
defence arrangements, and whether it was ASEAN or any other arrange-
ment of nations in this area which agreed to group itself for defence 
purposes, we would think this a healthy development".
15 
The Labor government which came into power in 1972, also strong-
ly supported the basic aims and objectives of ASEAN.- Unlike the 
L-NCP government, the Labor government put much emphasis on the econ-
omic aspect of ASEAN. The Labor government believed that non-mili-
tary co-operation would be the best way to reduce ideological tension 
in the region as well as for the economic development of ASEAN 
countries. In January 1974, the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, 
paid an official visit to ASEAN and during his visit he was reported 
to have said, "ASEAN is unquestionably the most important, the most 
relevant and the most natural of all the regional arrangements and 
associations of Southeast Asia".
16 
When the L-NCP came into power in 1975, the Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Fraser, reiterated the readiness Of the Australian govern-
ment to develop friendly relations with ASEAN. The Prime Minister 
himself made an official tour of ASEAN in January 1976. In a speech 
given in Singapore, he strongly criticised the previous government's 
attitudes toward ASEAN and promised to give special attention to 
ASEAN under his administration. It was reported that the Prime 
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Minister offered to hold joint discussions with the ASEAN political 
leaders but the offer was rejected by ASEAN as premature.
17 
Stressing the need to develop friendly relations with ASEAN, 
in a statement to the Parliament in March 1976, the Foreign Minister, 
Andrew Peacock, declared that, "The government attaches the great- 
: 
 
est importance toconsolidating and developing our close relationship . 
with the five members of ASEAN, both individually and collectively. 
On their two basic political priorities - the determination to see 
a region free of great power rivalry and domination and the concern 
to develop harmonious and co-operative relations among the countries 
of the region themselves - we are in full agreement with them. The 
government recognizes that, while political and security consider-
ations will always be vitally important and while aid in various 
forms is, for the foreseeable future, indispensable, the ASEAN 
countries are increasingly concerned to develop their economic rela-
tions with Australia. We, for our part, are determined that they 
shall be developed, for we fully recognize the importance of healthy 
economic growth in the region and the importance of expanding trade 
for the developing economies generally. We have stated our position 
on this matter". 18 
Thus, for political, security and economic reasons, 
ASEAN has long been regarded as vitally important for Australia and 
as a result, every Australian government has increasingly tended to 
woo ASEAN with various political and economic commitments. 
On the economic front, the Australian dilemma has been how to 
respond to ASEAN while protecting Australia's economic interests. 
Almost all the ASEAN demands are related to either the abolition or 
the modification of the protectionist measures introduced since 
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1974. Most of the protectionist measures have been introduced 
with a view to overcoming the growing unemployment problem which 
was estimated to be around 7 per cent of the total work force when 
the first set of trade restrictions were implemented in 1974. The 
local labour intensive manufacturing sector appeared to be highly 
vulnerable to international competition and as a result, the govern-
ment felt that it should be protected until the government was 
able to overcome the current economic difficulties. 
With regard to the trade issues, ASEAN's objectives have been 
twofold. First, in the short-run, ASEAN has wanted the Fraser govern-
ment - at the very least - "... to cease raising levels of protect-
ionism on items of import interest to ASEAN, and to make a firm 
commitment to start the process of trade liberalization soon".
19 
Second, in the long run ASEAN appears to be anticipating the estab-
lishment of an ASEAN-Japan-Australia Economic Community in which 
goods from Australia, especially primary products destined 
for Southeast Asian industries, would have assured markets in ex-
change for a progressive lowering of Australian trade barriers and 
by implication, the phasing out of labour intensive industries 
there".
20 
 All these economic demands are obviously in conflict 
with the economic policies implemented by the Fraser government in 
order to overcome the current internal economic difficulties. 
With regard to the ASEAN joint approach, the Australian govern-
ment finally decided that it should make everyeffort to defend cur-
rent economic policies until Australia recovered from the present 
economic recession, while reaffirming Australia's long-term commit-
ments to maintain close and friendly relations with ASEAN. This 
has been the central theme of Australian policy toward ASEAN in the 
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period after 1976. The Australian determination to defend its 
current economic policies was clearly manifested during Foreign 
Minister Andrew Peacock's tour to ASEAN in April 1977, the Solo 
discussions in July 1977 and the Kuala Lumpur Summit in August 1977. 
The first task undertaken by the Australian government in 
connection with the joint approach was the establishment of the 
Inter-departmental Standing Committee in January 1977. The Committee 
was composed of senior officials from the various departments - 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Treasury, Overseas Trade, 
Industry and Commerce, Business and Consumer Affairs. The Committee 
was assigned to review and monitor all aspects of Australia's rela-
tions with ASEAN and advise the government on future policy 
formulation towards ASEAN. 21 
In July 1979, the Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, toured 
three ASEAN countries - Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
During the discussions, the Foreign Minister explained to those three 
countries the reasons which led Australia to impose various trade 
restrictions on imports and he promised that, as Australia returned 
to economic health, the Federal Government would progressively re-
duce industry protection and liberalize trade in the interests of 
better relations with the Third World.
22 
In May 1977, senior officials from both Australia and ASEAN 
met in Solo, Indonesia, to discuss current problems relating to 
trade. At this meeting, it was repo rted that "ASEAN official reit- 
erated their concern at rising protectionist tendencies in Australia, 
their unhappiness over the growing ASEAN trade deficit with Australia 
and their desire for better access to the Australian market for 
ASEAN manufactured products and semi-processed products".23 
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Once again ASEAN demands were largely ignored and Australia 
defended its protectionist policies uncomprisingly. The Australian 
counter arguments centred mainly on four points.
24 
0) Although ASEAN's trade imbalance with Australia 
worsened in absolute terms from a deficit of 
A$ 209.7 million in 1970-1971 to a deficit of 
A$ 342.3 million last financial year (1976), 
Australia's imports from ASEAN increased at an 
annual growth rate of 29.04 per cent compared with 
a 17.3 per cent increase in Australia's exports to 
ASEAN countries. 
(ii)The trade imbalance fell from a ratio of 3.4 : 1 
five years ago to 2 : 1 last year. 
(iii)ASEAN's trade deficit with Australia arose basically 
from the smaller base on which ASEAN growth had 
been operating. 
(iv) If current rates of growth in imports and exports 
between ASEAN and Australia continued, an overall 
balance in trade would be reached by 1983-1984. 
The Australian officials further argued that about two-
thirds of Australian imports were duty free and the average rate 
of duty on the remainder was about 20 per cent. They point- 
ed out that only 4 per cent of the total imports were brought under 
the quota restrictions and argued that such restrictions were 
deemed necessary because of growing domestic economic problems. 
The Australian officials showedthat Australia was one of the leading 
importers of labour intensive products among the Western developed 
countries on a per capita basis, as average Australian imports 
per head were $2.18 versus $0.63 cents for the United States, 
$0.27 cents for the EEC and $0.25 cents for Japan.25 
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The Solo arguments were further elaborated in al briefing 
paper issued by the Australian government in August 1977. Reaffirm-
ing Australia's long-term commitments to developing friendly rela-
tions with ASEAN, the briefing paper said that, "... Australia appre-
ciates the particular desire of the ASEAN countries to foster their 
overall economic relations with Australia. The government has em- 
phasised that such relationship will be developed". Noting the 
existing trade imbalance between Australia and ASEAN, the paper 
said, "The imbalance is likely to continue as long as Australia re-
mains a significant competitive source of increasing quantities of 
foodstuffs, raw materials and equipment deemed necessary for the 
economic development of the ASEAN countries". It went on to say 
that "... the trade deficit was partially offset by the invisible 
capital flows to ASEAN countries, which in 1975-1976 amounted to 
A$ 161 million." The paper justified the protectionist measures 
introduced since 1974 by stating that "... the reaction of the 
Australian government was not, as some countries may well have done, 
to ban all imports of products which were competing with the sensi-
tive Australian industries involved. Instead, the government took 
steps to limit, but not prohibit, imports in line with procedures 
followed when industries-seek relief from higher level's of import 
competition. ASEAN exports to Australia in the short-term would 
pose difficult problems for Australia but long-term developments 
in the Australian economy may be expected to provide greater oppor-
tunities for ASEAN".
26 
The Kuala Lumpur Summit f August 1977  
The ASEAN heads of states held their second summit meeting 
in August 1977 to mark the tenth anniversary of ASEAN. Before the 
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summit meeting a decision was taken to invite the Prime Ministers 
of Japan, Australia and New Zealand to hold joint discussions on 
matters of mutual interest. Accordingly, the ASEAN political 
leaders met the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, on 
7 August 1977, at Kuala Lumpur. 
The summit discussions covered a wide range of issues including 
co-operation in political and economic spheres, Australian develop-
ment assistance to ASEAN, participation in the promotion of the 
NIE0 goals, protectionism of developed countries and trade issues 
between ASEAN and Australia. Trade issues dominated the whole series 
of discussions but Australia remained adamant to ASEAN criticisms. 
ASEAN request for more trade was repeatedly rejected. Instead, 
Australia opted to give more aid but this offer was entirely in 
conflict with ASEAN's basic demands. With regard to the trade 
issues, the only solution suggested by the Prime Minister was to set 
up a joint consultative mechanism between Australia and ASEAN to 
discuss trade problems and to recommend appropriate solutions. As 
the Prime Minister had argued, this mechanism would be able.to  act 
as an early device on the question of access of products to the 
Australian market. 
With regard to the other issues, the heads of government of 
ASEAN and Australia reached a series of agreements at the Kuala Lumpur 
summit meeting. Australia reiterated its readiness to support the 
new international economic order, agreed to increase scientific and 
technical assistance to ASEAN and promised to participate actively in 
other economic co-operation programmes such as tourism and energy 
development. The Australian Prime Minister informed the ASEAN leaders 
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that Australia had decided to take the following measures to enhance 
the Australian Development Assistance Programme to ASEAN.
27 
(a) A new commitment of A$ 10 million to support 
joint development projects under the 
Australian-ASEAN Economic Co-operation Programme. 
(b) Increasing the level of Australia's bilateral 
aid to ASEAN countries by A$ 90 million to 
A$ 250 million. 
(c) Contributing to aspects of agreed ASEAN 
regional industrial projects as they become 
more fully defined, within the skills and 
resources available from Australia. 
(d) An extension of untying Australia's aid to 
allow greater procurement from within the ASEAN 
region of materials and equipment having 
substantial local content. 
(e) Adoption of the principle of paying local costs 
associated with aid projects in ASEAN countries 
by funding up to 50 per centof project costs, 
or the estimated foreign exchange component, 
whichever is the greater. 
(f) Greater participation by Australia in co-financing 
arrangements with a view to more effective and 
efficient allocation of aid funds where this is 
considered appropriate by the recipient country. 
(g) Sponsorship of an ASEAN-Australia investment 
seminar which was proposed by ASEAN. 
The Australian protectionism was the central issue in the 
bilateral discussions between the Prime Ministers ofAustralia, 
Malaysia and Singapore at the Regional Meeting of the Commonwealth 
Heads of States held in Sydney in February 1978. Both Datuk 
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Hussein Onn (Malaysia) and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) repeatedly 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the current trading practices 
of Australia and requested the Australian Prime Minister to recon-
sider the restrictions imposed on the products which •were of 
interest to ASEAN. Once again their demands were totally rejected.
28 
Taken as a whole, the preceding discussion suggests that ASEAN 
has failed to achieve any tangible result from its dealings with 
Australia. However, it has been widely accepted that the ASEAN 
joint approach has generated a considerable amount of pressure on 
the Australian manufacturing sector as wider and wider sections of 
the Australian manufacturing sector have been forced into structural 
changes. 
It seems that the current problems in Australia's trade with 
ASEAN have been confined to a rleatively few industries such as 
textiles, clothing and footwear production. There have been numerous 
arguments which suggest that Australia should re-structure its 
industrial sector in order to accommodate the industrial devel-
opment in ASEAN countries.
29 
These arguments have shown that the 
Australian labour intensive industrial sector employs only about 
two per cent of the total workforce and part of it can possibly 
survive with freer trade. It has been further indicated that the 
amount of structural changes required to accommodate the problems 
in Australia's import trade with ASEAN is relatively small and Aust-
ralia can offset those problems by expanding its exports to the 
region which currently represents a big market for Australian pro-
ducts such as wheat, dairy products, beef and sugar.
30 
Though the Australian government appears to have accepted the • 
necessity to re-structure the industrial sector, the government 
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feels that it is not politically feasible for the immediate future 
because of the growing unemployment problem.
31 
This was clearly 
indicated by a statement issued by the Minister for Industry and 
Consumer Affairs on 14 July, 1977. The statement said that the 
existing levels of employment in the textiles, footwear and clothing 
industries would be maintained by government support for the next 
three years.
32 
Any attempt to support the existing labour intensive 
industries means that not only has Australia to maintain the cur-
rent restrictive trade practices, but also it may have to seek 
further restrictions in future as the existing industries appear 
to be highly vulnerable to foreign competition. Such a move would 
certainly aggravate the already deteriorating economic relations 
between Australia and ASEAN. 
The Low Air Fare Issue : Second ASEAN Joint Approach in 1979. 
Another important economic issue which led ASEAN, for the 
second time, to challenge the legitimacy of Australia's existing 
economic relations with the ASEAN countries, wasthe new Internation-
al Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) implemented by Australia with 
effect from 1 February 1979.- ICAP introduced a new cheap air 
fare system between Australia and Great Britain (subsequently ex-
tended to cover other European capitals), under which the return 
air fare between Sydney and London was reduced to A$ 568 in 
the off-peak season (two months of the year) and A$ 998 in the peak 
season (five months of the year) with several restrictions, one 
being the restriction on stopovers. Travellers intending 
to make a stopover tad to pay an additional A$ 432 in the 
off-peak season and A$ 302 in the peak season. The two national 
air lines - Qantas and British Airways - were given an 
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exclusive right to carry passengers between the two end points, 
thus having a duopoly of passenger carriage. 
Australia implemented the new cheap air fare policy aMidst 
ASEAN protests and requests for re-negotiations. Though the damage 
to ASEAN economies from the new air fare system appeared very un-
even,
33 
all the member countries of ASEAN took a similar view that 
the new policy would be a serious threat to their tourist industry 
and civil aviation industry for the following four reasons: the 
high surcharge imposed on stopovers, the exclusion of ASEAN air lines 
from the new air fare system, the call by Qantas and British Airways 
on Singapore Air Lines to reduce its passenger capacity by 40 per 
cent on Singapore-Australia and Singapore-London routes, and finally 
the decision of Qantas and British Airways to maintain airfares on 
the Australia-ASEAN sector, and the British-ASEAN sector at a higher 
level, on a cost per mile basis, than the Australian-London through 
fares.
34 
In the first instance,Australia rejected ASEAN's claims as 
grossly exaggerated and unfair. However, in response to the mount-
ing opposition from ASEAN to ICAP and ASEAN's threat to take retal-
iatory action against Australia, the Australian government agreed 
•to call a meeting to discuss the remaining problems between the two 
parties. Accordingly, senior officials from Australia and ASEAN 
met in Canberra in January 1979. The result was a deadlock as 
neither party was prepared to change its initial stand over the 
issue, but they finally agreed to hold a second round of discussions 
as soon as possible. ASEAN suggested that the next meeting should 
be held at ministerial level and in one of the ASEAN capitals. 
Accordingly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, and 
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the Minister for Transport, Nixon, met their ASEAN counterparts 
in Jakarta on 20-21 March 1979. 
ASEAN put forward a four point programme for negotiations - 
ASEAN countries should be allowed to participate in the Australia-
Europe low air fare scheme with or without stopovers; reasonable 
stopover charges should be implemented; capacity and landing rights 
should be increased and finally air fares between ASEAN-Australia 
and ASEAN-Great Britain should be decided on the same basis used 
to decide the airfares between Australia and Great Britain. 35 The 
Jakarta meeting also ended without reaching any agreement as Austra-
lia could not agree with the ASEAN's basic demands. However, both 
parties agreed to continue discussions until they would be able 
to reach a reasonable agreement over the issue. 
The third round of discussions between ASEAN and Australia 
over the airfare issue started on 5 May 1979, in Kuala Lumpur. 
At this meeting an agreement was reached to allow ASEAN air lines - 
Singapore Air Lines, Malaysian Air Line System, Indonesian Garunda 
Air Lines, Thai Airways and the Philippines Air Lines to partici- 
pate on the low air fare scheme between Australia and Europe. The 
five air lines were allowed on a collective basis to carry 350 
passengers in each direction - a total of 700 seats per week. With 
regard to stopovers, it was further agreed to set a new rate of 
A$ 150 but the passengers would be allowed only one stopover on a 
round-trip between Australia and Europe.
36 
With the outcome of the Kuala Lumpur talks, the airfare issue 
came to an end. In concluding, it can be said that ASEAN won 
the battle, though it was given only a limited participation. 
The airfare issue was an important land mark of the ASEAN history 
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as it became a test case of ASEAN solidarity and the ASEAN joint 
approach towards foreign economic policy. There_were many specu-
lations that ASEAN would not be able to formulate a common stand 
against Australia because of divergent national interests of the 
member countries. However, the unanimous decision by the Economic 
Ministers of ASEAN to approach Australia on a collective basis, and 
the subsequent decision to take retaliatory actions against Austra-
lia if no satisfactory solution was found to the dispute, has 
proved that maintaining ASEAN solidarity at this juncture 
has higher priority than maintaining amicable ASEAN-Australian 
relations.
37 
It is generally accepted-that ASEAN worked as a - 
more united group over the airfare issue than it ever did before. 
Once again the Australian dilemma was how to respond to ASEAN 
while safeguarding its twin objectives - maintaining friendly 
relations with ASEAN and protecting its economic and commercial
•interests at the same time. As in the case of trade issues, the 
initial stand of Australia over the airfare issue was tough and 
uncompromising. However, in the end, Australia had to change 
its uncompromising stand and accommodate ASEAN, at least to a 
• limited extent. From the Australian point of view, ASEAN has been 
given only limited concessions subject to a number bf conditions. 
But from the ASEAN point of view, it has achieved exactly what it 
wants. As one commentator has put it, "..• although the air lines 
collectively will be able to fly only 350 passengers a week out of 
Australia and 350 in on the fares, the offer from Mr. Nixon gives 
them exactly what they want 7 the right to advertise lower fares in 
Australia. It is almost certain that once the ASEAN airlines are 
allowed to take part in the scheme they will discount heavily, even 
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on seats which they are not legally allowed to sell at a cut 
price".
38 
In conclusion, it can be said that ASEAN-Australian relations 
have deteriorated rapidly in recent years with ASEAN unhappy about 
Australian protectionism. The existing problems have been further 
complicated by the airfare issue and as a result relations between 
the two parties have further deteriorated. Any improvement in 
ASEAN-Australian relations in future largely depends on the extent 
to which Australia is prepared to adjust itself in accordance with 
the development aims of its northern neighbours. 
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CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the factors accounting for the formation of 
ASEAN leads one to the conclusion that the five countries grouped 
themselves together in 1967 for political, security and economic 
reasons of which political motivations were the most important. In 
the political sphere, their main concern was the strengthening of 
national stability in the face of growing communist threat and the 
rivalries between great powers in regional political affairs. On 
the economic front, their main concern was the acceleration of 
economic development which was regarded as essential if the five 
countries were to deal effectively with the contemporary political 
problems faced by them. In particular, the existing poverty of the 
masses was identified as a principal driving force for the growing 
appeal of communism in ASEAN countries, and therefore, it was argued 
that the elimination of poverty would be one of the best means of 
combating communism. In retrospect, none of the five countries was 
in a strong position individually to handle the political and econ-
omic problems they faced, and as a result, all of them realised that 
their survival, in particular as non-communist nations, would largely 
depend on their ability, to co-operation in regional political and 
economic affairs. 
ASEAN's Political Activities  
On a broad basis, ASEAN's political activities during the last 
twelve years can be grouped into three sections as follows: 
(i) co-operation in intra-ASEAN politics, (ii) co-operation in 
security and military affairs, and (iii) co-operation in extra-
regional affairs. 
169. 
With regard to co-operation in intra-ASEAN politics, ASEAN's 
achievements during the period concerned are quite satisfactory. 
The growth of ASEAN as a viable regional organization and the recog-
nition that ASEAN has increasingly gained from the other parts of 
the world in recent years are indicators of the progress made by the 
five countries in the area of intra-ASEAN politics. The successful 
growth of ASEAN is mainly due to the mechanism which the five countries 
havegradually developed over the years to solve peacefully the prob-
lems of intra-ASEAN politics. 
When ASEAN was established in 1967. there were many doubts 
about its long-term prospects as the unresolved political problems 
between the member countries often appeared to be weakening the 
newly formed organization. Thus, the first task confronted by the 
five countries was to build up a political consensus among themselves 
by settling their internal disputes. Over the years, the five count-
ries have shown a marked progress in developing a habit of regional 
co-operation, one important feature of which has been their readi-
ness to solve disputes between themselves by peaceful means. This 
process has helped them to overcome most of the internal political 
problems which could otherwise have created frictions among themselves 
and destroyed their unity to a very large extent. Examples have 
been the solutions reached by the member countries over such criti-
cal issues as the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines, 
the conflict between Indonesia and Singapore over the execution •of 
two marines and the border dispute between Thailand and Malaysia. 
The growing political consensus among the member countries 
was further strengthened by the Bali summit of 1967, that provided 
an opportunity for all five political leaders of ASEAN to meet each 
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other for the first time in the history of ASEAN. The Bali dis-
cussions had helped them to a very great extent to understand each 
others aspirations. One important achievement from the Bali summit 
was the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia which 
marked the highest point of the growing political togetherness 
among the five countries. As a result, relations between ASEAN count-
ries in the period after 1967 have been very cordial. 
 
With regard to the promotion of co-operation in military and • 
• security affairs, only a limited progress has been achieved by 
ASEAN. This slow progress is mainly due to the divergent opinions 
of the member countries over the security and military issues. 
Indonesia,the Philippines and Thailand seem to be favouring an in-
creased co-operation in military and security affairs while Malaysia 
and Singapore seem to be less interested. In recent years, Thailand 
has been the most outspoken member of ASEAN of military co-operation. 
In particular, Thailand's concern over the co-operation in security 
and military affairs appears to have increased since the Vietnam's 
invasion of Cambodia in the early part of 1979. In the recent past, 
there have been a number of small scale border clashes between Thai-
land and its neighbouring communist countries and as a result, Thai-
land seems to be pressing on its fellow member countries the need to 
increase co-operation in security and military affairs. The border 
clashes are mainly due to the guerilla activities launched against 
the new Vietnam-backed, Cambodian government, by Cambodian refugees 
who are presently. sheltered on the Thailand-Cambodian border. If 
Thailand can find a proper solution to the refugee problem, then there 
will be a greater potential for reducing the current tension between 
Thailand and the Indo-Chinese communist states. 
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As far as the external security of the ASEAN countries is 
concerned, it seems that there is no immediate threat of direct 
military attack or invasion of ASEAN countries by the Indo-Chinese 
communist states. However, it can be assumed that the Indo-Chinese 
states would encourage internal communist movements in ASEAN count- 
. ries to accelerate their revolutionary activities by extending 
moral support as well as material support. Thus the actual threat 
to the national security of ASEAN countries seems to be more inter-
nal rather than external. Despite the heavy programmes of suppres-
sion launched by the ASEAN governments in recent years, communist 
activities still remain at a considerably high level in almost all 
the ASEAN countries, thus, posing serious internal security problems. 
ASEAN countries have yet to formulate an ASEAN joint approach to 
internal security issues, but there are various bilateral agreements 
concerning the promotion of co-operation in internal security mat-
ters between individual ASEAN countries. 
The five members have consistently ruled out any possibility 
of organising a direct military alliance under the ASEAN umbrella. 
Will ASEAN turn itself into a military bloc in future? It is quite 
difficult to provide a proper answer to this question at this stage. 
However, it can be assumed that ASEAN's future attitudes regarding 
the external security issues will largely depend on the future poli-
cies of the neighbouring communist countries towards ASEAN. If there 
is a threat of direct military attack on ASEAN countries, then there 
will be a greater possibility of turning ASEAN itself into a 
direct military bloc. 
With regard to the co-operation in extra-ASEAN politics, in 
particular the conduct of relations with the neighbouring communist 
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countries, ASEAN has made substantial progress in recent years. 
Perhaps the most important achievement in this area has been the 
increased recognition that ASEAN has gained from the neighbouring 
communist countries that it is not an anti-communist military .  
organization. 
In recent years, relations between ASEAN and China have mark-
edly improved, but Indonesia and Singapore have yet to establish 
relations at diplomatic level. Normalisation of relations between 
Indonesia and China is only a matter of time and there is a great 
deal of speculation that it will occur in the near future. Singapore 
appears to be waiting until Indonesia normalises relations with 
China. The growing relationship between ASEAN and China is mainly 
due to the changing political environment in Southeast Asia. Worsen-
ing Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnam relations along with the changing 
American attitudes towards Southeast Asia have caused China to 
change its initial antipathetic stance towards ASEAN and now China 
would like to see ASEAN developing itself as a buffer , zone to 
counter the expansionist activities of the Soviet Union and Vietnam 
in the region. As a result, in recent years, China has become one 
of the ardent supporters of ASEAN. 
Despite some disagreements between ASEAN and Vietnam over 
such issues as the Vietnamese refugee problem and Vietnam's invasion 
of Cambodia, in general, relations between ASEAN countries and Viet-
nam also appear to have improved in recent years. As in the case 
of China, Vietnam has also changed its initial hard line attitude 
towards ASEAN with the changing political circumstances in Southeast 
Asia. The principal factor behind the Vietnam's change is the 
worsening relations between Vietnam and China. 
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Though relations between ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese communist 
states appear to have improved rapidly in recent years, ASEAN has 
yet to formulate a common policy to conduct relations with Indo-
Chinese states on a collective basis. The current progress is a 
result of efforts made by individual ASEAN countries, in particular .  
by Malaysia, which has improved relations with Indo-Chinese commun-
ist states more than any other member country of ASEAN. However, 
a tradition has been developed to consult each other before under-
taking major foreign policy initiatives. 
The current improvement in the relations between ASEAN and 
the Indo-Chinese communist states, however, does not indicate that 
the two parties have reached a consensus over the existing differ- 
ences born out of their contradictory political, economic and social 
concepts. Despite the apparently genuine sentiments on both sides 
to seek a common ground for lasting peace and mutual understanding, 
both ASEAN and Indo-Chinese communist states have a long way to go 
before they can overcome the existing differences. There is a 
great deal of potential for political conflicts between ASEAN and 
Indo-Chinese communist states, as they represent entirely different 
political, economic and social systems. Thus, the future develop-
ments in relations between ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese communist 
states will largely depend on the extent to which ASEAN and these 
states are able to understand each others political and social 
visions and their readiness to adjust to each others political, 
economic and social aspirations. 
As noted in the first chapter, the only common policy which 
ASEAN has initiated in the area of extra-ASEAN politics is the pro-
posal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, yet it still remains 
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only a talking point rather than a commonly accepted policy. 
recent years, except for the U.S.A., all the other countries 
including China, the Soliiet Union and Vietnam have shown some 
interest in the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, but a common 
agreement over the issue is yet to be reached. The U.S. participa-
tion is .essential for the implementation of the proposal, but the 
U.S. has already indicated that it will not support the proposal. 
In addition, there are many differences between ASEAN and Vietnam 
over the existing military bases in Thailand and the Philippines. 
Vietnam insists that as a pre-condition all the military bases 
should be dismantled before making any positive approach towards 
the implementation of the proposal. ASEAN has yet to make a decision 
over the existing military bases, but it is most likely that ASEAN 
will not make a decision to remove military bases until the neutral-
isation of Southeast Asia is fully guaranteed by the countries 
outside ASEAN. 
Co-operation in Intra-regional Economic Affairs  
As noted before, promotion of economic development has been 
seen as a pre-condition for the security of member countries, ever 
since ASEAN's inception in 1967. As a result economic factors have 
played an important role in shaping policy formulation of ASEAN 
• in relation to both internal and external aspects. ASEAN's role as 
an emerging regional economic grouping has received greater atten-
tion in recent years than its role as a regional political entity. 
During the last twelve years, ASEAN's economic activities have 
spanned a wide range of areas which on a broad basis can be divided 
into two groups - (i) co-operation in intra-regional economic 
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affairs and (ii) co-operation in extra-regional economic affairs. 
During the period concerned, ASEAN has made fairly satis-
factory progress in the promotion of co-operation among the five 
countries in such areas as shipping, tourism, food and agriculture, 
•science and technology, transportation and communication, civil 
aviation, fisheries, etc. All these are non-controversial areas 
and the five countries have hardly caused any disagreement over 
the pace and form of co-operation. 
However, ASEAN's achievements in the promotion of intra-
regional trade and industrial development are rather disappointing. 
These two are the areas in which ASEAN has encountered many dis-
agreements and differences among the member countries over the pace 
and form of co-operation. ASEAN efforts to overcome these differ-
ences have so far met with only a limited success. As noted in the 
second chapter, the expansion of intra-regional trade largely de-
pends on the ability of ASEAN to go ahead with a comprehensive 
regional industry specialisation programme with the support of the 
liberalization of trade based on the across-the-board-tariff cut 
system. Such a programme would enable the ASEAN countries to achieve 
scale of economies, thus avoiding thedanger of the polarization of 
inefficient small scale industries in the member countries. 
The proposed five industrial plants can be regarded as an 
attempt to overcome this problem but all of them encountered various 
problems when they reached the stage of implementation. The diesel 
engine plant allocated to Singapore has already been abandoned, 
while there are many doubts about the economic viability of the 
industrial plants allocated to Malaysia, Thailand and the Philip-
pines. The urea plant allocated to Indonesia is the only one which 
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appears certain to be established at this stage. 
It seems that the decision to establish the five industrial 
plants was taken rather hurriedly as the political leaders of 
ASEAN wanted to show the outside world that they had achieved some-
thing solid at the Bali summit. Very little preliminary study was 
done before the selection of industries and the allocation decision 
was made only on the basis of resources endowment of the member 
countries. Financing and management of the five industrial plants 
were expected to be undertaken by the rather inefficient public 
sector. It is clear that political expediency overrode economic 
criteria in the selection, allocation, financing and management of 
the five industrial plants and as a result each industry is con-
fronted with the problem of economic viability. 
ASEAN has so far failed to reach an agreement on the intro-
duction of across-the-board-tariff cuts even at a nominal rate of 
10 per cent or 15 per cent. Instead, ASEAN has adopted a more 
complicated and cumbersome approach to the liberalisation of trade 
on a product by product basis. It is hard to expect that the pre-
sent approach will have a big effect in expanding intra-ASEAN 
trade, as the products on which tariff concessions have been made, 
constitute only a very small fraction of total intra-ASEAN trade. 
ASEAN's failure to achieve a substantial progress in the area 
of trade liberalisation and industrial development is mainly due 
to the economic nationalism of the member countries resulting from 
the existing differences in the level of industrial development 
and industrial efficiency of the member countries. Except for Singa-
pore, all the other countries of ASEAN are still very much concerned 
with the protection of their infant industries and as a result 
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theyappear to be reluctant to go ahead with regional industry 
specialisation programmes which they think will have adverse 
effects on their industrial development. 
Co-operation in Extra-regional Economic Affairs 
ASEAN has made satisfactory progress in this area, particu-
larly in the period after 1976. This progress is mainly due to 
the fact that co-operation in extra-regional economic affairs is a 
much less contentious issue than intra-regional economic co-oper- 
ation as there is no fear of unequal distribution of welfare gains. 
One important achievement in this area is ASEAN's joint 
approach towards international commodity and monetary problems. In 
recent years, ASEAN countries have increasingly seen their internal 
development problems - resulting from the instability in the inter-
national commodity markets, the growing foreign indebtedness, lack 
of capital investment and protectionism of developed countries - 
as issues which require an international effort to achieve proper 
solutions. This increasing awareness of the international dimensions 
of their economic development problems has caused ASEAN countries 
to place greater emphasis on extra-regional economic matters in 
recent years. 
As outlined in the third chapter, ASEAN's joint approach to 
international commodity and monetary problems has three aspects. 
Firstly, the active participation in the promotion of the new inter-
national economic order goals. Secondly, the growing determination 
of ASEAN to use its commodity producer power to strengthen its inter-
national bargaining power, and thirdly, increased participation in 
the establishment of commodity producers organizations. 
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With regard to the promotion of the new international 
economic order, ASEAN has strongly affirmed that its stand towards 
the NIE0 is inseparable from that of the Group of 77, as declared 
in the Manila Declaration. Thus ASEAN has actively lent its 
support to the activities of the Group of 77. The NIE0 demands 
have been the focal points of ASEAN's trade dialogues with the U.S.A., 
EEC, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada held in recent years. 
ASEAN is particularly interested in the Integrated Commodity Policy 
as its member countries rank among the most affected countries •in 
the Third World if the Integrated Commodity Policy is brought into 
effect. The ASEAN stand is that the Common Fund should be estab-
lished as a main source of financing the buffer stocks but not for 
the management of the buffer stocks. 
As noted in the third chapter, ASEAN as a major producer of 
several commodities such as natural rubber, tin, Palm oil, holds 
a commanding position in the trade of these commodities in the world 
market. In recent years, ASEAN has shown active interest in the 
use of commodity producer power in order to strengthen its inter-
national bargaining power. However, as discussed before, ASEAN's 
ability to use its producer power to intervene ininternational 
commodity markets seems to be very limited, mainly due to the rela-
tively elastic demand and the availability of various substitutes 
in consumer countries. Nevertheless, ASEAN can use its strategi-
cally important raw materials such as natural rubber and tin to 
strengthen its bargaining power to some extent. 
The conflicting economic interests of the member countries 
is another factor which limits ASEAN's capability to adopt a hard 
line towards international commodity bargaining. Singapore being 
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a resources poor developed country is not interested in market 
intervention either by forming cartels or any other means which 
would enable the producers to charge monopolistic prices for com-
modities. Though Singapore is the smallest partner of ASEAN, its 
economic interests cannot be simply overlooked by the other members, 
because of its role in financing, processing and shipment in the 
region's commodity production. 
Recently, ASEAN has actively participated in the establish-
ment of commodity producer organizations as part of its overall 
diplomacy towards international commodity problems. One objective 
of these organizations is to work out price stabilization programmes 
for commodities with which each organization is concerned,through 
international agreements between producer and consumer countries. 
Perhaps the most important achievement of ASEAN in the area 
of extra-regional economic co-operation is the growth of ASEAN 
as a collective bargaining force vis-a-vis externalparties. In the 
period after 1976, ASEAN has increasingly developed close economic 
ties with almost all the Western developed countries through the 
establishment of trade dialogues. ASEAN's main demands have been: 
price stabilization of commodities; the early establishment of 
the Common Fund; market access for manufactured products and 
increased inflow of capital investment and foreign aid. As dis- 
cussed in chapters four and five, though ASEAN has failed to extract 
major trade concessions, it has been successful in generating a 
considerable amount of pressure on the developed countries. However, 
ASEAN would have achieved far better results had it agreed to deal 
with developed countries on the basis of reciprocity and industr-
ial complementation. There is greater potential to work out some 
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degree of industrial complementation programme between •ASEAN and 
the developed countries, in particular between ASEAN and Japan 
and between ASEAN and Australia. 
The preceding discussion has outlined the achievements and 
failures of ASEAN in the promotion of regional co-operation in 
political and economic affairs since its inception in 1967. The 
discussion suggests that ASEAN has achieved a somewhat satisfactory 
progress in the area of regional political co-operation but failed 
to achieve substantial progress in economic co-operation. The main 
reason for this slow progress, as repeatedly mentioned in the 
previous chapters, is the economic nationalism of the member count-
ries resulting from their different stages of economic development. 
As a result, ASEAN still lacks the necessary political will. This 
in turn has weakened ASEAN's policy formulation towards both 
intra-regional and extra-regional economic issues. Thus future 
developments of ASEAN's regional economic co-operation depends 
largely on the ability of the five countries to give priority to 
economic regionalism at the cost of economic nationalism. 
181. 
APPENDIX I. 
THE ASEAN DECLARATION 
(BANGKOK DECLARATION) 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Thailand: 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems 
among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to 
strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and 
cooperation; 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to 
promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of 
equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, 
progress and prosperity in the region; 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the 
cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic 
well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good 
neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of 
the region already bound together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a 
primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social 
stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive 
national development, and that they are determined to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accord-
ance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only 
with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not 
intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national 
independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the 
orderly processes of their national development; 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Coopera-
tion among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
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development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit 
of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation 
for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian 
Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect 
for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among 
countries of the region and adherence to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters 
of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, 
scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and 
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical 
and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of 
their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, 
including the study of the problems of international commodity 
trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication•
facilities and the raising of the living standards of their 
peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves. 
THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the following 
machinery shall be established: 
• (a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation 
and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings 
of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required; 
(b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign 
Minister of the host country or his representative and having 
as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member 
countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in 
between Meetings of Foreign Ministers; 
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists 
and officials on specific subjects; 
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out 
the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to 
service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, 
the Standing Committee and such other Committee as may 
hereafter be established. 
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FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to 
all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the 
aforementioned aims, principles and purposes. 
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will 
of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in 
friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, 
secure for their people and for posterity the blessings of peace, 
freedom and prosperity. 
Done in Bangkok on the Eight Day of August in the Year 
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven. 
FOR INDONESIA 
FOR MALAYSIA 
(Sgd.) 
(ADAM MALIK) 
Presidium Minister of 
Political Affairs/Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 
(Sgd) 
(TUN ABDUL RAZAK) 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Minister of Defence and 
Minister of National 
Development. 
FOR THE PHILIPPINES (Sgd) 
(NARCISO RAMOS) 
Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs 
FOR SINGAPORE (sgd) 
(S. RAJARATNAM) 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
FOR THAILAND (Sgd) 
(THANAT KHOMAN) 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
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APPENDIX II. 
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD 
A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN RATIONS. 
The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister 
of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declaration of Bandung, 
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations; 
ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the 
welfare of the peoples of member states; 
UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand 
ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political 
fields: 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the 
following objectives •and principles in the pursuit of political 
stability : 
1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region 
is an essential contribution to international peace and security. 
Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion 
to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience. 
2. Member states, individually andcollectively, shall take 
active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality. 
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy 
is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore 
intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with 
particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the 
improvement of the living standards of their peoples. 
4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard 
the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within 
their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress. 
5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their 
national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as 
possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the 
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complementarity of their respective economies. 
6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall 
rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-
regional differences. 
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, 
to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooper-
ation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual 
respect and mutual benefit. 
8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of 
regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN 
community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis 
of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the 
principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of nations. 
I 
AND DO HEREBY ADOPT' 
The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN 
cooperation : 
A. Political 
1. Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states 
as and when necessary. 
2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia. 
3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means 
as soon as possible. 
4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition 
of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever 
possible. 
5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political 
cooperation. 
6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the 
possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty; 
7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the 
harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and 
desirable, taking common actions. 
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B. Economic 
1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and 
Energy 
(i) Member states shall assist each other by according 
priority to the supply of the individual country's 
needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the 
acquisition of exports from member states, in respect 
of basic commodities, particularly food and energy. 
(ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation • in 
the production of basic commodities particularly food 
and energy in the individual member states of the 
region. 
2. Industrial Cooperation 
(i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale 
ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet 
regional requirements of essential commodities. 
(ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the 
available materials in the member states, contribute 
to the increase of food production, increase foreign 
exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create 
employment. 
3. Cooperation in Trade 
(i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade 
in order to promote development and growth of new 
production and trade and to improve the trade structures 
of individual states and among countries of ASEAN 
conducive to further development and to safeguard and 
increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves. 
Member states shall progress towards the establishment 
of preferential trading arrangements as a long term 
objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular 
time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject 
to the unanimous agreement of member states. 
(iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be 
facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, 
particularly in food and energy and through cooperation 
in ASEAN industrial projects. 
(iv) Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve 
access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material 
and finished products by seeking the elimination of all 
trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage 
• for these products and in adopting common approaches 
and actions in dealing with regional groupings and 
individual economic powers. 
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(v) Such efforts shall also lead to co-operation in the 
field of technology and production methods in order 
to increase the production and to improve the quality 
of export products, as well as to develop new export 
products with a view to diversifying exports. 
4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and 
Other World Economic Problems 
(i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also 
be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to 
international commodity problems and other world 
economic problems such as the reform of international 
trading system, the reform of international monetary 
system and transfer of real resources, in the United 
Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a 
view to contributing to the establishment of the New 
International Economic Order. 
i) Member states shall give priority to the stabilisation 
and increase of export earnings of those commodities 
produced and exported by them through commodity agree-
ments including bufferstock schemes and other means. 
5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation 
Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held 
regularly or as deemed necessary in order to: 
(i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of. 
Governments of member states for the strengpening 
of ASEAN economic cooperation; 
(ii) review the coordination and implementation of agreed 
ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation; 
(iii) exchange views and consult on national development 
plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing 
regional development; and 
perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon 
by the member Governments. 
C. Social 
1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with 
emphasis on the well being of the low-income group and of the 
rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for 
productive employment with fair remuneration. 
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2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and 
levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, 
in development efforts. 
3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation 
in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, 
and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration 
with appropriate international agencies. 
4. Intensification of cooperation among member states 
as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention 
and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal 
trafficking of drugs. 
D. Cultural and Information 
1. Introducion of the study of ASEAN, its member states 
and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools 
and other institutions of learning in the member states. 
2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass 
media representatives to enable them to play an active role in 
fostering a sense of regional identify and fellowship. 
3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer 
collaboration among national institutes. 
E. Security 
Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the 
member states in security matters in accordance with their 
mutual needs and interests. 
F. Improvement of ASEAN machinery 
1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Secretariat. 
2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure 
with a view to improving its effectiveness. 
3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional 
framework for ASEAN. 
DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in 
the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six. 
For the Republic of Indonesia (Sgd)  
Soeharto, 
President 
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For Malaysia (Sgd)  
Datuk Hussein Onn, 
Prime Minister 
For the Republic of 
the Philippines (Sgd)  
Ferdinand E. Marcos 
President 
For the Republic of 
Singapore (Sgd)  
Lee Kuan Yew 
Prime Minister 
For the Kingdom of Thailand (sgd)  
Kukrit Pramoj, 
Prime Minister 
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APPENDIX III. 
TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION 
IN . SOUTHEAST ASIA 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties: 
CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, 
which have bound their peoples together; 
ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law and enhancing regional 
resilience in their relations; 
DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on 
matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles 
adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, 
the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed 
in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala 
Lumpur on 27 November 1971; 
CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between 
their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and 
sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which 
might endanger or hinder cooperation; 
• BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving 
nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance 
of world peace, stability and harmony; 
SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, ever-
lasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contri-
bute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. 
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Article 2 
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties 
shall be guided by the following fundamental principles: 
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; 
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence 
free from external interference, subversion or coercion; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation among themselves. 
CHAPTER II 
AMITY 
Article 3 
In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting 
Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, 
cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and 
cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote 
closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall 
encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples. 
CHAPTER III 
COOPERATION 
Article 4 
The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation 
in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and admini- 
strative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspiration 
of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters 
of common interest. 
Article 5 
Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert 
their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the 
basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit. 
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Article 6 
The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceler-
ation of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in 
Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utiliza-
tion of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their 
trade and the improvement of their economic infra-structure for the 
mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard, they shall continue 
to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other 
States as well •as international and regional organisations outside 
the region. 
Article 7 
The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice 
and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, 
shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall 
adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and 
mutual assistance. 
Article 8 
The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest 
cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance 
to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the 
social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. 
Article 9 
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation 
in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and stability in 
the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain 
regular contracts and consultations with one another on international 
and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions 
and policies. 
Article 10 
Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form 
participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the 
political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity 
of another High Contracting Party. 
Article 11 
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their 
respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-
cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective 
ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as 
internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective 
national identities. 
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Article 12 
The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional 
prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields 
for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of 
self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and 
solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable 
community of nations in Southeast Asia. 
CHAPTER IV 
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Article 13 
The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and 
good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on 
matters directly affecting them shall refrain from the threat or use 
of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves 
through friendly negotiations. 
Article 14 
To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contract-
ing Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council 
comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High 
Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes 
or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. 
Article 15 
4 
In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, 
the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation 
and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of•
settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. 
The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement 
of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of medi- 
ation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council 
shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deteriora-
tion of the.dispute.or the situation. 
Article 16 
The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a 
dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application• 
to the dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contract-
ing Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assist-
ance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be 
well disposed towards such offers of assistance. 
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Article 17 
Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes 
of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter 
of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are 
parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives 
•to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the 
other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 18 
This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of 
Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified 
in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each 
signatory State. 
It shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast 
Asia. 
Article 19 
This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit 
of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of 
the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this 
Treaty and of the instruments of ratification or accession. 
Article 20 
This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the 
High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. 
There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the 
English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common 
text shall be settled by negotiation. 
IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed 
the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals. 
DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February 
in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six. 
Untuk Republik Indonesia 
Bagi Pihak Republik Indonesia • 
Para sa Republika ng Indonesya• 
• For the Republic of Indonesia 
 
Soehart o, 
President. 
• Untuk Malaysia 
Bagi Pihak Malaysia 
Para sa Malaysia 
For Malaysia 
Datuk Hussein Onn, 
Prime Minister 
Untuk Republik Pilipina 
Bagi Pihak Republik Filipina 
Para sa Republika ng Pilipinas 
For The Republic of the Philippines  
Ferdinand E. Marcos, 
President 
Untuk Republik Singapur .a 
Bagi Pihak Republik Singapura 
Para .sa Republika ng Singapore 
For The Republic of Singapore 
Lee Kuan Yew, 
Prime Minister 
Untuk Kerajaan Thailand 
Bagi Pihak Thailand 
Para sa Kaharian ng Thailand 
For the Kingdom of Thailand 
Kukrit Pramoj, 
Prime Minister 
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APPENDIX IV. 
THE KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION  
WE the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of 
Thailand; 
FIRMLY believing in the merits of regional cooperation which 
has drawn our countries to cooperate together in the economic, social 
and cultural fields in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; 
DESIROUS of bringing about a relaxation of international tension 
and of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia; 
INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, 
in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states, abstention from the threat or 
use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal 
rights and self-determination and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States; 
BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the 
Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" of the Bandung Conference 
of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states 
may coexist peacefully; 
RECOGNIZING the right of every state,large or small, to lead 
its national existence free from outside interference in its internal af-
fairsas this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independ-
ence and integrity; 
DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence 
unimpaired; 
BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new develop-
ments by cooperating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both 
within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, 
stability and harmony; 
COGNIZANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-
free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a 
nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security 
by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tensions; 
REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok 
Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of 
Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the 
economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful 
and progressive national development, and that they are determined to 
ensure their stability and security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities 
in accordance with ideals and aspirations of their peoples"; 
AGREEING that the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable 
objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing 
about its realization, and 
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CONVINCED that the time is propitous for joint action to give 
effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the people of 
Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability 
indispensable to their independence and their economic and social 
well-being; 
DO HEREBY STATE 
(1) That Indonesia, Malaysia,the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary 
efforts to secure recognition of, and respect for, 
Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 
free from any form or manner of interference by outside 
Powers; 
(2) that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted 
• efforts to broaden the areas •of cooperation which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer 
relationship. 
Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November, 1971. 
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